Peavler v. Law Firm of Krisor & Assocs.
| Decision Date | 21 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:14–cv–00080–TWP–TAB.,1:14–cv–00080–TWP–TAB. |
| Citation | 49 F.Supp.3d 535 |
| Parties | Joann PEAVLER, Plaintiff, v. LAW FIRM OF KRISOR & ASSOCIATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Michael Anthony Eades, John Thomas Steinkamp, John T. Steinkamp and Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.
Todd J. Kaiser, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
ENTRY ON ASSESSMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Joann Peavler's (“Ms. Peavler”) Motion for Assessment of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Filing No. 15). On April 8, 2014, Ms. Peavler filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Defendant, The Law Firm of Krisor & Associates (“Krisor”) opposed the motion, and Ms. Peavler filed a reply and a Supplemental Motion for Attorney's Fees. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.
On January 17, 2014, Ms. Peavler brought this action against Krisor seeking “actual and statutory damages, legal fees and costs” pursuant to the FDCPA (Filing No. 1). On or about March 18, 2014, Krisor made an Offer of Judgment on the FDCPA claim and agreed “to pay $1,000 in statutory damages, as wel as, [sic] the Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.” (Filing No. 16, at ECF p. 1). Ms. Peavler accepted the Offer of Judgment on March 24, 2014, and sent a settlement proposal to the Defendant on April 1, 2014. On that same date she filed the instant Motion for Assessment of Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Ms. Peavler employs the familiar lodestar method to calculate the attorney's fees leading to the acceptance of the offer of judgment, and requests $2,675.00 for attorney time (10.7 hours at $250.00 per hour), $720.00 for paralegal/clerk time (7.2 hours at $100.00 per hour), and $500.00 in additional costs. (See Filing No. 15–3; Filing No. 16.) This amount, totaling $3,895.00, is explained in detail by the invoice submitted by Ms. Peavler's counsel. (Filing No. 15–3.)
Krisor does not generally oppose the award of attorney's fees and costs, but does challenge two aspects of the award sought by Ms. Peavler and argues the amount of the award should be reduced, because 1) the number of hours expended by Ms. Peavler's counsel was unreasonable; and 2) the attorney's fees are inconsistent with Ms. Peavler's bankruptcy position.
A Supplemental Affidavit (Filing No. 21) accounts for professional services rendered after the acceptance of the offer of judgment and, in doing so, requests an additional $2,825.00 for attorney time (11.3 hours at $250.00 per hour) and $580.00 for paralegal/clerk time (5.8 hours at $100.00 per hour) for the Reply to Defendant Krisor's Response (Filing No. 20). Additionally, Ms. Peavler submitted a Supplemental Motion (Filing No. 26) ostensibly to clarify, revise, and supplement requests that had already been explained and detailed across the original Motion for Assessment of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Filing No. 15), the original Motion's Exhibit B (Filing No. 15–3), and the Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Filing No. 21). As originally submitted, Exhibit A of the Supplemental Motion (Filing No. 26–2) overlooked entries for April 22, 2014 through May 5, 2014 (see Filing No. 26–2, at ECF pp. 7–8) and was subsequently corrected the following day (See Filing No. 27). When corrected, the revised Exhibit A (Filing No. 27–1), requests for professional services rendered after acceptance of the offer of judgment a total of $4,125.00 for attorney time (15.0 hours at $275.00 per hour) and $840.00 for paralegal/clerk time (8.4 hours at $100.00 per hour) (Filing No. 27–1). Combined with the pre-acceptance amount, Ms. Peavler requests a total award of $8,860.00.
Plaintiffs who prevail under the FDCPA are entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the Court. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) ; Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir.1995). In proving the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the burden rests on the party seeking the fee award. Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1999). The decision whether to award fees rests within the broad discretion of the District Court, id. (quoting Bankston v. Ill., 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1995) ), who is able to exercise discretion to remove any “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary” hours, Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ).
Because the fee amount is not mechanically linked to the amount of the plaintiff's award, Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc., 927 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir.1991), the lodestar method of calculating the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is an appropriate, and helpful, determination. Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir.2010). This method may be adjusted by the Court to “reflect various factors including the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation.” Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., P.C., 574 F.3d 852, 856–57 (7th Cir.2009). In this manner, the lodestar method yields a fee amount that is presumptively reasonable, see Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) ; Gastineau, 592 F.3d at 748, yet defers to the district court's “greater familiarity with the case” regarding the reasonable number of hours expended on the case. Small, 264 F.3d at 708 ; see also Gastineau, 592 F.3d at 748 ().
The Court must exclude from the fee award any hours deemed “ ‘excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Small, 264 F.3d at 708 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). The Court will specifically address only the objections that were brought by Krisor, including the amount of time spent on: 1) drafting and research of the complaint; 2) secretarial or clerical tasks; 3) drafting of discovery; 4) review of time entries; and 5) communications with the bankruptcy trustee and with the client.
Krisor argues that the following time entries are excessive: 0.2 hours of attorney time to draft the affidavit, 1.2 hours of paralegal/clerk time for drafting the complaint and accompanying documents, 0.4 hours of paralegal/clerk time for researching Krisor on PACER, 0.2 hours of attorney time for researching and reviewing the bankruptcy docket with regards to Krisor, 0.1 hours of attorney time for receiving client documents relating to the complaint, and 0.7 hours of attorney time for reviewing and revising the complaint and accompanying documents (Filing No. 17, at ECF pp. 2–4). In claiming such, Krisor relies heavily on Young v. Accounts Recovery Bureau, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–255–WTL–DKL, 2012 WL 3764014 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 8, 2012)report and recommendation adopted as modified, 1:11–CV–255–WTL–DKL, 2012 WL 3776498 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 28, 2012), and M.T. ex Rel. Todd v. Accounts Recovery Bureau, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–969–WTL–DKL, 2012 WL 3764039 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 8, 2012)report and recommendation adopted, 1:11–CV–969–WTL–DKL, 2012 WL 3764036 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 28, 2012). In the reply, counsel for Ms. Peavler asserts that, not having ever encountered Krisor as a defendant, the charges were necessary for the adequate preparation of a complaint that could pass the scrutiny of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
The Court agrees with counsel for Ms. Peavler. Though courts have found that it is excessive to charge 1.9 hours of paralegal/clerk time to “make relatively minimal changes to a form complaint” that had been recycled against a defendant for a second use, Young, 2012 WL 3764014 at *3, it is not unreasonable under these circumstances to charge 1.2 hours to draft a Complaint, Summons, Civil Cover sheet, Appearance forms, and a Consent to Jurisdiction form against Krisor, who had never been a defendant of the counsel to Ms. Peavler, and an additional 0.7 hours for an attorney to oversee and ensure the veracity of the alleged claims. (See Filing No. 20, at ECF pp. 6–7.) Research on a new defendant is unlike research on a three-repeat defendant. For the same reason, the entries for 0.2 hours of attorney time to draft the affidavit and 0.4 hours of paralegal/clerk time to research Krisor are easily distinguished from those in Young and Todd.
Like Young and Todd, however, the 0.2 hours of attorney time in the present case spent reviewing the bankruptcy docket with regards to Krisor was both reasonable and prudent given the requirements of Rule 11.
The Court concludes that the time required in researching and preparing a complaint against this particular defendant is neither excessive nor otherwise unnecessary. Consequently, these time entries do not warrant reduction.
Krisor objects to the 0.8 hours of paralegal/clerk time spent on filing the complaint on January 17, 2014, as well as the 0.1 hours spent sending the demand letter to Krisor on February 21, 2014 (Filing No. 17, at ECF p. 4). Krisor, in arguing that this work falls in the category of administrative tasks for which recovery should not be awarded, again relies on the Court's findings in Young and Todd.
The Court agrees that the 0.1 hours for sending the demand letter constitutes administrative time that should not be compensable under attorney's fees. “Simple administrative tasks that can easily be performed by a full-time secretary” cannot be charged as attorney or paralegal time. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553 (...
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