Peede v. State
| Decision Date | 15 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 65318,65318 |
| Citation | 474 So.2d 808,10 Fla. L. Weekly 397 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 397 Robert Ira PEEDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Sean Daly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Robert Ira Peede appeals his conviction for the first-degree murder of his estranged wife, Darla Peede, and his sentence of death. Finding no reversible error, we affirm his conviction and his sentence.
Intent on getting Darla to come back to North Carolina with him to act as a decoy to lure his former wife Geraldine and her boyfriend Calvin Wagner to a motel where he could kill them, Peede, on March 30, 1983, traveled from Hillsboro, North Carolina, to Jacksonville, Florida, on his motorcycle. He sold his motorcycle near Ormond Beach, took a cab to the airport, and flew to Miami. He attempted to call Darla at her daughter's residence several times, each time speaking with Darla's daughter Tanya because Darla was not at home. At 5:15 p.m., he called back and spoke with Darla who agreed to pick him up at the airport. Prior to leaving for the airport, however, Darla left very strict instructions with Tanya to call the police if she was not back by midnight and to give them the license plate number of her car because she may have been forced into the car. She was afraid of being taken back to North Carolina and being put with the other people he had threatened to kill. She gave Tanya the telephone numbers of Geraldine and the police in Hillsboro, North Carolina. She left her residence with only her purse and took no other belongings that would evidence her intention not to return home that evening. Although she would normally call Tanya if she were going somewhere and not coming back for the evening, Tanya received no such call.
According to Peede, when Darla picked him up at the airport, she informed him that she planned to go back to her apartment and then to the beach the next day. He then directed her to drive north on Interstate 95, but, after gassing up Darla's car, they mistakenly got on the turnpike heading for Orlando. As they left the Miami area and the song "Swinging" came on the radio, Peede took his lock-blade knife and inflicted a superficial cut in Darla's side. In his confession, Peede described his belief that Darla and Geraldine had mutually advertised for sexual partners in a nationally publicized, pictorial "Swinger" magazine which he had seen while imprisoned in California.
Peede said that on the way to Orlando they stopped and picked up a hitchhiker who drove the car while they had intercourse in the backseat. The hitchhiker was dropped off in Orlando and Peede drove east on I-4 toward Daytona Beach. As they drove, the conversation again returned to the subject of Peede's belief that Geraldine and Darla had advertised in "Swinger" magazine. Approximately five to six miles outside of Orlando, Peede stopped the car on the shoulder of the road, jumped into the backseat, and, with his lock-blade hunting knife, stabbed Darla in the throat which resulted in her bleeding to death within five to fifteen minutes. Still determined to get back to North Carolina to kill Geraldine and Calvin, he proceeded up I-95. He left Darla's body in a wooded area in Camden, Georgia, and he threw the murder weapon out of the car window on his way to North Carolina. When he returned to his home in Hillsboro, North Carolina, he decided that he would kill Geraldine and Calvin while they were on their way to work. He loaded his shotgun and placed it beside the door. Before he could carry out his plan, the police arrived, and he was arrested. Darla's heavily bloodstained car was parked at his residence. In addition to his lengthier confession to the authorities, Peede wrote out and had witnessed the following short confession:
My name is Robert Peede, on March 31, 1983, I killed my wife Darla, by stabbing her in the neck with a Puma folding knife. This occurred on Hwy. 4 (interstate) about six miles east of Orlando Fla., in the back seat of Darla's 71 Buick.
I ask for the death penalty in this crime, to be carried out as soon as possible.
Darla's body was found in the woods. She had a stab wound in the throat area which continued into the chest and into the superior vena cavae, a second stab wound nine inches below her shoulder in her side, and bruising on various parts of her legs and arms which the medical examiner characterized as defensive bruising. The contusions on her wrists evidenced a struggle.
Peede was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury recommended that the death penalty be imposed, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
Peede challenges his conviction and sentence on several grounds. He initially contends that the trial court reversibly erred in excusing him, at his own personal request, from attending portions of the guilt phase of his trial. He argues that because this was a capital trial, he was denied due process of law by the trial court's granting his request to voluntarily absent himself. He also alleges that the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be present. The main thrust of his argument is that the trial judge could not excuse him from attending his capital trial.
Relative to this claim, it appears that during voir dire and during the early stages of the trial, Peede personally asked to be excused from trial on several occasions. The trial court told Peede that it would be in his best interest to be involved in the trial and denied his request. At one point, during the cross-examination of Geraldine, Peede interrupted the proceedings and disrupted the courtroom. Because of his outburst, he was escorted out of the courtroom until the cross-examination of Geraldine was completed. He was then brought back into the courtroom and remained there until the lunch recess, at which time he again requested to voluntarily absent himself from the trial. The court declined at that time to rule on Peede's personal request. After lunch, Peede's counsel advised the court that Peede had told him that he did not want to be present during the remainder of the trial and that he would physically resist being brought back into the courtroom. The court then took a short recess and, accompanied by counsel and the court reporter, continued the proceedings at the county jail. Peede advised the court that he was not ill, but he just did not want to return to trial. The court extensively questioned Peede as to whether he was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his presence at trial. Peede made it abundantly clear that he fully understood the significance of his waiver and that his absence was voluntary. After making a full and adequate inquiry of Peede, the trial court concluded:
Want to first note that, from the opportunity I had to see and talk to Mr. Peede in the jail facility, I'm satisfied that his decision not to be present for further proceedings in this case is a consideration or a decision that's made after weighing the consequences; it's a free and voluntary decision on his part, and it's not prompted by any illness that he may have or any outside factors being exerted upon him.
He has indicated on two or three prior occasions during the jury selection process and the trial proceedings in this case that he simply does not wish to be present any further.
There is no indication this is a temporary desire on his part or that a continuance would lead to a different decision, or if the case were continued for a while he would change his mind.
Has indicated he does realize the trial will go forward without his presence, and he does understand that.
....
Mr. Peede does realize that his attorneys will continue acting on his behalf during these proceedings.
The court then carefully instructed the jury as follows, with regard to Peede's absence from the courtroom, so as to avoid the jurors' drawing any adverse inference from his absence that could prejudice his trial:
Members of the jury, after, well, during the lunch break it came to the Court's attention Mr. Peede did not wish to participate or be physically present during further proceedings concerning the trial.
I went up and talked to Mr. Peede personally with the Court Reporter and the attorneys who are present, and I'm satisfied this is a free and voluntary decision on Mr. Peede's part, and that it's not a decision that's made because of any illness he may be suffering or because of any improper pressures being placed on him.
Mr. Peede, Mr. Peede's absence is not to be considered by you in any way as prejudicial against him. He has the right to be present or to be absent, and he's chosen not to physically be present during these proceedings.
I will be checking with him later on today, and tomorrow also, just to make sure that is still his position.
He has not been disruptive in any way.
There's, I don't want you to think his presence here would cause any disruption or anything like that. He simply doesn't want to be here, and I can't compel him to be here if those are his desires.
The Florida Law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically go to the defendant being absent. And I had to make sure this is what he wanted to do. And that appears to be the case.
Peede returned to the courtroom for the sentencing phase of his trial.
The trial court's finding that Peede knowingly and voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom is supported by the record. Therefore, the issue of whether a defendant can voluntarily waive his presence at a capital trial is now squarely before us for the first time. A defendant has the constitutional right to be present at the stages of his trial where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his...
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