Teele v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 01 January 1896 |
| Citation | 165 Mass. 88,42 N.E. 506 |
| Parties | TEELE et al. v. CITY OF BOSTON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
B.W. Harris and H.E. Ware, for petitioners.
F.E Hurd, for respondent.
The petitioners' exceptions mostly relate to the exclusion or admission of testimony offered for the purpose of affecting the estimate of damages. The land taken amounted to about 16 acres fronting on a street for about 400 feet. Its character was described to the jury by expert witnesses called by the petitioners, and its special adaptation to be used as a park was explained. The jury also took a view, and both parties put in evidence of sales of other land in the vicinity, and also called witnesses to testify to the value of the land in question. It is reasonably to be inferred that the strongest evidence of these kinds which each party had to offer was laid before the jury, and the rejection of other and weaker evidence is comparatively unimportant. And where there has been such evidence on both sides, a new trial should not be granted because of the admission or exclusion of other similar evidence, unless for plain error. The exceptions now before us upon questions of evidence relate to sales of other lots of land, and to the competency of certain witnesses to give their opinions as to the value of the land taken. The admission or exclusion of such evidence has often been held to rest largely in the discretion of the presiding justice and this may depend in part in any particular case upon the existence of other and better evidence of the same kind which has been or may be produced at the trial. Phillips v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 148 Mass. 326, 328, 19 N.E. 547; Tucker v. Railroad Co., 118 Mass. 546; Amory v. Inhabitants of Melrose, 162 Mass. 556, 39 N.E. 276.
1. Taking now in detail the exceptions which are relied on, the evidence of the sale of a lot by Cavanagh was excluded because the sale was made too long before, and the lot was too far away, and too unlike the land of the petitioners in condition, situation, and circumstances, to afford any aid. The time was three years and three months before the taking of the petitioners' land. The distance was about a quarter of a mile. The lot contained less than one acre and one-third. The lot was on a different street, was near the river, and bordered on a railroad. Its shape is not stated. We cannot say that there was error in excluding the testimony.
2. The petitioners except to the exclusion of Cavanagh's opinion as to the value of their land. His dealings in land were limited to a few small lots, which, in the opinion of the presiding justice, were differently situated. The court was willing to admit his testimony if there was none better, but excluded it on the ground that the petitioners had better evidence. It would seem, from a remark by him which is reported, that their preceding witness, Faunce, had testified as a competent expert. We see no error in the exclusion of Cavanagh's opinion.
3. Archer's purchase, which was excluded, was of a house lot, containing 8,400 feet, on a street, about four years before. The mere difference in the size of the lot is not decisive against the competency of the evidence (Sawyer v. City of Boston, 144 Mass. 470, 11 N.E. 711); but it may be considered. An occasional sale of a small house lot containing less than one-fifth of an acre is not a very decisive indication of the value of a large lot of 16 acres, with but a small extent of front line upon the street. When cut up into small lots, it might take long to dispose of them all. We cannot say that there was error in excluding this testimony.
4. The three house lots sold by Stark were still smaller, and were situated about a quarter of a mile away, on a street into which city water had been introduced, nearer to the river, the village, and the railroad station, and across the railroad. We see no error in excluding these sales. This witness may have been a competent expert to give his opinion as to value. No question is presented as to this.
5. The witness Brooks was allowed to testify to the cost of one lot bought by one Barker in 1890, but he was not allowed to testify to the cost of a house lot containing 8,500 feet, in 1887, four years before the taking of the petitioners' land. This exclusion was within the discretion of the court, evidence which was deemed to be better having been received from the same witness.
6. The opinion of Brooks as to the value of the petitioners' land was sought to be introduced, not on the ground that he was a general expert as to the value of land,...
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