Pedro Q., In re
| Decision Date | 26 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. G006077,G006077 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re the Matter of PEDRO Q., A Person Coming Under The Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEDRO Q., Defendant and Appellant. |
Pedro Q. appeals his California Youth Authority (CYA) commitment. In the published portion of this opinion, we consider his contentions that probation conditions restricting his travel were improperly imposed by the probation officer and were, in any event, unconstitutional.
In March 1986 Pedro was placed on juvenile probation for assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The following terms were imposed: (1) commitment to Los Pinos Conservation Camp for nine months; (2) no association with members of "F-Troop," a Santa Ana gang to which the minor belonged; (3) participation in a program of therapy and counseling as directed; (4) submission to search and seizure; and (5) no use or possession of alcohol, drugs or dangerous weapons.
On May 18, 1987, Pedro's probation officer, Robert Gates, added several conditions to his probation, including an 8 p.m. curfew and a directive not to be in an area bounded by First, Bristol, Raitt and McFadden Streets, the operating territory of F-Troop. Gates explained the new terms to Pedro, who stated he understood and, at Gates' request, placed his initials next to the conditions.
In June 1987 a supplemental petition was filed charging Pedro with using PCP (Health & Saf.Code, § 11550). On June 30 the minor admitted the petition and the dispositional hearing was set for August.
On July 13 Gates visited Pedro's residence at 10 p.m., but he was not at home. As a result, Gates informed other probation officers to arrest Pedro if they saw him in F-Troop territory.
On the evening of July 17, several probation officers, including Michael Fleager, joined members of the Santa Ana Police Department's gang unit to patrol a residential neighborhood under F-Troop dominion. Police stopped between five and eight cars over the course of two hours. At approximately 10 p.m., the police detained an orange car. Because the street was a narrow two-lane road, several vehicles were backed up behind the stopped car. Fleager, standing on the sidewalk, saw Pedro in one of the cars with three other youths. Fleager placed the minor under arrest.
On July 29 a supplemental petition alleged the minor violated his probation by missing curfew and traveling within the restricted area. In August the hearing on the supplemental petition was joined with the dispositional hearing on the PCP charges. On October 19 the court sustained the petition alleging the probation violations, committed the minor to CYA, and fixed the maximum confinement at 10 years and 8 months.
Pedro contends the condition restricting his travel cannot support a probation violation because it was unilaterally imposed by the probation officer. He argues the court alone has the power to modify probation by adding new terms. We agree.
It is well settled that courts may not delegate the exercise of their discretion to probation officers. Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, which authorizes juvenile courts to establish probation conditions, provides in part: "The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Emphasis added.) The probation officer is statutorily authorized to assist the court by preparing a "social study" of the minor, recommending a disposition, supervising and, in many cases, taking actual custody of the minor. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 280.) The probation officer may recommend probation terms, but it is the court's responsibility to tailor the conditions specifically to each minor. "[I]n planning the conditions of appellant's supervision, the juvenile court must consider not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor's social history." (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 169 Cal.Rptr. 625, emphasis added.)
Here, the court never considered the modification restricting travel; in fact, it was never even informed of the change. Pedro was placed on probation in March 1986; the "standard probation terms" were imposed in addition to a nine-month commitment to Los Pinos and a non-association order. Afterward, he was released to his parents' custody. In May 1987 the probation officer met with Pedro to explain several new probation terms which included the travel restriction. The terms were written on a form entitled "Gang Violence Suppression Terms and Conditions of Probation." Those terms were devised by probation officers as part of a group effort to monitor suspected gang activities. The juvenile court was never informed of the additional probation terms, nor was a copy of the form forwarded to the court.
The Attorney General acknowledges that a court may not delegate judicial discretion to the probation officer, but argues the condition restricting travel was "derivative" of the court's order not to associate with gang members. In support of this proposition he relies on People v. Thrash (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 898, 146 Cal.Rptr. 32 and our decision in In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 244 Cal.Rptr. 254. 2
In Frankie J., the juvenile court released the minor to his father on "the usual terms and conditions of probation" listed on a preprinted court document. Frankie J. was subsequently found in violation for possessing a dangerous weapon. In rejecting the minor's claim the trial court delegated its "decision-making" power to the probation officer, we stated: "Frankie J. was represented by a seasoned defense attorney who undoubtedly was familiar with the 'usual' terms and conditions of probation which were enumerated on the preprinted form." (In re Frankie J., supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1154, 244 Cal.Rptr. 254.) Although the Frankie J. court did not orally pronounce the conditions on the form, they were considered and imposed by the court. Here, in contrast, the trial court was completely unaware of the travel restriction added to Pedro's probation conditions. Moreover, this proviso was not a standard term incorporated into the court's preprinted form, but rather one specifically designed for offenders involved with gangs.
The Attorney General's reliance on People v. Thrash, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 898, 146 Cal.Rptr. 32 is equally unavailing. Thrash...
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