Pelletier v. City of Campbell
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 2121,153 Ohio St.3d 611,109 N.E.3d 1210 |
| Decision Date | 05 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017–0088,2017–0088 |
| Parties | PELLETIER, Appellee, v. The City of CAMPBELL, Appellant, et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Rossi & Rossi and Gregg A. Rossi, Youngstown, for appellee.
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, Gregory A. Beck, James F. Mathews, and Tonya J. Rogers, North Canton, for appellant.
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., and Paul Giorgianni, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.
Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Peter N. Griggs, Donald F. Brosius, Columbus, and Jennifer L. Huber, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Township Association and Coalition of Large Ohio Urban Townships.
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, L.L.C., and Kurt D. Anderson, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Mark Landes, Andrew N. Yosowitz, and Shawn K. Judge, Columbus, urging reversal for amici curiae County Commissioners Association of Ohio, Ohio Municipal League, and County Engineers Association of Ohio.
Joseph Martuccio, Canton Law Director, and Kevin R. L'Hommedieu, Chief Counsel, urging reversal for amicus curiae city of Canton.
Andrea Scassa, Massillon Law Director, urging reversal for amicus curiae city of Massillon.
Jennifer L. Arnold, Alliance Law Director, urging reversal for amicus curiae city of Alliance.
Kennedy, J.{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from the Seventh District Court of Appeals presents the question whether the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744, grants immunity to appellant, the city of Campbell, in a personal-injury action seeking recovery based on the city's failure to remove foliage that was growing 34 feet in front of a stop sign. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the city's motion for summary judgment on the claims of appellee, Judith Pelletier. It held that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), which provides that a political subdivision may be held liable for the negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and the negligent failure to remove obstructions from them, applies as an exception to the city's immunity from suit.
{¶ 2} Because the language of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) is plain and unambiguous, it must be applied, not interpreted. Sears v. Weimer , 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. It is not disputed that the stop sign at issue in this case was mandated and therefore part of the public road. However, the stop sign was in repair, and because there was no foliage to remove from the stop sign, the sign was not obstructed.
{¶ 3} Accordingly, the city is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the trial court to dismiss the claims against the city.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 4} On August 26, 2013, Pelletier was driving down Sanderson Avenue in Campbell, Ohio, to attend an orientation related to her employment as a high-school nurse, when she came to the intersection with 12th Street. Traffic on Sanderson Avenue is controlled by a stop sign, while traffic on 12th Street has the right-of-way and no stop sign. According to Pelletier, she did not see the stop sign because trees or large bushes in the "devil strip"—what the parties call the grassy area between Sanderson Avenue and the sidewalk—blocked it from her view. Although she saw the intersection, she did not slow down, brake, or look for other vehicles on 12th Street before proceeding through it. As a result of her failure to yield the right-of-way, she collided with another vehicle entering the intersection on 12th Street.
{¶ 5} In March 2014, Pelletier brought this personal-injury action against the city, Danny Saulsberry (the owner of the land on which the foliage grew), the Bank of New York Mellon (which had initiated foreclosure proceedings on Saulsberry's property), and Safeguard Properties, L.L.C. (which had previously contracted to maintain the property for the bank), alleging that their failure to maintain the devil strip to ensure that the stop sign was visible to approaching traffic caused her injuries. The bank and Safeguard filed cross-claims against the city, seeking indemnification and contribution. Pelletier later settled her claims against Safeguard.
{¶ 6} The city moved for summary judgment against Pelletier and the bank, asserting that it is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, because the city had no duty to maintain the stop sign, the stop sign was not obstructed, and the city lacked notice of the overgrown foliage. The city supported its motion with the affidavit of Gary Bednarik, the city's park-and-street superintendent, who averred that the stop sign was 34 feet, two inches from the foliage in the devil strip.
{¶ 7} The trial court denied the city's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the city could be liable for negligently failing to keep public roads in repair "[w]here, as here, a mandated traffic control device (which is considered to be, by definition, a public road) no longer serves its purpose because of some extraneous factor," such as foliage blocking it. 2016-Ohio-8097, 75 N.E.3d 779, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.). It also concluded that "[w]hether or not the failure to remove the foliage here was an obstruction which [the city] was obligated to remove presents a question of material fact for the trier of fact to resolve." Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 8} The city appealed to this court, presenting two propositions of law:
Positions of the Parties
{¶ 9} On appeal to this court, the city maintains that the appellate court erred in deciding that a political subdivision can be held liable for failing to keep a stop sign "in repair" based on "extraneous circumstances entirely unrelated to the actual condition" of the sign. It points to our decision in Heckert v. Patrick for the proposition that a road is "in proper repair" when it is not deteriorated or disassembled. See 15 Ohio St.3d 402, 406, 473 N.E.2d 1204 (1984). The city contends that liability should not be imposed for the failure to trim or remove tree limbs that do not affect the condition of the roadway itself—and here, it maintains, there is no evidence that the stop sign was deteriorated, disassembled, or in any way damaged. It further argues that the foliage was not an "obstruction" as defined by this court in Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div. , i.e., "an obstacle that blocks or clogs the roadway and not merely a thing or condition that hinders or impedes the use of the roadway or that may have the potential to do so," 119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792, 891 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30. Here, the foliage did not completely block the stop sign or make it indiscernible. The city asserts that the General Assembly amended R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) in 2003 to clarify that political subdivisions are not liable for conditions that merely hinder or impede the use of the public road, and it argues that "[f]oliage or other extraneous conditions—not located on the traveled portion of the roadway—that merely impose a potential visual hindrance, but do not literally render the road sign entirely indiscernible, are not obstructions within the meaning of the statute."
{¶ 10} Pelletier responds that the duty to keep public roads in repair requires a political subdivision "to maintain the proper operation and functioning" of traffic-control signals that fall within the definition of "public roads." She maintains that the stop sign on Sanderson Avenue was indiscernible and that therefore it was not functioning as designed and cannot be considered "in repair." For this reason, she contends, the city had a statutory duty to trim or remove limbs that were causing the stop sign to be "rendered wholly ineffective or even significantly ineffective." She argues that this court's decision in Heckert is distinguishable, because that case was decided prior to the enactment of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) and did not concern a mandated traffic-control device on a public road. Pelletier also asserts that when foliage "constitutes an obstruction to visibility of the traffic control device," rendering it "ineffective or useless," the city can be held liable based on the exception to immunity for the negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads. She asserts that the foliage at issue here not only blocked part of Sanderson Avenue but also completely blocked the stop sign and therefore satisfies the definition of "obstruction" articulated in Howard .
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we are asked to decide whether the failure to remove foliage growing in the devil strip 34 feet, two inches from a stop sign constitutes either a failure to keep a public road in repair or a failure to remove an obstruction from a public road.
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶ 12} Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. Conley v. Shearer , 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992) ; see also Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership , 137 Ohio St.3d 123, 2013-Ohio-4530, 998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17 ().
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