Peeters v. Schultz
| Decision Date | 31 July 1923 |
| Citation | 254 S.W. 182,300 Mo. 324 |
| Parties | IDA PEETERS, Appellant, v. EMMA SCHULTZ et al. IDA PEETERS v. EMMA SCHULTZ et al.; WILLIAM SCHULTZ and WILLIAM SCHULTZ, Administrator of Estate of FREDERICK SCHULTZ, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court -- Hon. John W McElhinney, Judge.
Affirmed.
Wm. B. & Ford Thompson and Randolph Laughlin for appellants.
(1) Real or sham, fair or fraudulent, genuine or concocted, the claims of Emma against Frederick were paid, and paid in full by the transfer of all of Frederick's property to Emma on September 22, 1917, and the trial court so finds. (2) The fact of payment was one which the administrator could have put in issue had he known of its existence, and his want of knowledge of this fact, which made the demand fictitious and fraudulent, is not, alone and of itself, sufficient to impeach the judgment on his suit. Clyce v. Anderson, 49 Mo. 40; Howard v. Scott, 225 Mo. 715. (3) Instead of proceeding by way of bill in equity to establish a resulting trust against the land (which she had conveyed to Frederick pursuant to an unpatriotic and criminal conspiracy between her and him to enable him to claim exemption from military service), the claimant elected to revive her old paid claims, to conceal from the probate court the fact that they had been paid, and to file the same with an affidavit that they were correct and true, that she had given credit thereon for all payments, and that the balance of $ 9,837.50 claimed was justly due -- a false affidavit which operated to deceive the administrator and the court, the former into making no investigation and the latter into assuming jurisdiction over the demand -- a jurisdiction which, but for the affidavit, it never would have assumed or exercised. R S. 1919, sec. 192; Williams v. Gerber, 75 Mo.App. 30; Bank v. Ward, 45 Mo. 311; Dorn v. Parsons, 56 Mo. 602; Bick v. Tanzey, 181 Mo. 524. (4) The false affidavit to the claim was a step preliminary to the conferring of jurisdiction. That the instrument which set the court in motion involved none but intrinsic facts made it none the less a fraudulent device without which the court could not have acted. Through it the proceedings reached the hand of the court tainted with fraud. To thrust a thing so corrupt in its inception into court was fraud upon the administration of justice, and no judicial act innocently performed for its effectuation could serve to purge it of corruption. The case therefore possesses all of the elements for equitable action. Fitzpatrick v. Stevens, 114 Mo.App. 502; Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 648; Howard v. Scott, 225 Mo. 685, 714; Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 588, 600; Clyce v. Anderson, 49 Mo. 40; Bresnehan v. Price, 57 Mo. 422; Lee v. Harmon, 84 Mo.App. 157; Link v. Link, 48 Mo.App. 349, 354; Chicago Railroad v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. (8 C. C. A.) 799, 809; Pickens v. Merriam, 242 F. 336; Nugent v. Railway Co., 46 A.D. 105; Graver v. Faurot, 64 F. 241, 76 F. 257, 162 U.S. 435; Greenleaf v. Maher, 2 Wash. C. C. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 5780; Moffat v. United States, 112 U.S. 24. (5) A judgment derives its force and dignity from the fact that it is the decision of a competent tribunal, before which both the parties have had a fair and equal opportunity of appearing, presenting their claims and defenses, and having them fairly adjudicated. Where this is prevented by any manner of fraud or circumvention, the judgment ceases to have its binding effect, and it is competent for the injured party to resort to equity for relief. Daniels v. Benedict, 50 F. 347; Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa 199. (6) Independent of the fraudulent affidavit the fact that the attorney was on both sides of the suit, and while assuming to represent the estate, yet connived at its defeat, and represented the other side, is sufficient ground, in and of itself, to impeach the judgment. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61; Pacific Co. v. Mo. Co., 111 U.S. 505; Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438; Beck v. Bellamy, 93 N.C. 129; Elting v. Bank, 173 Ill. 368; Link v. Link, 48 Mo.App. 345, 355; Black on Judgments, sec. 570. (7) Discovery of failure of consideration of a judgment after its rendition is ground for enjoining its enforcement, or setting it aside in equity. Walton v. Bonham, 24 Ala. 513; Wray's Admr. v. Furniss, 27 Ala. 471; Cox v. Jerman, 41 N.C. 526; Graham v. Tankersley, 15 Ala. 634; Gray v. Ward, 52 S.W. 1028; Taylor v. Railroad, 86 Tenn. 228; Jaynes v. Brock, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 211; Davis v. Millaudon, 14 La. Ann. 868; Poe v. Decker, 5 Ind. 150; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 2 Story, 59 Fed Cas. No. 10406; Railway v. Smith, 91 Ark. 362; Roche v. Hoyt, 72 N.J.Eq. 945, 54 Am. St. 227.
Joseph C. McAtee for respondents.
(1) Emma Schultz, in all her conferences with the plaintiff and William Schultz, made no false statements to either of them as to the facts in regard to her claim and was guilty of no concealment of any fact or facts in regard to such claim, except that there was no statement or offer of evidence to the probate court of the execution of said deeds and bill of sale of September 22, 1917, or of the preparation of said unexecuted deed or the circumstances connected with said instruments. (2) Emma Schultz showed the deeds to Judge Lubke and related the circumstances of their execution on her first visit to him. (3) It is fundamental that fraud in the cause of action itself, or in false testimony, or fraud which was within the issue on the merits of the case in which the judgment was rendered, will not suffice to set the judgment aside. These are defenses which must be interposed in the case itself, unless their interposition is prevented by fraud on the part of the opposite party; and in such case it is primarily the latter fraud in the merits of the case, that is the real basis of equitable interposition. In other words the fraud must arise on extrinsic matters and must be in the procurement of the judgment. Woodmen Acc. Co. v. Martin, 215 S.W. 777; Dous v. Lockett, 215 S.W. 769; Doud v. Ebbinghaus, 215 S.W. 771; Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 42; Cantwell v. Johnson, 236 Mo. 600; Vandeventer Trust Co. v. Stoneware Co., 197 Mo.App. 133; Hamilton v. McLean, 139 Mo. 685; Shelbina v. Hotel Assn., 58 Mo. 327; Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 587; Johnson v. Realty Co., 167 Mo. 359; Dorman v. Hall, 124 Mo.App. 9; Murphy v. DeFrance, 101 Mo. 157. (4) Respondent was not required to resort to an action in equity or for specific performance, but was warranted in proceeding against the administrator for the reasonable value of her services, no provision for payment having been made. Baldwin v. Lay, 226 S.W. 602. (5) No collusion of any kind was shown between Judge Lubke and respondent. He acted for the administrator and for respondent with William's knowledge and consent. His knowledge of the facts was his client's knowledge. Meier v. Blume, 80 Mo. 179; Keyser v. Hinkle, 127 Mo.App. 79. And if he failed to notify William (admitting for the purpose of the argument that the facts set forth would have precluded recovery) and this can be said to be negligence, then the neglect of the attorney is the neglect of the client and he takes the consequences as though he had been the actor. Welch v. Mastin, 98 Mo.App. 277; United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61; Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 44. (6) William and Mrs. Peeters knew of the conveyance by Frederick to Emma and of the later conveyance by Emma to Frederick. They were accordingly put upon inquiry as to the consideration. If Emma's conduct was fraudulent it could have been the subject of judicial inquiry before the probate court. The principle upon which the rule is founded ignores the fact of the degree of care actually exerted by the defendant in making his defense. He may have been never so diligent but, if he permits a defense to escape him, he is as conclusively bound by the judgment as he would have been under conduct the most negligent. He must present his defenses in the time and manner allowed him and is estopped from saying that he was deceived or misled by his opponent in anything pertaining to the merits. Being given his day in court, the presumption is conclusive that he is at fault if he fails to make everything out of his case that could be made. To borrow a term from another class of cases, his assumed negligence, not the fraud of his opponent, is the proximate cause of his misfortune. Fitzpatrick v. Stevens, 114 Mo.App. 500. (7) A notice is anything that would put a man upon his inquiry. Conn. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 292; Sicher v. Rambousek, 193 Mo. 129; Evans v. Railroad, 82 Mo.App. 96; Natl. Bank of Com. v. Brunswick Tobacco Co., 155 Mo. 608; John Deere Plow Co. v. Sullivan, 158 Mo. 440; 20 Cyc. 481. (8) A party will not be aided, after a trial at law, unless he can impeach the justice of the verdict by facts, or on grounds of which he could not have availed himself, or was prevented from doing it by fraud of the opposite party, unmixed with fraud or negligence on his own part. Shelbina Hotel Assn. v. Parker, 58 Mo. 327. The administrator may waive the general Statute of Limitations and the special does not apply, as the claim was exhibited within one year. Carder v. Primm, 47 Mo.App. 306. However the account was running and continuous and the statute could not successfully be invoked. Bayle v. The Victory, 40 Mo. 244; Chadwick v. Chadwick, 115 Mo. 581.
This is an action in equity to cancel a judgment of the Probate Court of St. Louis County, by which judgment Emma Schultz had an allowance made her of some $ 9,837 against the estate of Frederick Schultz, deceased. The plaintiff, Ida Peeters, and defendants Emma Schultz, and William...
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