Peek v. Mayfield
| Docket Number | 02-22-00492-CV |
| Decision Date | 14 September 2023 |
| Parties | Gary Bruce Peek, Appellant v. Linda Mayfield, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 271st District Court Wise County, Texas Trial Court No. CV12-04-254
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Appellant Gary Bruce Peek (Bruce) appeals an interim judgment in this trust dispute. This is the second interlocutory appeal of the trial court's receiver appointment and the third appeal overall in this case. In two issues, Bruce contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to appoint a receiver over the family trust and that the evidence is insufficient to support that appointment. We affirm the trial court's interim judgment.[1]
I. Background
The first appeal in this case was taken from the trial court's judgment after a bench trial. Mayfield v Peek (Peek I), 546 S.W.3d 253, 257-58 (Tex App.-El Paso 2017, no pet).[2] The El Paso Court of Appeals categorized the claims at issue as the Guardianship Claim the Will Claim, and the Trust Claim. Id. at 256-57. The Guardianship Claim concerned the guardianship of Russell Peek. Id. at 257. The Will Claim concerned the probate of Dorothy Peek's will. Id. Russell and Dorothy are Bruce and appellee Linda Mayfield's parents. Id. at 256. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on the Will Claim and the Guardianship Claim and remanded those claims to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the county court at law had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims from its prior guardianship and probate proceedings. Id. at 264, 267.
The Trust Claim concerned Bruce's alleged fiduciary-duty violations as trustee of the Peek Family Revocable Living Trust (2000) (the Peek Trust), which was established by Russell and Dorothy. Id. at 256-57. The El Paso Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's judgment on the Trust Claim and remanded the claim for a new trial, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to hear the claim. Id. at 266.
After remand, the trial court held a bench trial on the Trust Claim and found that Bruce had breached fiduciary duties as the Peek Trust's trustee and unduly influenced Dorothy to transfer certain assets from the trust. The trial court issued an "Interim Judgment" appointing a receiver over the trust and ordering remedies for the breaches. Bruce filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's interim judgment. Peek v. Mayfield (Peek II), No. 02-20-00107-CV, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Although the parties asserted numerous issues on appeal, we determined that the trial court's interim judgment failed to require a bond for the receivership. Id. at *5. Thus, we reversed the interim judgment's receiver appointment and remanded the case. Id.[3] After the second remand, Linda died, and her daughter Lainie Latshaw filed a suggestion of death notifying the trial court that she would prosecute the claims as the executor of Linda's estate under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 151. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 151 ().[4] She also filed a motion to re-appoint a receiver with a bond.
Bruce filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to abate. According to Bruce's motion, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Linda's claims were related to the county court at law's probate of Dorothy's will, giving that court dominant jurisdiction. Bruce also filed an opposition to Linda's motion to re-appoint a receiver, reasserting his dominant-jurisdiction argument and arguing, among other things, that the trial court's interim judgment had been reversed in its entirety by our mandate in Peek II, that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support a receiver appointment, and that Linda's claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Bruce also filed a supplemental answer, asserting additional affirmative defenses and specifically denying the trial court's jurisdiction because of the county court at law's dominant jurisdiction. The trial court denied Bruce's motion to dismiss or abate and issued an order appointing a receiver over the Peek Trust and requiring a $50,000 bond. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Bruce asserts two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Bruce contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim because the county court at law has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims "challenging [the] distribution of estate assets" and the Trust Claim seeks to do just that. In his second issue, Bruce contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the receiver's appointment. We address each issue in turn.
In the prior appeals, Bruce argued that the trial court was barred from hearing Linda's Trust Claim because the county court at law had dominant jurisdiction. See Peek I, 546 S.W.3d at 255; Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3. Bruce also raised dominant jurisdiction in the trial court after both the first and the second remands. See Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *2; supra Section I. Both times, he asserted that the county court at law's dominant jurisdiction deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. See Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *2; supra Section I. As we explained in Peek II, however, dominant jurisdiction does not implicate a court's subject-matter jurisdiction but is more of a venue issue that cannot be raised by interlocutory appeal from a receiver's appointment. Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3-4 &n.2. Bruce now contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the county court at law had exclusive jurisdiction over the Trust Claim.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). It "cannot be waived or conferred by agreement and can be raised at any time, including in an interlocutory appeal." Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022 WL 17173526, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction and whether a plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction are questions of law that we review de novo. City of Westworth Vill. v. City of White Settlement, 558 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)).
The El Paso Court of Appeals held in Peek I that the trial court had subjectmatter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. Peek I, 546 S.W.3d at 265. The court specifically held, "As to the Trust Claim, the Property Code authorized the 271st District Court to hear the issues raised." Id. Noting the county court at law's concurrent jurisdiction over certain trust disputes, the court further concluded that "the issue is not one of exclusive jurisdiction, but rather dominant jurisdiction." Id.
Bruce essentially contends that the El Paso Court of Appeals got it wrong. According to Bruce, the Trust Claim seeks not only to void transactions by which Dorothy transferred certain assets from the Peek Trust several months before her death, but it also seeks to reverse asset distributions under Dorothy's will. Thus, Bruce contends that the Trust Claim is in reality a will contest over which the county court at law has exclusive jurisdiction. We disagree.
Subject to limited exceptions, "a district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings against a trustee and all proceedings concerning a trust." Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001(a)). These exceptions include determining facts affecting the administration, distribution, or duration of a trust; relieving a trustee of duties; and requiring an accounting. Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001(a)(6), (7), (8), and (9)). When such matters are related to a prior probate proceeding in a county court at law, both courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
As noted by the court in Peek I, Linda's Trust Claim alleged that Bruce had breached his duties as the Peek Trust's trustee and (1) sought an accounting, (2) complained of Bruce's administration of trust assets, and (3) sought his removal as trustee of the PK Revocable Living Trust, which had been set up by Bruce and received assets improperly transferred from the Peek Trust. Id. Thus, the court concluded that "the Trust Claim could have been heard by the 271st District Court, or one of the county courts at law for Wise County if they were exercising original probate jurisdiction." Id. The record does not reflect that Linda amended her pleadings after the El Paso Court of Appeals remanded the case.[5] Thus, her pleading at issue in Peek I is still her live pleading.
Bruce contends that we must disregard the substance of Linda's pleading and consider the "end result" to determine whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. According to Bruce, "[t]he 'end' guides this analysis, not the 'means,'" and the "end" is "the setting aside of Dorothy's will and the [county court at law's] distribution of estate assets." Thus, he argues the county court at law has exclusive jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. He cites Stodder v. Evans, ...
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