Peninsular Industrial Ins. Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1911
• Citation: 61 Fla. 376,55 So. 398
• Parties: PENINSULAR INDUSTRIAL INS. CO. v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

55 So. 398

61 Fla. 376

PENINSULAR INDUSTRIAL INS. CO. v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

May 5, 1911

Error to Circuit Court, Leon County; J. W. Malone, Judge.

Action by the State against the Peninsular Industrial Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Which a statute may be declared inoperative because it is clearly unconstitutional or is so indefinite and uncertain as to be incapable of just and certain enforcement, yet, if the law can fairly be so construed as to make it lawfully enforceable, the courts should, in deference to the lawmaking power, give it that effect rather than to adjudge a legislative enactment to be illegal or vain.

Legislative enactments upon the same subject should be considered as an entirety in ascertaining the real legislative intent and purpose.

The language used in a statute should be construed as an entirety and with reference to the purpose of the law as shown by all enactments on the subject; and the meaning of words is ascertained by the connection in which they are used, and the evident intent disclosed by all the provisions on the same subject.

Particular words or provisions should be construed with reference to the general purpose designed to be accomplished.

A construction should, if practicable, be adopted that would make an act constitutional and effective rather than one that would render it of doubtful validity or uncertain and incapable of definite and effective enforcement.

It must be assumed that the Legislature intended a valid and effective enactment; and the construction of an act should be such as to make it valid and effective if its language does not exclude such a result.

In designating classes engaged in a particular business or affected by a statutory regulation or requirement, it is not necessary to enumerate all the classes every time they are referred to, if the provisions as an entirety show an intent to include all classes engaged in the business or designed to be affected by the regulations or requirement.

While an arbitrary and unjust classification of those affected by a legislative regulation may render the regulation inoperative when it in effect denies to some persons the equal protection of the laws, yet the regulation will not be nullified by the courts unless it is clear that the exercise of the state authority has been arbitrarily abused in making unjust discriminations that in effect deny substantial rights secured by the organic law of the land.

The provision of section 8 of chapter 5597, Acts 1907, imposing a tax of 2 per cent. of the gross receipts of premiums from policy holders by companies or associations engaged in the business of sick and funeral benefit insurance in this state is not void for uncertainty, and does not by unjust discrimination deny the equal protection of the laws.

COUNSEL Fletcher & Dodge, for plaintiff in error.

Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, C.J.

The state recovered judgment against the insurance company for premium taxes, and the company took writ of error.

In view of the points decided at this term in the case of Afro-American I. & B. Ass'n v. State, 54 So 383, the only contentions urged here are that the statute imposing the tax upon sick and funeral benefit insurance companies doing business in the state, of which the plaintiff in error is one, is void for uncertainty, in that it does not state when the tax shall be paid, and that the statute unjustly discriminates in not applying to individuals who may be authorized to do such insurance business.

While a statute may be declared inoperative because it is clearly unconstitutional or is so indefinite and uncertain as to be incapable of just and certain enforcement, yet, if the law can fairly be so construed as to make it lawfully enforceable, the courts should in deference to the lawmaking power give it that effect rather than to adjudge an illegal or a vain legislative action by declaring the act invalid or inoperative. Legislative enactments upon the same subject should be considered as an entirety in ascertaining the real legislative intent and purpose.

The language used in a statute should be construed as an entirety and with reference to the purpose of the law as shown by all enactments on the subject; and the meaning of words is ascertained by the connection in which they are used and the evident intent disclosed by all the provisions on the same subject. Particular words or provisions should be construed with reference to the general purpose designed to be accomplished. A construction should, if practicable, be adopted that would make the act constitutional and effective rather than one that would render it of doubtful validity or uncertain and incapable of definite and effective enforcement. It must be assumed that the Legislature intended a valid and effective enactment; and the construction of an act should be such as to make it valid and effective if its language does not exclude such a result. In designating classes engaged in a particular business or affected by a statutory regulation or requirement, It is not necessary to enumerate all the classes every time they are referred to, if the provisions as an entirety show an intent to include all classes engaged in the business or designed to be affected by the regulation or requirement. See Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 656; 36 Cyc. 969; 1 Lewis' Suth. Stat Const. § 86.

While an arbitrary and unjust classification of those affected by a legislative regulation may render the regulation inoperative when it in effect denies to some persons the equal protection of the laws, yet the regulation will not be nullified by the courts unless it is clear that the exercise of the state authority has been arbitrarily abused in making unjust discriminations that in effect deny substantial rights secured by the organic law of the land. See Mobile Jackson & K. C. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78,

Section 2 of chapter 5459, Acts of 1905, provides that 'any individual or company, corporation or association organized under the laws of this or any other state or country may transact the business of sick and funeral benefit insurance for the purpose of caring for the sick or the burial of the dead, or both, in this state upon compliance with the provisions of this act.' In section 5 of the act it is provided that: 'In addition to the foregoing requirements * * * all such companies,...