Pearson v. Townsend

• Decision Date: 19 July 1973
• Docket Number: 72-1296 and 72-1427.,Civ. A. No. 72-1086
• Citation: 362 F. Supp. 207
• Parties: James PEARSON, Plaintiff, v. Harvey TOWNSEND et al., Defendants. Jimmy HEARDE, Plaintiff, v. MEMBERS OF the INMATE ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE et al., Defendants. Jimmy HEARDE, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

362 F. Supp. 207

James PEARSON, Plaintiff, v. Harvey TOWNSEND et al., Defendants.

Jimmy HEARDE, Plaintiff, v. MEMBERS OF the INMATE ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE et al., Defendants.

Jimmy HEARDE, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 72-1086, 72-1296 and 72-1427.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

July 19, 1973.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert R. Madama, Jr., Legal Aid Service Agcy., Richard James Whitaker, S. C. Council on Human Relations, Herbert E. Buhl, III, American Civil Liberties Union, Columbia, S. C., for plaintiffs.

Daniel McLeod, Atty. Gen. of S. C., Columbia, S. C., for defendants.

ORDER

SIMONS, District Judge.

Is an inmate confined in a state penal institution entitled to due process of law when he is charged with an infraction of the institution's rules? If so, how much due process must be afforded him? These are the broad general issues raised in these actions.

These matters have all been brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by which plaintiffs generally allege that they have been deprived, under color of state law, of certain privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Both plaintiffs contend that as a result of actions taken by the Inmate Adjustment Committee of the Central Correctional Institution, South Carolina Department of Corrections, they have been disciplined by being removed from the prisoner classification they formerly enjoyed and placed in a more restrictive status. Plaintiff Hearde's "sentence" also included one to fifteen days in punitive segregation and nine months in administrative segregation. They argue that before such deprivations may be visited upon them, they should be afforded a hearing comporting with minimal standards of due process. Generally they seek declaratory relief to the effect that they have not been afforded such due process, and injunctive relief to the effect that the defendants may not further discipline them and their fellow inmates without adequate due process hearings. They further contend that the due process provisions of the Inmate Guide of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, which governs disciplinary proceedings against all prison inmates is constitutionally deficient. Civil Action 72-1296 is brought as a class action; in civil action 72-1427 plaintiff Hearde seeks monetary damages from the defendants, alleging the same factual basis which gives rise to civil action 72-1296.

As these actions involve common questions of law, they were consolidated by Order of March 19, 1973, pursuant to Rule 42(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Legal Aid attorneys who were already representing Hearde in 72-1296 were likewise appointed to represent him in 72-1427 and Pearson in 72-1086. Although attorneys for the parties indicated to the court at one time that there were no substantial issues of fact in dispute, attorneys for plaintiffs desired to present evidence to give the court an in-depth view of the circumstances giving rise to this litigation. Accordingly, a full evidentiary hearing was held before me in Aiken on April 4, 1973. Thereafter attorneys for the parties submitted proposed Orders and briefs.

I

On July 9, 1972, plaintiff Hearde¹ was leaving his work in the Prison Industries section of Central Correctional Institution, carrying a rolled-up pair of trousers in his hand, when he was subjected to a "shakedown" by J. V. Taylor, a corrections officer. Officer Taylor found a knife concealed in the pants and charged Hearde with possession of contraband, a "major violation" of the prison rules as set forth in the "Inmate Guide," a publication of the Department of Corrections which is distributed to the inmates. On July 21, Hearde appeared before the Inmate Adjustment Committee. He was represented by Gene Hood, a law student employed by the Department as an "Inmate Representative" to defendant prisoners charged with violations of institutional rules. At the time of the hearing, Robert R. Madama, Jr., an attorney with the Legal Aid Service Agency, was present and ready to appear on Hearde's behalf, but was not permitted to represent Hearde. Officer Taylor, the prosecuting witness, was present at the hearing and presented his side of the controversy. Hood demonstrated to the members of the Committee that it could have been possible for the plaintiff to have carried the trousers without knowing of the knife's presence, thus asserting the defense of innocent possession. Hearde was asked if he would submit to a polygraph test; he agreed and the hearing was suspended pending the results of that test. On July 28, the hearing resumed. In the interim Warden J. W. Strickland had overruled the Committee's decision as to the polygraph test, and it was not given to Hearde. At the second hearing the Committee found Hearde guilty of possession of contraband and sentenced him to one to fifteen days confinement in punitive segregation and nine months confinement in administrative segregation. Hearde asserts that this infraction will be entered on his prison record and will be of detrimental effect in any attempt to gain parole. Hearde testified at the hearing that he served fourteen days in solitary confinement and over seven months in segregation before he was returned to "B" custody, the general medium classification of inmates. Hearde further testified that as a "B" custody inmate he had worked as a welder in the metal shop, had played trumpet in a prison band, and was able to participate in recreational activities. These activities were not available while he was in administrative segregation imposed by the Committee.

On July 28, 1972, plaintiff Pearson² was a "AA" classification trusty, the least restrictive classification afforded any inmate. As such he was assigned to work as a driver for Prison Industries and was allowed to drive Department vehicles throughout the state. On that day he was charged with making an unauthorized stop while driving for Prison Industries, possession of currency in excess of that amount allowed by the Department rules, and illegal transportation of drugs. The drug charge was subsequently dropped as a result of the efforts of the Inmate Representative in his behalf. On August 25, 1972, Pearson appeared before the Inmate Adjustment Committee, represented by Hood and another Inmate Representative.³ Pearson apparently admitted his guilt as to the two remaining charges, but pled justification in that at the time of the offenses he was selling leather goods which he had made while an inmate, and that the excess currency resulted from his sale of those goods. Pearson was found guilty of the two charges and sentenced to confinement in punitive segregation for one to fifteen days, reduced from "AA" custody to "B" custody, and made to forfeit the excessive currency. The sentence to punitive segregation was suspended. Pearson testified at this court's hearing that he felt that this adjudication by the Committee would have an adverse affect on his parole.

II

The jurisdiction of this court in these actions is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) which gives district courts authority to entertain suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state prisoner who alleges a denial of due process when prison officials place him in a more restrictive confinement has stated a claim which, if supported by the evidence, may entitle him to relief under these statutes. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

III

Plaintiff Hearde initiated 72-1296 as a class action, on his behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hearde contends that the members of the class which he represents are "all persons who have been or stand to be placed in a more restrictive status in the South Carolina Department of Corrections without having been present at a hearing" which comports with plaintiffs' concept of due process of law. The purpose of seeking recognition of this suit as a class action is so that whatever final injunctive and declaratory relief decreed by this court, if any, will be applicable to the class as a whole. The defendants do not oppose these cases being maintained as class actions.

The court is required under Rule 23(c)(1) to determine by order whether the class action is to be so maintained. In making such a determination, the court must consider whether the action meets the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) and whether it falls within one of the three categories of class suits provided for in Rule 23(b). A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow the maintenance of a class action. It has been said that subdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 as part of the 1966 amendments so that civil rights suits for injunctive relief could be brought as class actions: "The class suit is a uniquely appropriate procedure in civil rights cases, which generally involve an allegation of discrimination against a group as well as the violation of rights of particular individuals. Moreover, by their very nature, civil rights class actions almost invariably involve a plaintiff class." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1776.

A class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (4) the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (5) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to...