Pedigo v. Celanese Corp. of America

• Docket Number: 16581.
• Decision Date: 13 May 1949
• Parties: PEDIGO et al. v. CELANESE CORPORATION OF AMERICA.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

54 S.E.2d 252

205 Ga. 392

PEDIGO et al. v. CELANESE CORPORATION OF AMERICA.

No. 16581.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 13, 1949

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1949.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In the instant case, wherein the plaintiffs in error were found guilty of criminal contempt in alleged violation of a temporary restraining order or injunction, and penalties were imposed therefor within the provisions of Code, § 24-2615(5) held, that the temporary restraining order alleged to have been violated was not void, even if for some reason it might have been erroneous, and the court did not err in overruling the demurrer filed by the plaintiffs in error (respondents in the trial court), assailing the petition for citation. The petition did not show that freedom of speech or other constitutional right of respondents would be infringed by requiring them to answer for such alleged contempt.

2. The exceptions to rulings admitting evidence over objections of the respondents did not show error.

3. The reasonable-doubt rule as declared in Code, § 38-110, in reference to 'criminal cases,' does not apply on the trial of one for criminal or quasi-criminal contempt in disobeying an injunctive order, but the preponderance-of-evidence rule applies, Code, § 38-106; and if there is any substantial evidence authorizing a finding that the party or parties charged were guilty of such contempt, and the trial judge so finds, his judgment must be affirmed in so far as sufficiency of the evidence is concerned.

4. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the respondents, though not then served, had actual knowledge of the restraining order, intentionally violated the same, and induced others to do so. Accordingly, the judgment finding them guilty of contempt and imposing penalties must be affirmed.

The plaintiffs in error in this case are J. D. Pedigo and C. L Ross. They except to a judgment finding them guilty of contempt in alleged violation of a temporary restraining order, and imposing penalties therefor within the provisions of Code, § 24-2615(5). See general statement applicable to this case and six companion cases, Ga.Sup., 54 S.E.2d 240 where the allegations of the original suit for injunction, the terms and conditions of the restraining order, and the petition for citation for contempt are all set forth in detail. As shown in that statement, the order which these respondents were charged with violating temporarily restrained or enjoined them from mass picketing, from any acts of intimidation or force, and from doing other similar acts, as more specifically set out in the order itself. The petition for citation alleged that these respondents violated this restraining order by engaging in mass picketing and by other acts, specifying wherein it was contended that such order had been violated.

The original suit for injunction was filed on October 25, 1948, and the injunctive or der was issued on that date. The petition for citation was filed on the following day, October 26, and it was alleged therein that these respondents, with full knowledge of such restraining order, had violated the same on the latter date. The respondents demurred generally to the petition for citation on the ground that it alleged no violation of the said injunction, for the reason that it shows that the respondents were exercising their right of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly, any restraint of which, it was insisted, would be in violation of the due-process clause, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, art. 1, § 1, par. 3 (quoting it as in Code, § 2-103), and 'of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which provides as follows' quoting both of these amendments. Code, §§ 1-801, 1-815. The overruling of such demurrer is one of the alleged errors of which respondents complain in their present bill of exceptions. It is also insisted that the order was void for the reason that the original suit in equity did not state a cause of action, in that it was based upon mere apprehension.

The following is a statement of the salient portions of the evidence: A witness for the plaintiff testified: At 5:30 on the morning of October 26, 'a large mass of pickets approached the [main] gate and began a steady walk across the entrance * * * the pickets immediately in front of the gates were crowded four deep and numbered several hundred. * * * At 6 a. m. the first Georgia Power bus loaded with passengers stopped in front of the Chatillon Road, and the pickets holding signs stopped in front of the bus slowing it to a stop. One picket, whom the witness could not identify because of the darkness, ran around the bus and peered into the windows and queried the driver * * *. The bus turned around without going to the end of its usual run and proceeded out Chatillon Road towards town. * * * All subsequent Georgia Power busses were treated in a manner similar to that of the first bus. At 7:55 an Associated Transport truck approached the pickets at Cedar Street, and a picket named H. L. Kiser stepped in front and forced the truck to halt. Approximately 10 pickets crowded around the truck, apparently led by J. D. Newton. After talking to the pickets for several minutes the truck driver turned around and went bank to town. * * * At approximately 5:30 that morning an automobile with a public-address system drove up and intermittently during the day words of encouragement and direction were broadcast to the pickets.' It appeared from the testimony of other witnesses for the plaintiff that Pedigo was in the car with the sound system that morning, giving directions to the pickets; that on the following morning, among other things, Pedigo stated over the loud speaker, 'keep the line moving, that's a good strong line there, does anyone want to go through that line?'

Another witness testified that he stayed at the watchman's house on the plaintiff's premises from 6 a. m. to 6 p. m. on October 26 except for lunch hour, and that during this time he saw many men picketing at or near the main gate, 'among them respondents C. L. Ross' and others named. Other testimony as to mass picketing and its direction by Pedigo was introduced.

It appeared from the testimony of the respondent J. D. Pedigo that he is International Representative of Textile Workers Union of America, and was in charge of the strike which began some month and a half prior to the hearing. He procured time for a radio speech by Mr. Ross on October 25, and wrote the speech. The speech thus prepared by Pedigo and read over the radio by Ross was as follows:

'Good Evening:

'Mr. W. Y. Brown will be on the air in the next few minutes, and goodness only knows what he will say. You may have heard that we have been enjoined against mass picketing. We have talked to our attorneys, Wright & Scoggin, and they tell us that such an injunction, before there has been mass picketing, is without precedent and absolutely illegal.

'So regardless of what Mr. W. Y. Brown says, let's all be on the line at 5:30 in the morning.'

Pedigo further testified: He did not know the terms of the injunction until between 7:30 and 7:45 of the morning of October 27. He prepared the speech to be read by Mr. Ross because people started telephoning him about 7 o'clock that night saying Mr. W. Y. Brown of the Celanese Corporation was going to make a speech. Several of the people who telephoned him stated that Mr. Brown was going to make a speech about an injunction against mass picketing, and because the people kept telephoning the witness he requested radio time to stop the calls and ease the people's minds. He did not intend to violate through such speech any order that the court had granted. He went to the picket line the following morning and used a sound system, the purpose of which was to make sure that the picketing was orderly, that the crowd was orderly, that there was no disturbance, and that nobody was interfered with who wanted to go into the plant or come out of the plant. He neither prepared nor authorized any abusive picketing or abusive placards nor anything of that kind. He left the picket line at approximately 7:45 a. m. (October 26). He guesses that probably a couple of hundred people were around the property when he first went there on the morning of October 26, and that number increased while he was there. The maximum number who were in and around the street and across the street and walking in front of the gate while he was there was around 400 to 500. He heard no abusive language or violence. He did not see any truck stopped near the intersection of Cedar Street and Chatillon Road, and never heard of any incident, until hearing the affidavits of the plaintiff read. He did not see the stopping of any Georgia Power Company busses and did not know that it occurred until hearing the plaintiff's affidavits. He has since learned of the provisions of the order of the court and has undertaken to see that the order was completely carried out in all its particulars.

The witness further testified: He consulted the Union's attorney, Mr. Scoggin, about 8:30 p. m. October 25, before he wrote the radio script read by Mr. Ross that night. At that time he had not heard that there was an injunction issued. The reason he referred to an injunction in the radio script by saying 'You may have heard that we have been enjoined from mass picketing,' was because they had heard that Mr. W. Y. Brown was going to make a statement on the radio that they were going to be enjoined. He talked with Mr. Scoggin around 8:30 p. m., and told him some of the people had been calling in reference to the talk which Mr Brown was going to make about an injunction that had been issued against the...