Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Brown, 43854

• Citation: 254 Miss. 685,182 So.2d 384
• Decision Date: 31 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 43854,43854
• Parties: PEARL RIVER VALLEY WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT v. Floyd T. BROWN and Mrs. Amie Brown.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

Page 384

182 So.2d 384

254 Miss. 685

PEARL RIVER VALLEY WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT v. Floyd T. BROWN and Mrs. Amie Brown.

No. 43854.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 31, 1966.

Clifford C. Chittim, John H. Stennis, Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam, Jackson, for appellant.

W. D. Coleman, Dan M. Lee, Jackson, Boyd, Holifield & Harper, Laurel, for appellees.

RODGERS, Justice:

The Pearl River Valley Water Supply District (hereafter called District) was organized under Chapter 197, Mississippi Laws 1958, for the purpose of construction and development of a water reservoir, and the authority to acquire by eminent domain proceedings the land necessary for the construction and protection of the reservoir. On June 13, 1962, the District filed petitions in the Special Court of Eminent Domain in Madison County, Mississippi, to acquire for public use seven parcels of land. Two of these parcels of land containing five acres each designated as 'Tracts I and J' were owned by Mrs. Amie Brown. The remaining five tracts, 'A, B, C, D and E' composing 204.1 acres were owned by Floyd T. Brown. It appears that originally four suits were brought by the District, in which separate trials, verdicts and judgments were had to acquire 630.2 acres belonging to various members of the Brown family, but which were operated as one farm unit, and leased by Mrs. Amie Brown and J. Leland Brown. Appeals were instituted in all of these suits, but judgments were entered here November 22, 1965, dismissing No. 43.758 styled Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. F. Stanton Brown, and No. 43,759 styled Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. J. Leland Brown and Mrs. Amie Brown.

After the suits were filed to acquire the property belonging to the Brown family, the appellees here filed petitions for writs of prohibition to stay the eminent domain proceedings. This application was settled adversely to petitioners on appeal to this Court in May 1963. In the two cases now before the Court, the proceedings resulted in a judgment in the eminent domain court in favor of Mrs. Amie Brown in the sum of $6,000 and for Floyd T. Brown in the sum of $80,000. The District appealed to the circuit court where the cases were consolidated and tried in October 1964, resulting in a verdict in favor of Mrs. Amie Brown in the sum of $8,000, and a verdict in favor of Floyd T. Brown in the sum of $122,500.

The District has appealed from the judgments of the circuit court, and contends: First, that the trial court erred in excluding from the jury all evidence of enhancement or diminution in the value of the land arising after June 13, 1962, attributable to the construction of the Reservoir Project. Second, it is said that the court granted an erroneous instruction. Third, that the verdict of the jury was so excessive and unreasonable, and so contrary to the weight of the credible evidence, as to show bias and prejudice on the part of the jury and to shock the enlightened judicial conscience.

The appellant argues that the District should have been permitted to have introduced evidence showing the increase in value of the land because of the construction of the reservoir after the date when it filed the eminent domain proceedings. The District points out the rule that, in eminent domain proceedings, damages are assessed and compensation determined as of the time of taking, but general benefits and injuries resulting from the use to which the land is to be put, and which are shared by the general public, are not to be considered in awarding damages. We agree that this is the rule. Mississippi Highway Comm'n v. Stout, 242 Miss. 208, 134 So.2d 467 (1961); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565 (1940). We also agree that the time of taking for the purpose of determining due compensation is the date of the institution of the eminent domain suit. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 172 So.2d 196 (Miss. Feb. 22, 1965); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 176 So.2d 282 (Miss. June 14, 1965).

The agency exercising the extraordinary power of eminent domain cannot complain that the property has increased in value because of a proposed public project, until it actually files a petition to take the land by eminent domain proceedings. The problem we have encountered on this point is, not so much the rule as in finding testimony offered by appellant to show the increased value of the land because of the construction of the reservoir after the date of the institution of eminent domain proceedings.

The record shows that appellant offered testimony of an expert witness to show that land values in the reservoir area had increased from the time the District had put a notice in a local newspaper on March 19, 1959; that the witness had made a study and an analysis of land sales of a similar block of land on Pearl River so that he could, by comparison show the increase in value of the land in the reservoir area month by month. This evidence revealed a study by the witness, from January 1, 1950, through May 15, 1964, and establishes a 'median' price.

The trial court did not have the benefit of our holding in Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Wood, 172 So.2d 196, (Decided February 22, 1965), when the instant case was tried in the circuit court in October 1964. The appellant, District, contended during the trial that the value of the land should be established at the beginning of the project in 1959 so as to exclude the increased value of the land since that time, which it contended, was a benefit, or increased value, resulting from the construction of the reservoir.

We are of the opinion that the trial court was not in error in refusing to permit the introduction of this evidence, because it was based upon the valuation of 1959, and not based upon the date of the taking on June 13, 1962. We do not hold, however, that this method of determining market value at the time of the taking (by the comparison of land sales in a nearby similar area) is not admissible in evidence when it does show the market value of the land at the time of the taking.

Neither do we think the court committed error in refusing to permit expert land appraisal witnesses for the appellant to give testimony on cross-examination as to the market value of the land, 'excluding therefrom the general benefits and injuries shared by the general public from the creation of the Pearl River Reservoir.' The value test does not begin from the creation of the reservoir but rather from the date of taking. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 176 So.2d 282 (Miss.1965); Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 172 So.2d 196 (Miss.1965). Enhancement in value of the land prior to the taking may be shown and claimed by the landowner. Increased value of the land after the taking may be shown by the state agency to prove the value of the land at the date of the filing of the eminent domain proceedings, without regard to the injuries or benefits shared by the general public resulting from the use to which the land is to be put. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Stout, 242 Miss. 208, 134 So.2d 467 (1961). Cf. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Taylor, 237 Miss. 847, 116 So.2d 757 (1959).

The appellant complains that an instruction granted to the defendants is erroneous because it embodies the clause 'and you are not to deduct therefrom anything on account of supposed benefits incident to the public use for which the application is made.' It is contended that the instruction was taken from a clause found in Mississippi Annotated Code section 2750 (1956), and that the clause only relates to and modifies the phrase 'but also for damages, if any, which may result to him as a consequence of the taking.' It is said that the clause only refers to a partial taking and is not applicable here because all of the land belonging to defendants was acquired. A careful study of the foregoing code section will show that the clause set out in the instruction is applicable, whether a part or all of the property of a landowner is acquired for public use.

Moreover, since the date of the filing of the eminent domain proceeding is the date when the fair market value of the property is to be determined, the landowner is not entitled to the increased value of the property after that date. He is then entitled to the value of the land acquired.

The instruction would have been correct if the jury had been properly informed of the date when the fair market value was to have been determined.

We do not, therefore, find any merit in the first two assignments of error above set out and presented on this appeal, but the final assignment of error is well-taken and requires a reversal of this case. Appellant contends the verdicts of the jury were so excessive as to indicate bias and prejudice on the part of the jury.

The District offered testimony to show that the land taken was good, ordinary rolling land, with scattered trees. Some was used principally for cattle grazing, some for farming, and a small part was submarginal. The major portion of the land is below contour 298 feet above sea level, and was...