Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-00210 |
| Parties | ALICIA M. PEDREIRA, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. KENTUCKY BAPTIST HOMES FOR CHILDREN, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the court on motions for attorney fees and costs made by Defendant Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., ("KBHC") (DN 312) and by Defendant Kentucky Cabinet for Families and Children (DN 311), and on a supplemental motion for attorney fees and costs made by KBHC (DN 328). Pursuant to this court's order, Magistrate Judge James D. Moyer issued a report and recommendation, recommending that this court deny the motions (DN 410). KBHC filed an objection to the report and recommendation (DN 417). For the reasons stated herein, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation that the motions for attorney fees and costs should be denied.
The allegations and background in this case are familiar to all involved and are detailed in the most recent Sixth Circuit opinion in this case. Pedreira v. Kentucky Babtist Homes For Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, this court will provide only a short procedural history.
In 2000, Alicia Pedreira and Karen Vance brought suit against KBHC, alleging that KBHC's policy of firing and not hiring gay and lesbian employees violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. In addition, Pedreira, Vance, and six Kentucky taxpayers brought claims against the Cabinet for Families and Children and the KBHC, alleging violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In 2001, this court dismissed Pedreira's and Vance's claims of employment discrimination, finding that sexual orientation was not a protected class under either Title VII or the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, and that Pedreira and Vance failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to their claim that they were discriminated against because of their refusal to comply with KBHC's religion. However, this court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim. In 2003, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring allegations of violations of the Establishment Clause. This court denied that motion. In March of 2008, however, this court found that the recent Supreme Court opinion in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007), narrowed taxpayer standing and thus granted renewed motions to dismiss made by the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On August 31, 2009, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the employment discrimination claims, but reversed this court's order dismissing the Establishment Clause claims. Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes For Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722.
Meanwhile, in 2008, after this court had dismissed the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims, both KBHC and the Cabinet for Families and Children filed motions for attorney fees and costs. This court administratively remanded the defendants' motions for attorney fees andcosts from the docket of pending motions, to be reinstated upon completion of the appeal process. After the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision, KBHC filed a motion for supplemental attorney's fees and costs.
At that point, this court referred the attorney fees motions to Magistrate Judge James D. Moyer for a report and recommendation regarding their disposition. The Magistrate Judge recommended that this court deny the defendants' requests. In particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the case had been hard fought by all parties, "who have not shied from encouraging the courts to expand the boundaries of precedent." The Magistrate Judge continued that "[i]t would be inaccurate" to "characterize any of the claims as frivolous, unreasonable, or without any foundation, or to characterize the energetic advocacy of plaintiffs' counsel as an unreasonable or vexatious multiplication of the proceedings." Indeed, noted the Magistrate Judge, "[p]ushing the envelope of constitutional and statutory analyses is different from frivolity." KBHC has objected to the report and recommendation, the plaintiffs have filed a response to those objections, and KBHC has submitted reply papers. Having been fully briefed by the parties and considered by the Magistrate Judge, the motions for attorney fees and costs are now ripe for decision.
II. KBHC'S MOTION AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court referred the motions for attorney's fees and costs to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a report and recommendation. This court reviews de novo any part of the Magistrate Judge's report andrecommendation that the parties objected to. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). KBHC has vigorously objected to the Magistrate Judge's order in virtually all respects.
In certain civil rights cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that the court may, in its discretion, allow the "prevailing party" to collect "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." When a plaintiff prevails in a civil rights action, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to recover attorney fees from the defendant because the plaintiff is acting as a "private attorney general" and "vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)). However, the determination of whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant is made "under a different standard reflecting the 'quite different equitable considerations' at stake." Id. (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978)). Thus, § 1988 authorizes a court to award attorney fees only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. And in applying that criteria, courts should not engage in the post hoc reasoning that since the plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. Id. at 421-422. Instead, "[e]ven when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit." Id. at 422. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that, although the plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail on their employment discrimination claim, that claim was not frivolous or unreasonable, and the plaintiffs' attorneys were not vexatious in their advancement and litigation of that claim. While it is true that this court and the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not state a claim for relief on their employment discrimination claims, that, by itself, does not mean that the plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. See Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 595-596 (6th Cir. 2003) ().
This court dismissed the plaintiffs' religious discrimination in employment claim because, although the plaintiffs alleged that KBHC made employment decisions based on their religious objection to homosexuality, the plaintiffs did not allege any facts about their own religious beliefs, nor did they allege that their sexual orientation was premised on their religious beliefs or lack thereof. Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (W.D.Ky. 2001). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pedreira's claim on that ground, also finding that Vance's claim was barred because she had not established standing. Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 728. As defendants point out, the Sixth Circuit and this court both relied on Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000), which was decided just a couple of months prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint, and which supported the view that an employer does not run afoul of Title VII's religious discrimination prohibition by firing an employee based solely on the fact that the employee's sexual orientation is contrary to the employer's religious beliefs.
But the fact that Hall contained language that was contrary to the substance of the employment discrimination claim made by the plaintiffs does not end the story. The plaintiffs have pointed, both in their response papers to the motion for attorney fees and their response papers to the motion to dismiss, to cases that, arguably at least, supported the position that their complaint was sufficient. For instance, in, Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit employed language suggesting that to sustain a claim of religious discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff need not necessarily allege anything regarding the plaintiff's own religion, but only needs to allege that the plaintiff's actions did not meet his or her employer's religious expectations. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit stated:
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