Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1945
• Citation: 58 N.E.2d 825,317 Mass. 529
• Parties: PEARL v. WILLIAM FILENE'S SONS CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

317 Mass. 529

58 N.E.2d 825

PEARL

v.WILLIAM FILENE'S SONS CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 4, 1945.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Williams, Judge.

Action of contract or tort by Morey Pearl against William Filene's Sons Company for personal injuries to plaintiff's wife because of defendant's breach of warranty in sale of a permanent wave set to her and fraud in inducing her to purchase the set. A motion to order a verdict for defendant was granted, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.A. J. Zimmerman and S. Zimmerman, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

W. L. Allen, of Boston, for defendant.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, RONAN, and WILKINS, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an action of contract or tort in which the plaintiff seeks to recover consequential damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by his wife, which, as alleged in the first count of the declaration, resulted from a breach of warranty in the sale by the defendant of a permanent wave set to her, and, as alleged in the second count, arose because of fraud and deceit of the defendant which induced her to purchase the set. The plaintiff excepted to the granting of a motion that a verdict be ordered for the defendant.

There was evidence that the plaintiff's wife, after witnessing a demonstration of a permanent hair wave set, took off her hat, showed her hair to the defendant's clerk, informed him that her hair had been bleached for a number of years, and inquired if the set could be safely used on her hair. He replied that the set could be used on any kind of hair whether dyed or bleached, and that it was perfectly safe and harmless. She then purchased and paid for the set. When she removed the curlers after using the set, her hair broke off where they had been applied, leaving it only two or three inches long. She had before this occurrence bleached her hair every five or six weeks for ten or twelve years and had oil shampoos every week to offset the effect of the bleaching rinses in order to prevent her hair from becoming brittle. She received no medical treatment as a result of using the set but continued to receive the same treatments from her hairdresser as she had received for years, with the addition of certain treatments known as a mange cure to stimulate the growth of her hair. The wife gave notice to the defendant of a breach of warranty, brought an action for breach of warranty and for deceit, and recovered a judgment on the count for breach of warranty. The plaintiff does not contend that the money used for the purchase of the set was his money or money furnished by him for this purpose. Neither did he introduce any evidence that he had given any notice of breach of warranty to the defendant.

The plaintiff could not recover upon the first count for breach of warranty arising from the sale of the set to his wife. She and not he was the buyer. There was no contractual relation between the defendant and him with reference to the sale of the set, and in this respect he stood as a stranger to the defendant. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785, L.R.A.1916D, 1006;Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass. 339, 161 N.E. 245;Groce v. First National Stores Inc., 268 Mass. 210, 167 N.E. 308;Cleary v. First National Stores, Inc., 291 Mass. 172, 196 N.E. 868. The case differs from Sherlag v. Kelley, 200 Mass. 232, 86 N.E. 293, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 633, 128 Am.St.Rep. 414, and Paradis v. A. L. Nichols Co., 299 Mass. 364, 12 N.E.2d 863, where the husband was allowed to recover consequential damages on account of personal injuries sustained by his wife which were caused by a breach of a contract which he made with the defendant. In any event, the plaintiff could not maintain an action of contract for breach of warranty against the seller of the set, even if it could be assumed in his favor that in some way he became a party to the transaction, because he failed to give the seller the notice required by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 106, § 38. Putnam v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 304 Mass. 364, 23 N.E.2d 866;Bruns v. Jordan Marsh Co., 305 Mass. 437, 26 N.E.2d 368. Compare Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467, 472, 120 N.E. 126.

If he cannot recover in contract, then he contends that he can recover in an action for deceit. It is true that one may sue in tort as well as in contract for a false warranty. Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N.E.2d 465. That principle does not aid the plaintiff, because there can be no breach of warranty where there is no privity of contract. It was assumed in Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397,1 L.R.A. 429, and settled in Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Association, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95, that a husband could recover in an action of tort for damages sustained by him on account of the illness of his wife and children resulting from false representations made to him, which in the first case induced him to hire a tenement containing an unsanitary plumbing system and in the second case to purchase a bottle of a malt preparation which was unwholesome and unfit to drink. The representations in those cases were made to the husband, but in the instant case they were made to the wife who was acting in her own behalf and not as agent of her husband. He does not and could not on this record contend that he was the party defrauded. We assume, however, that a husband may recover consequential damages arising from a personal injury suffered by his wife on account of a fraud practised on her by a third person. The fact that the wife did not maintain her action against this third person for deceit would not bar the husband from maintaining an action for the same deceit for the purpose of recovering consequential damages. His rights are derivative in the sense that they are acquired through the marital relation but he has a cause of action independent of hers; and while his rights are not affected by the judgment entered in her case, he cannot recover unless he proves that she had a good cause of action for deceit. Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347,48 Am.Dec. 671;Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632;Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10.

The plaintiff did not furnish any medical care to his wife. Her injury, which seems to have been...