Peerless Food Products Co. v. Barrows, 33967
| Decision Date | 28 February 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 33967,33967 |
| Citation | 307 P.2d 882,49 Wn.2d 879 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY, Appellant, v. Clifford BARROWS, and the marital community composed of Mr. and Mrs. Clifford Barrows, Respondent. |
Burgess & Lambert, Seattle, for appellant.
Lester T.Parker, Aberdeen, for respondent.
This is an action to recover damages allegedly arising out of a collision of motor vehicles which occurred about 4:00 p. m. October 29, 1954, at the intersection of highway 410 and Glenn Road, near the city of Montesano, Washington.
Plaintiff's vehicle, a 1953 two-ton truck, tractor, and refrigerator van, was proceeding in an easterly direction on highway 410. Simultaneously, the vehicle, driven by defendant Barrows, was proceeding in a southerly direction on Glenn Road toward highway 410. The defendant testified that he stopped upon approaching the intersection, looked to his right and then to his left; that his view to the left was obstructed by a telephone pole, but that he could see no vehicle approaching within a distance of three hundred feet. He proceeded onto highway 410 and, when his front wheels were on the arterial highway, the bumper of his vehicle was struck by an automobile proceeding in a westerly direction on highway 410, driven by John F. Cole, Jr., now deceased. The Cole automobile was thrown out of control. It continued down highway 410, crossed onto the wrong side of the highway and crashed into the plaintiff's vehicle.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to yield the right of way; and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the court denied plaintiff's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
Error is assigned to the giving of instruction No. 8 to the jury. This instruction informed the jury that if they found that the defendant looked to his left before entering the arterial highway and saw that there was no car approaching from that direction in close enough proximity to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe that there was not sufficient time for him to enter the highway, then the defendant had a right to assume that any car approaching was being driven at a reasonable and legal rate of speed and that its driver would maintain a reasonable lookout ahead and have it under reasonable control, that defendant could rely upon such assumption, until in the exercise of ordinary care, he should have determined that the car was approaching him at an unlawful rate of speed.
In the trial court plaintiff excepted to instruction No. 8 on the ground that it was an incorrect statement of the law in 'that it purports to relieve the defendant from the obligation of looking from a place at which he can see.' On the other hand, on appeal, the plaintiff argues that instruction No. 8 was erroneous because it is inconsistent and conflicting with other instructions. This latter contention was not called to the attention of the trial court. It cannot be urged for the first time here on appeal, and consequently we will not consider this particular contention on appeal. Burwell v. Moore, 1955, 47 Wash.2d 570, 575, 288 P.2d 841; Sigurdson v. City of Seattle, 1956, 48 Wash.2d 155, 163, 292 P.2d 214.
In any event we think that Instruction No. 8 is a proper statement of the law. In other words, every driver has the right to assume, until he knows or should know to the contrary, that other users of the highway will obey the traffic laws and rules of the road. Massengale v. Svangren, 1953, 41 Wash.2d 758, 760, 252 P.2d 317; Nopson v. City of Seattle, 1949, 33 Wash.2d 772, 789, 207 P.2d 674.
Instruction No. 7 provided that every operator of a vehicle is charged by law with...
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...177 A.2d 404. In general, the boulevard rule has developed differently in Washington than in Maryland. Compare Peerless Food Products Co. v. Barrows, 49 Wash.2d 879, 307 P.2d 882, with Shriner v. Mullhausen, We must assume in passing upon the plaintiff's request for a directed verdict that ......
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