Pelekai v. White

Decision Date16 November 1993
Docket NumberNo. 17092,17092
Citation75 Haw. 357,861 P.2d 1205
PartiesRussell PELEKAI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Judge Iwalani D. WHITE, Family District Court Judge of the Family Court of the First Circuit, and Judge Frances Q.F. Wong, Family Circuit Court Judge of the Family Court of the First Circuit, and State of Hawaii, by the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney for the City and County of Honolulu, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Wong, Family Circuit Court Judge of the Family Court of the

First Circuit, and State of Hawaii, by the Office of the

Prosecuting Attorney for the City and County of Honolulu,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17092.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Nov. 16, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates an indisputable right to relief and a lack of other means to adequately redress the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.

2. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy where a court acts in contravention of statute and a petitioner has no appropriate remedy by way of appeal.

3. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 804 governs bail in all criminal cases.

4. Pursuant to HRS § 804-5, the chief of police, or persons appointed by the chief of police, may admit an accused to bail, in accordance with HRS § 804-9, where the maximum punishment is two years or less.

5. Pursuant to HRS § 804-9, the amount of bail should be fixed in a reasonable amount, taking into account the pecuniary circumstances of the accused and the punishment to be imposed upon conviction. HRS § 804-9 also grants to the bail setting authority the discretion to balance these and other relevant factors in determining the amount of bail.

6. Because HRS § 804-5 grants the chief of police or his designee independent authority and discretion to admit persons charged with misdemeanor offenses to bail, in accordance with HRS § 804-9, a senior family court judge lacks authority to issue a bail schedule requiring the police to exercise their discretion in a specified manner.

7. Where a trial judge has discretion to set bail for persons appearing before the court, it is an abuse of discretion to use a bail schedule as the standard by which to determine bail amounts.

Todd W. Eddins and Theodore Y.H. Chinn (Richard W. Pollack), Deputy Public Defenders, on the briefs, Honolulu, for petitioner-appellant Russell Pelekai.

Steven S. Alm, Kathleen M. Sato and Charlotte J. Duarte (Keith M. Kaneshiro), Deputy Pros. Attys., on the briefs, Honolulu, for respondent-appellee State of Hawaii.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this original proceeding, Petitioner Russell Pelekai (Petitioner) seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition (1) directing Respondent, the Honorable Judge Iwalani D. White, Judge of the District Family Court of the First Circuit (trial judge), to set aside Petitioner's bail in FC-CR. No. 93-2193, and (2) directing Respondent, the Honorable Judge Frances Q.F. Wong, Senior Judge of the Family Court of the First Circuit (senior judge), to rescind the May 3, 1993 Family Court Order Establishing Bail Schedule (Bail Schedule) that is being followed in all cases in which a person is arrested and charged with abuse of a household member.

Upon review of the disputed bail schedule and the relevant bail setting statutes, we conclude that the senior judge was without authority to promulgate the family court bail schedule and that the trial judge abused her discretion by following the schedule without considering relevant statutory criteria. Accordingly, we vacate the Bail Schedule and direct the trial judge to hold a hearing to reconsider Petitioner's bail in light of the relevant statutes.

I.

Prior to May 3, 1993, bail for persons arrested for Abuse of a Household Member in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906 (Supp.1992) 1 was usually set at $50.00 by the Honolulu Police Department (HPD). On May 3, 1993, the senior judge issued the order establishing the Bail Schedule, which set the bail for persons charged with abuse of a household member as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following standards be followed in the initial setting of Bail for both first offenses and subsequent offenses of Section 709-906 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes:

1) $500.00 Standard Bail.

2) $700.00 Where there have been any prior arrests for alleged violence against the present or any other victim.

3) $900.00 Where the appointed officer of the Honolulu Police Department has any other concerns regarding the safety of prospective witnesses or the community as reflected by the Defendant's words or conduct.

Petitioner was arrested and charged with abuse of a household member after the Bail Schedule was implemented. Because this was Petitioner's first arrest, HPD, in compliance with the Bail Schedule, set Petitioner's bail at $500.00. Petitioner, unable to post the bail, was held in custody at HPD and brought to the arraignment and plea on the following day. When Petitioner appeared before the trial court, he pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. At his arraignment, Petitioner moved for a reduction of bail, citing the following reasons: (1) Petitioner had never been arrested before for any offense; (2) he had lived in Hawaii all of his life and had immediate family members who lived in Waianae and Wahiawa; (3) although he had been unemployed for three months, Petitioner had a job interview on the day of his arraignment; and (4) prior to being unemployed, Petitioner had worked three years for the same company.

The trial court ruled that the Bail Schedule prescribed the standard bail in spouse abuse cases and denied the motion for bail reduction. When asked if she was relying solely on the Bail Schedule, the trial judge stated that she was not. She further stated that "[t]his man has been unemployed for three months. He's been living with his parents. This is his first adult arrest; [it is] unknown whether he has a prior history as a juvenile."

After defense counsel asked whether the trial court was concerned that Petitioner was a flight risk, the following exchange ensued:

The Court: And bail is set in the amount of five hundred dollars. That is regular bail. I do not have to make a finding unless I'm going to deviate from the bail schedule. It's not as far as I understand it.

Defense Counsel: So it's the Court's understanding that it does not have to issue any findings with respect to whether there is a flight risk or cannot be assured as to his appearance in Court or any kind of safety--

The Court: He's unemployed--

Defense Counsel: --to the complaining witness?

The Court: --for three months, plus there is the bail order issued by Judge Wong setting first time arrest [sic] at five hundred dollars....

(Emphasis added.)

Unable to post bail, Petitioner was incarcerated for approximately two weeks before bail was posted by family members. While in custody, Petitioner filed the instant petition.

II.

"This court has consistently held that a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is an extraordinary remedy which will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief and (2) a lack of other means to adequately redress the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action." Breiner v. Takao, 73 Haw. 499, 502, 835 P.2d 637, 640 (1992) (citing State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 441, 746 P.2d 568, 570 (1987)). Such writs are not meant to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they meant to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures. See State ex rel. Marsland v. Town, 66 Haw. 516, 668 P.2d 25 (1983). Where a trial court has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to interfere or control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before the court where it is under a legal duty to do so. State ex rel. Marsland v. Ames, 71 Haw. 304, 307, 788 P.2d 1281, 1283 (1990) (citations omitted). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy where, as in this matter, a court acts in contravention of statute and the petitioner has no appropriate remedy by way of appeal.

III.

Petitioner contends the disputed bail order: (1) contravenes HRS §§ 804-5 and 804-9 (1985); (2) violates the prohibition against excessive bail contained in the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the Hawaii Constitution; and (3) violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution. In addition, Petitioner contends that the trial judge manifestly abused her discretion by rigidly adhering to the Bail Schedule. 2

A. The Bail Schedule Contravenes The Controlling Bail Statutes.

HRS ch. 804 governs bail in criminal cases. HRS § 804-5 designates the persons who may admit an accused to bail 3 and provides as follows:

By whom allowed. In cases where the punishment for the offense charged may be imprisonment for life not subject to parole, or imprisonment for a term of more than ten years with or without a fine, a judge or justice of a court of record, [other than a district court judge,] shall be competent to admit the accused to bail, in conformity with sections 804-3 to 6. In all other cases the accused may be so admitted to bail by any judge or justice of a court of record, [including a district judge,] and in cases where the punishment for the offense charged may not exceed two years' imprisonment with or without a fine, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputy, the chief of police or any person named by the chief of police, or the sheriff of Kalawao, regardless of the circuit within which the alleged offense was committed, may admit the accused person to bail.

(Emphasis added and brackets in original.)

Pursuant to HRS § 804-5, where the maximum punishment is two years or less, a circuit court judge, a district court judge, the chief of police, or persons appointed by the...

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