Peelle v. Town of Irondequoit

• Decision Date: 31 March 2017
• Citation: 51 N.Y.S.3d 304,148 A.D.3d 1761
• Parties: David H. PEELLE and Baiba Peelle, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. TOWN OF IRONDEQUOIT, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

148 A.D.3d 1761

51 N.Y.S.3d 304

David H. PEELLE and Baiba Peelle, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.TOWN OF IRONDEQUOIT, Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

March 31, 2017.

The Zoghlin Group, PLLC, Rochester (Bridget A. O'Toole Of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Law Offices of John Wallace, Rochester (David F. Bowen of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages based upon flooding damage to their property allegedly caused by acts or omissions of defendant, Town of Irondequoit (Town). Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for, inter alia, negligence, trespass, nuisance, inverse condemnation, and constitutional takings. Plaintiffs moved for leave to serve an amended complaint, and the Town cross-moved to dismiss certain causes of action for failure to state a cause of action, and to dismiss all claims related to alleged flooding events that occurred in 2000, 2004, and 2005 on the ground that such claims were time-barred. Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part both the motion and cross motion, and we now affirm.

We agree with plaintiffs that the inverse condemnation and constitutional takings causes of action have a single accrual date, contrary to the implication of the court in its decision. "[A] de facto taking is a permanent ouster of the owner or permanent interference with his physical use, possession and enjoyment of the property by one having condemnation powers"

(Carr v. Town of Fleming, 122 A.D.2d 540, 541, 504 N.Y.S.2d 904 ; see O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158 ; Stewart v. State of New York, 248 A.D.2d 761, 762, 669 N.Y.S.2d 723 ), and thus a de facto taking cause of action accrues when that occurs, if at all. Indeed, once the taking occurs, there is no longer a trespass inasmuch as the de facto taking is permanent and "a trespass is temporary in nature" (Carr, 122 A.D.2d at 541, 504 N.Y.S.2d 904 ; see Smith v. Town of Long Lake, 40 A.D.3d 1381, 1383, 837 N.Y.S.2d 391 ). Here, plaintiffs alleged theories of both trespass and a taking, and "the issue of whether the entry was a trespass or a taking must be resolved at trial" (Carr, 122 A.D.2d at 541, 504 N.Y.S.2d 904 ; see Stewart, 248 A.D.2d at 763, 669 N.Y.S.2d 723 ).

We reject plaintiffs' contention that, with respect to their takings causes of action, the court improperly rejected application of the stabilization doctrine as set forth in United States v. Dickinson , 331 U.S. 745, 749, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789. That doctrine is used to determine the accrual date of certain takings claims that occur from a gradual process (see Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370–1371 ). Inasmuch as the court did not determine if a taking occurred and, if so, when the takings causes of action accrued or dismiss those causes of action in their entirety as untimely, however, there is no need to address whether the doctrine applies in this case...