Pegan v. Crawmer
Decision Date | 24 July 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-2569,95-2569 |
Citation | 666 N.E.2d 1091,76 Ohio St.3d 97 |
Parties | PEGAN, Appellant, v. CRAWMER, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
In February 1989, appellant, Stella M. Pegan, gave birth to a daughter, Candi. Pegan subsequently filed a paternity action against appellee, Ronald L. Crawmer, who acknowledged that he is Candi's natural father. In December 1990, the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, entered a judgment establishing Crawmer's paternity of Candi and ordering him to pay child support. The juvenile court further awarded custody of the minor child to Pegan and visitation rights to Crawmer. Effective January 1991, the General Assembly established the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over, inter alia, parentage actions and postdecree proceedings arising in parentage actions in Licking County. R.C. 2301.03(S). The domestic relations court thus possessed continuing jurisdiction over the orders previously entered by the juvenile court in Pegan's paternity action.
In October 1993, Candi was discovered wandering the streets after she had been left alone by Pegan with Pegan's two other minor children, Tekela and Daniel, who are younger than Candi. In February 1994, the Licking County Municipal Court convicted Pegan of theft in connection with a shoplifting incident. In March 1994, Tekela, then about two years old, was found wandering the neighborhood. A police officer observed that the child had dried fecal matter on her legs and dried green "nasal matter" coming from her nostrils, and looked as if she had not bathed in several days. In October 1994, the municipal court convicted Pegan of child endangering in connection with the March 1994 incident.
Meanwhile, Crawmer had filed a motion for change of custody in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. The domestic relations court granted temporary custody of Candi to Crawmer, pending a hearing on the motion. At the October 1994 hearing on Crawmer's motion, Pegan moved to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction because Crawmer had failed to attach an R.C. 3109.27 custody affidavit. On October 19, 1994, the domestic relations court granted Pegan's motion and dismissed Crawmer's motion. However, the court stayed the dismissal pending an appeal by Crawmer. During the stay, Pegan filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the Licking County Court of Appeals to restore custody of Candi to her.
On October 20, 1994, just prior to filing his notice of appeal from the domestic relations court's October 19 dismissal entry, Crawmer filed a second motion for a change of custody, this time attaching an R.C. 3109.27 child custody affidavit indicating that he had no knowledge of any pending custody proceeding involving Candi in any other court. The domestic relations court immediately issued an ex parte order granting temporary custody of Candi to Crawmer pending a hearing on his second motion for change of custody.
The court of appeals dismissed Pegan's habeas corpus complaint for failing to certify that a copy of it had been served on Crawmer. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the cause to the court of appeals to determine if the writ should be allowed and a return ordered. Pegan v. Crawmer (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 607, 653 N.E.2d 659. In the interim, the court of appeals affirmed the domestic relations court's dismissal of Crawmer's first motion for a change of custody. Pegan v. Crawmer (Apr. 13, 1995), Licking App. No. 94-CA-107, unreported, 1995 WL 434108. Thereafter, the domestic relations court proceeded to hold a hearing on Crawmer's second change-of-custody motion and awarded custody of Candi to Crawmer. Pegan appealed the custody determination.
On remand of Pegan's habeas corpus action, the court of appeals allowed the writ. Crawmer then filed a trial brief with attached exhibits. In November 1995, the court of appeals denied the writ of habeas corpus.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Central Ohio Legal Aid Society, Inc. and Patricia L. Moore, for appellant.
Cindy Ripko, Newark, for appellee.
Price & Neel and Tyra L. Taylor, Newark, guardian ad litem, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Candi Pegan.
Pegan asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeals determined that the domestic relations court retained continuing jurisdiction over the custody issues, that Pegan's appeal was pending before the court of appeals regarding the domestic relations court's custody award, and that Pegan had failed to demonstrate that she has no adequate remedy at law.
A writ of habeas corpus lies in certain extraordinary circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person's liberty and there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29. Habeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the general rule in child custody actions. Barnebey v. Zschach (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 588, 646 N.E.2d 162. A writ of habeas corpus will ordinarily be denied where there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. In re Hunt (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 378, 75 O.O.2d 450, 348 N.E.2d 727, paragraph two of the syllabus; Marich v. Knox Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 543 N.E.2d 776, 779. Nevertheless, where a judgment is void due to lack of jurisdiction, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy despite the availability of alternative remedies such as appeal. Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284; In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 47 O.O. 129, 131, 105 N.E.2d 35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus.
In her first and second propositions of law, Pegan contends that the domestic relations court lacked continuing jurisdiction to grant custody of the parties' child to Crawmer when its predecessor juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to originally award custody and visitation concerning the child in the context of the paternity action instituted by Pegan.
R.C. 3111.13(C) provides:
* * * "(Emphasis added.)
Pegan relies on Burns v. Darnell (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 419, 654 N.E.2d 169, in which an appellate court held that there is no provision in the paternity statute for the determination of visitation rights and that a trial court does not err in requiring a father to seek visitation in a separate action rather than by postjudgment motion for visitation in the paternity proceeding.
The Burns view is not shared by other appellate courts. See, e.g., Hammon v. Hammon (Apr. 12, 1991), Van Wert App. No. 15-90-14, unreported, 1991 WL 53747 ) ; West v. Anderson (Mar. 17, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-1006, unreported, 1992 WL 55440 ().
In addition, Burns noted that "any error in proceeding to determine visitation in [a paternity] action, rather than in a separate action, may not be prejudicial." Burns, 100 Ohio App.3d at 421, 654 N.E.2d at 170; see, also, West, supra (). Burns is also distinguishable from the instant case, since the trial court in Burns did not enter a visitation order in the original paternity determination.
Pegan further relies on In re Byard (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 294, 658 N.E.2d 735. In Byard, at the syllabus, we held that "Ohio's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ['URESA'], R.C. Chapter 3115, does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over issues concerning child custody and visitation in an action for child support enforcement." In so holding, we noted that in a URESA action, the custodial parent requesting support enforcement has no notice that visitation and custody issues will be raised. Id., 74 Ohio St.3d at 297, 658 N.E.2d at 738. Conversely, the record in this case, which does not include the pleadings or hearing in the 1990 paternity action, discloses no lack of notice concerning visitation and custody. In fact, the record before the court of appeals indicates no argument to that effect by Pegan. Further, the...
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