Peltz v. Long

• Citation: 40 Mo. 532
• Parties: SAMUEL PELTZ, Respondent, v. HENRY W. LONG, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 31 March 1867
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

40 Mo. 532

SAMUEL PELTZ, Respondent,

v.HENRY W. LONG, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1867.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

The court at request of respondent gave the following instructions:

1. Although it appear that the plaintiff holds the note in question for collection merely, he is still entitled to bring suit upon the same and recover thereon, provided the payees thereof were so entitled.

2. Although the jury believe from the evidence that a portion of the consideration of the note in question was “pretended paper money called Confederate notes or bonds,” and that the same were void in law, and finally became worthless in fact, still the plaintiff is entitled to recover if he believed that the said notes or bonds were actually current at the time defendant so received them, unless the defendant further show that the identical notes or bonds so received by him proved worthless in his hands, or that he was compelled to take them back to whom he had paid them.

3. The plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the defendant show affirmatively that one or more of the payees of said note did after the 17th day of July, 1862, “engage in, aid or abet the rebellion against the Government of the United States,” and did not within sixty days after the proclamation of the President, dated 25th July, 1862, “cease to aid, countenance and abet such rebellion,” or that one or more of said payees was at the time of the commencement of this suit resident of or within a State declared to be in insurrection, and of a portion thereof not excepted by proclamation of the President.

Geo. P. Strong, for appellant.

The contract which was entered into by defendant with plaintiff when he gave this promissory note for tin ware at its supposed value in Confederate money, and for a loan of Confederate money, was illegal and against public policy inasmuch as it aided in giving value and circulation to these “Confederate notes,” which were issued under the authority of armed insurgents, and were used to carry on and support a treasonable conspiracy against the Government of the United States. It was therefore a contract void, as being in contravention of the established interests of society and against public policy--1 Sto. Cont. §§ 545, 546, 569, 587, (n. 2, p. 716,) 608, 610, 615, 624, 461. Contracts against public policy: Coal Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 45; 1 Pars. Cont. (5th ed.) 456-7, book 1, ch. 1, § 12; Brown v. Larkington, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 377; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Id. 70-9; Schmidt v. Barker, 17 Lou. Ann. 261; Laughlin v. Dean, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 20; Armstrong v. Loler, 11 Wheat. 258.

The authorities thus cited show that any contract which is based upon acts prejudicial to the public interests, in violation of sound morals, or against public policy, cannot be enforced in the courts of the country. Parties to such contracts will be left just where the court finds them.

No contract could be more offensive to public policy or good morals than one which had its foundation in transactions respecting the purchase of goods, sold at prices which by express or implied contract were to be paid in Confederate money.

There must have been another violation of public law, which only appears incidentally in the case. The goods sold were tin ware, and the tin ware must have been imported; so that this rebel officer was not only dealing in Confederate money, but was also directly or indirectly violating the blockade. But this objection was not essential, as the note in suit is unquestionably tainted with a fatal violation of public duty.

Whoever received this Confederate money had a direct interest in sustaining the rebellion, by the success of which alone the money could have any value. It is matter of public notoriety that the rebellion was sustained for years by the issue and forced circulation of this Confederate money. It was made a legal tender for debts. Every man who dared refuse it was proscribed and driven from the country, or subjected to barbarous treatment while he remained there; and one of this firm who now asks this court to enforce this tained contract for his benefit, was actually engaged in compelling the circulation of this treasonable currency. The note was given while he was actually engaged in resisting the attempt of the lawful authorities to enter the city of New Orleans.

Could there be a combination of circumstances which would more clearly justify a court in holding a contract null and void, and turn a plaintiff out of court, than is found in this case?

S. S. Boyd, for respondent.

I. Could the payees and appellant enter into any contract?

1. Had they been subjects of a foreign power at war with the United States, their right to enter into contract would be unquestioned; and being citizens of the United States residing in a rebel State, they have the same power to contract, unless there is some express prohibition in the laws of the United States. The laws passed in regard to commercial intercourse must govern in this case; they only prohibit commercial intercourse, meaning thereby to include all contracts between citizens of an insurrectionary State and a “citizen of other States and other parts of the United States”--Laws U. S. 1861, p. 257, § 5; Proc. in App. V.

2. This does not include intercourse or contracts made with citizens of some State not within the lines of the United States--Laws U. S. 1863-4, p. 376, § 4.

II. Was the contract in question valid?

1. It having been shown that the parties could contract, it follows that the same rules of law are applicable to their contract when made, as would have been had there been no civil war.

2. In determining whether an act is illegal, fraudulent, or against public policy, and thereby rendering a contract void, courts cannot take into consideration the greater or less injury that may result from such act. If it is illegal or fraudulent or against public policy, it matters not how evil may be the consequences, or how little injury may result; the contract is equally void in either case.

3. This contract was not illegal, fraudulent or against public policy--1 Wall. (U. S.) 73; 3 Id. 377; 11 How. 520; 17 Wend. 170; 11 Wheat. 272; 1 Watts & S. 315; 5 Taunt. 182; 13 Mass. 33.

4. Civil war existed in this country after the 13th July, 1861, and the people of the rebel States were all enemies, and owed a qualified allegiance to the State of their domicil, and their persons and property are subject to its laws--2 Black, 635. Consequently, if they contract they must do so according to the laws of their domicil; and if Confederate notes are the only money in circulation, they must base their contracts on these, and pay and receive them in their transactions.

5. There was no failure or want of consideration--37 Mo. 371; 9 Ind. 135; 1 Morris, 312; 5 Fla. 150; 1 N. H. 174; 23 Pick. 283; 2 Hill, 606; Smith on Cont. 87; Add. on Cont. 27; 3 Ind. 39; 8 Yerg. 176.

III. Could the payees bring suit in a loyal State?

1. They lived in New Orleans, which since 1st January, 1863, has been exempted from among the insurrectionary districts, and its inhabitants therefore, saving their liability to be punished for their treason, were on the same footing as any other citizen of the United States in respect to their right to a status in the courts of a loyal State--Laws U. S. 1862-3, App. III.; Id. 1863-4, App. I.

2. Punishment for treason is well defined, and prior to July 17, 1862, the guilty party, before conviction, had all the rights of other citizens, and among them the right to a standing in court; this is evident from the following: Laws U. S. 1861-2, p. 591, § 6; Id. App. IV.

3. The act of July 17, 1862, has no application here, for there is not one tittle of evidence to prove these payees amenable to its provisions. This simple allegation of the facts therein set forth as constituting a bar will not suffice; there must be positive proof of the facts by the party relying upon them as a bar. Even if it be believed that one or more of the payees were in arms prior to 17th July, 1862, no presumption follows that they continued so; but, on the contrary, every legal presumption is in favor of innocence and that they obeyed the law.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action commenced in the court below on a promissory note made in New Orleans on the 20th of March, 1862, by Long to the firm of Austin, Goodwyn & Co., for the sum of $2,323.03, and by them assigned to Peltz, the respondent. It is admitted that the note was assigned after maturity and merely for collection, and that Austin, Goodwyn & Co. are the real parties in interest, and no question arises in regard to the rights...