Pecora v. Szabo

• Decision Date: 06 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-69,82-69
• Citation: 109 Ill.App.3d 824,65 Ill.Dec. 447,441 N.E.2d 360
• Parties: , 65 Ill.Dec. 447 Ted PECORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank SZABO, Jr., John Schultz and Modern Car Wash Systems, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 360

441 N.E.2d 360

109 Ill.App.3d 824, 65 Ill.Dec. 447

Ted PECORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank SZABO, Jr., John Schultz and Modern Car Wash Systems Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-69.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Oct. 6, 1982.

Gerald M. Sheridan, Jr., Wheaton, for plaintiff-appellant.

Laraia & Kilander, Joseph M. Laraia, Wheaton, for defendants-appellees.

VAN DEUSEN, Justice:

Plaintiff, Ted Pecora, brings this appeal from an order of the circuit court of DuPage County entered January 22, 1982, ordering that execution issue against plaintiff and his bonding company, Hanover Insurance Company, in the amount of $15,594.56.

In 1973, the plaintiff filed a multi-count, amended complaint seeking various money judgments against the defendants, Frank Szabo, Jr., John Schultz, and Modern Car Wash Systems, Inc. In response, the defendants filed several counterclaims. Jury verdicts were entered on the numerous claims and counterclaims of the parties. The net effect of those verdicts was that the total amount of damages awarded the defendants exceeded the money judgments entered in behalf of the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and posted a $25,000 appeal bond by which he and the surety obligated themselves to pay the defendants "any part of the judgment which is not reversed" on appeal. The first appeal followed.

In the first appeal, this court affirmed all of the various judgments entered on the verdicts of the jury. However, the court also reversed and remanded for further proceedings the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on count I of the plaintiff's amended complaint. See Pecora v. Szabo (1981), 94 Ill.App.3d 57, 49 Ill.Dec. 577, 418 N.E.2d 431.

After the filing of the mandate of this court in the trial court, the defendants moved the trial court to set count I of the plaintiff's complaint for trial and requested that the court enter an order of execution against the plaintiff's appeal bond. The trial court heard oral argument on the motion on two separate occasions. At one of the hearings, the plaintiff argued that because plaintiff's count I was still pending, the trial court could not enforce the affirmed judgments and enter execution without first making a specific finding, as required by Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (73 Ill.2d R. 304(a)), that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement of the judgments. In response to this argument, the court remarked that it did not believe the 304(a) finding was necessary to enforce a judgment affirmed on appeal. On January 22, 1982, the court ordered that execution issue against plaintiff and his bonding company Hanover Insurance Company in the amount of $15,594.56.

Initially, the plaintiff contends that the enforcement of the affirmed judgments is "inherently unfair." The plaintiff has failed to cite any authority in support of this contention, and plaintiff's argument of only three pages gives us little assistance in our consideration of this issue. A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research. (Williamson v. Opsahl (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 1089, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783; In re Estate of Kunz (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 760, 763, 288 N.E.2d 520.) Under such circumstances, the reviewing court may deem waived those issues which have not been sufficiently or properly presented. Williamson v. Opsahl (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 1089, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783.

The plaintiff's other contention is that absent a 304(a) finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the affirmed judgments. The plaintiff asserts that the limited remand for further proceedings on count I places this case in the posture of an action in which there has not been a final judgment with respect to all of the claims involved in the lawsuit, and, therefore, the provisions of Rule 304(a) are applicable. We disagree.

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) provides as follows:

"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reasons for delaying enforcement or appeal. Such a finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court's own motion or on motion of any party. The time for filing the notice of appeal shall run from the entry of the required finding. In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties." 73 Ill.2d R. 304(a).

Rule 304(a) governs cases involving multiple claims...