Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago,

• Decision Date: 20 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-2589.,04-2589.
• Citation: 464 F.3d 29
• Parties: Miguelina PEGUERO-MORONTA, Plaintiff, Maribel Negrón-Almeda, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Carlos Gabriel SANTIAGO, et al., Defendants, Appellees, Vilma Jiménez, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

464 F.3d 29

Miguelina PEGUERO-MORONTA, Plaintiff Maribel Negrón-Almeda, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Carlos Gabriel SANTIAGO, et al., Defendants, Appellees Vilma Jiménez, Defendant.

No. 04-2589.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard May 4, 2006.

Decided September 20, 2006.

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Pablo Landrau Pirazzi, with whom Aldarondo & López Bras was on brief, for appellants.

Héctor Benítez-Arraiza, with whom Francisco Ríos-Rivera and Llovet Zurinaga & López, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, LYNCH, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Maribel Negrón-Almeda, Aracelis Gascot-Cuadrado, and Nilda Pérez-Montalvo (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), former employees of Puerto Rico's Commercial Development Administration ("CDA"), brought suit against Carlos Gabriel Santiago, Susana Hernández Colon, and Vilma Jiménez (collectively, "Defendants"), officials of that agency, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful termination because of their political affiliation. Plaintiffs asserted that these adverse employment actions violated their First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.

At trial, Plaintiffs' case focused on the circumstances of their dismissals at the end of the probationary periods for their career positions. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), asserting that Plaintiffs had not presented a prima facie case of political discrimination. The district court granted that motion in part and denied it in part. After Defendants presented their case, which sought to justify Plaintiffs' terminations because of their poor job performance, Defendants renewed their Rule 50(a) motion. Relying on our decision in Vázquez-Valentín v. Santiago-Díaz, 385 F.3d 23 (1st Cir.2004), which has now been vacated by the United States Supreme Court on the basis of its decision in Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 980, 163 L.Ed.2d 974 (2006),¹ the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence of political discrimination to get their case to the jury.² Conducting our own review of the evidence presented at trial, which includes a credibility contest between Plaintiffs and Defendants over the circumstances of Plaintiffs' job loss, we vacate the district court's judgment in favor of Defendants and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Before we summarize the evidence in this case, we must describe the ruling of the trial judge at the heart of this appeal. The jury trial began on September 20, 2004. At the close of Plaintiffs' case on September 21, 2004, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a), asserting that Plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to reach the jury on their case of political discrimination. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that their political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in their terminations. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 50(a) motion in part and denied it in part:

(1) All claims against Vilma Jiménez ("Jiménez"), Director of Human Resources and Legal Services, were dismissed;

(2) The claims brought by Maribel Negrón-Almeda ("Negrón") and Aracelis Gascot-Cuadrado ("Gascot") against Susana Hernández Colon ("Hernández"), a Human Resources Officer, were dismissed;³

(3) The First Amendment claim of Nilda Pérez-Montalvo ("Pérez") against Hernández survived;

(4) The First Amendment claims of all of the Plaintiffs against Carlos Gabriel Santiago ("Santiago"), Administrator of the CDA, survived.

At the close of their case on September 27, 2004, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law a second time on the remaining claims, on essentially the same grounds as their first Rule 50(a) motion. Ruling from the bench that same day, the district court granted Defendants' motion. In presenting their renewed Rule 50(a) motion, Defendants relied heavily on our decision in Vázquez-Valentín, which was published during the trial. It is also apparent from the record that the district court reviewed Vázquez-Valentín during the noon break between the morning session of the trial—when Defendants made their second Rule 50(a) motion—and the afternoon session when the district court ruled on the motion. The district court explained its reading of the import of Vázquez-Valentín in these terms:

If this case—if the case of Vázquez-Valentin did not meet the standard of proof for jury submission as to the fact of whether political discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged employment action, then this case, that we are trying now, the one that is before us, doesn't meet it, either.

The truth of the matter is that the case of Vázquez . . . contained a lot more evidence of potential discriminatory motives and of a circumstantial nature than the one that we are trying.

So under those circumstances, it seems to me that I don't see how I can let this case go to the jury.... I recognize, and I know, on the basis of my experience, that when these things happen in the context of positions like this, usually you have to look carefully, because there is always the good possibility that improper political motives were behind the personnel action. But it is not what I think; it is what the evidence sustains.

And obviously, the problem that I have here is that there is no evidence other than a scintilla of evidence to let this case go to a jury, and this case [Vázquez-Valentín] is extremely clear as to what is required. And the case before me doesn't satisfy the standard. ....

So on the basis of that, I have no other alternative but to disregard my own feelings as to what the case is and enter a judgment under Rule 50, dismissing it on the basis of insufficiency of evidence on the issue of political discrimination under this case of Vázquez v. Santiago [sic]. No other alternative.

Plaintiffs read this ruling as reflecting the district court's focus on the evidence in their case only and a disregard of the evidence presented by Defendants. If, in fact, the district court examined only the evidence presented in Plaintiffs' case when granting Defendants' renewed Rule 50(a) motion, this would be an error of law. See 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2534 (2d ed. 1994) ("A renewed [Rule 50(a)(1)] motion will be judged in the light of the case as it stands at that time."); Potti v. Duramed Pharms, Inc., 938 F.2d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Our review of whether there was [sufficient] evidence [to survive judgment as a matter of law] . . . must be based on the entire record, not just the record at the end of plaintiffs' case, because [the defendant] proceeded to offer evidence in its own defense.").

Although Plaintiffs' reading of the district court's ruling is plausible, Defendants advance an equally plausible reading—the district court evaluated all of the evidence adduced during the trial when it announced its bench ruling. For example, in an exchange with defense counsel concerning the renewed Rule 50(a) motion, the district court insisted "[r]emember, I wanted the [sic] hear the evidence as a whole."

In the end, we need not decide which characterization of the district court's ruling is accurate. Even if the district court had unambiguously focused only on Plaintiffs' evidence—and hence had committed an error of law by disregarding Defendants' evidence when ruling on the renewed Rule 50(a) motion—we could not rule in Plaintiffs' favor if, in fact, the totality of the evidence did not permit their case to go to the jury. We engage in de novo review of the district court's decision granting judgment as a matter of law. See Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 233 (1st Cir.2005). We can affirm on any basis available in the record because "[w]e are not wedded to the lower court's rationale, but, rather, may affirm its order on any independent ground made manifest by the record." InterGen N.V. v. Grina 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir.2003). Therefore, the dispositive question on appeal is whether, in light of the totality of the evidence, the district court correctly ruled that there was insufficient evidence of political discrimination to permit the Plaintiffs' case to go to the jury. To pursue this inquiry, and to provide an adequate basis for explaining our decision, we must first set forth in some detail the evidence adduced at trial.

II.

On November 7, 2000, general elections were held in Puerto Rico. The Popular Democratic Party's ("PDP") candidate for governor won that election, leading to a change of administration from the incumbent New Progressive Party ("NPP") to the PDP. Defendant Santiago was appointed Administrator of the CDA on or about January 7, 2001. As such, he was in charge of all of the CDA's operations. At the time of the change in regime, Defendant Hernández served as a Human Resources Officer and Officer of Labor Relations, meaning that she carried out hiring and termination decisions and managed payroll, with Santiago's approval. Plaintiff Pérez worked in the human resources department of the CDA, where she maintained attendance and payroll records. Plaintiff Negrón served as the director of the general services division. She was responsible for supervising the maintenance of the CDA's physical plant and equipment, obtaining supplies, and providing support for the vehicles and equipment of her division. Plaintiff Gascot was director of the CDA's management and entrepreneurial school. Her duties included managing the school's equipment and physical resources, budgeting, and planning the school's curriculum.

Within three to four weeks after the change of administration in early January 2001, all of the Plaintiffs had lost their jobs at the CDA. Plaintiffs' case consisted almost entirely of descriptions of what happened to them in those...