Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 07 November 1912
• Citation: 160 N.C. 399,76 S.E. 262
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: PENN. v. STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.

76 S.E. 262

160 N.C. 399

PENN.

v.STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 7, 1912.

1. Insurance (§ 146^*)—Accident Policy-Construction.

Though an accident policy must be construed liberally, and ambiguous provisions or those capable of two constructions must be construed favorably to insured and most strongly against insurer, plain and explicit language cannot be disregarded, and an interpretation at variance with the clearly disclosed intent of the parties cannot be given.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent Dig. §§ 292, 294-298; Dec. Dig. § 146.*]

2. Insurance (§ 466*) — Accident Policy — Construction.

Where an accident to insured, in an accident policy insuring against bodily injuries, effected directly and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental, and violent means, caused a diseased condition, which together with the accident resulted in the injury or death complained of, the accident alone was the cause of the injury or death, and insurer was liable on the policy.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.*]

3. Insurance (§ 466*)—Accident Policy-Construction—"Sole Cause of Death."

Where at the time of an accident insured was suffering from some disease which had no causal connection with the injury or death resulting from the accident, the accident was the sole cause within the policy.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6544.]

4. Insurance (§ 466*)—Accident Policy-Construction—"Sole Cause of Death."

Where, at the time of an accident to insured, there was an existing disease which, co-operating with the accident, resulted in injury or death, the accident was not the sole cause or the cause independent of all other causes within the policy.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1178, 1186; Dec. Dig. § 466.*]

5. Insurance (§ 669*)—Accident Insurance —Actions—Evidence—Instructions.

Where, in an action on an accident policy providing a specified insurance for the loss of sight caused directly and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental, and violent means, the evidence showed that insured lost his eyesight due to an injury to an eye, caused by his accidentally falling from a train, but there was evidence that the fall merely hastened the loss of sight in the eye, which would have ultimately been lost independent of the accident because of a cataract, an instruction that if insured's loss of sight was caused directly and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental, and violent means, insurer was liable, but. if the jury did not so find, there was no liability, was sufficiently favorable to insured and substantially stated the rule that, where an injury was caused by accident and disease, there could be no recovery on the policy.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1551, 1771-1784; Dec. Dig. § 669.*]

6. Appeal and Error (§ 216*) — Presentation of Questions in Trial Court—instructions—Requests.

Where the court correctly submitted a theory of the case, a party desiring the submission of an alternative theory must request a special instruction, and he cannot on appeal for the first time urge error for failing to submit such alternative theory.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 216.*]

7. Trial (§§ 285, 295*)—Instructions—Construction.

The instructions must be read in view of the facts and must be construed as one connected whole, and if, when thus considered, the law is clearly stated, the instructions are sufficient.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 698. 699, 703-717; Dec. Dig. §§ 285, 295.*]

On petition for rehearing. Dismissed. For former opinion, see 158 N. C. 29, 73 S. EX 99.

Morehead & Morehead, Sapp & Williams, and Justice & Broadhurst, all of Greensboro, for appellant.

G. S. Bradshaw, of Greensboro, and T. H. Calvert of Raleigh, for appellee.

WALKER, J. This is a petition to rehear this case, which was decided by us at fall term, 1911, and is reported in 158 N. C. 29, 73 S. E. 99, where the facts are stated. There is no new question in the case as now presented, but the learned counsel for the plaintiff think that we have misapprehended the true nature and meaning of the charge of Judge Adams, who presided at the trial, and that, if properly construed, it would deny a recovery in a case where there was a former malady and an accident and the latter directly produced the injury as the efficient cause thereof, provided the malady itself would have resulted in the same injury, though at a later time. It is also said that certain expressions of the court in the opinion indicate that it was clearly not the intention so to decide. As to the latter suggestion, we agree with counsel, but we do not as to the former. What the court intended to decide, and did decide, was that there must have been a union of the two causes, so that they co-operated in producing the injury, and if the accident was the sole cause, or produced the result independent of all other causes, recovery could be had in such a case, and we are of the opinion now, as we were at the former hearing, that the judge so charged the jury. The instruction will not bear any other construction, as will appear from the following extract: "If you find from the evidence, and by the greater weight of it, that the plaintiff has suffered the entire loss of the sight of his eye, that the loss of his sight is irrecoverable, that the loss was caused directly and independently of all other causes, through external, accidental, and violent means, your answer to the second issue will be, 'Yes.' If you do not so find, your answer will be 'No.'" The other part of the instruction merely informed the jury that if the accident did not cause the injury directly and independent-ly of all other causes, but operated in connection with another cause, the case would be different, and the jury must have so understood it.

It must be remembered that we are construing a contract not of our making, and the terms of which we cannot alter, and not discussing the law of negligence and the doctrine of proximate cause. The plaintiff and defendant had the legal right to make any contract with each other, not unlawful in itself, both being at arm's length and in the full possession and enjoyment of their mental faculties. We must decide the case, therefore, not by what we may think would have been a wiser and more discreet contract on the part of the plaintiff, if he could have procured such a one, but by what is written in the contract actually made by them. Courts are not at liberty to rewrite contracts for the parties. We are not their guardians, but the interpreters of their words. We must therefore determine what they meant by what they have said—what their contract is, and not what it should have been. We said as much in our former opinion. "As long as parties who are capable of doing so shall be permitted to make their own contracts, it is the plain duty of the court to enforce them as they are written, unless fraud or public policy shall intervene. Binder v. Accident Association, 127 Iowa, 25, 35 . While the rule is thoroughly settled that policies of this and like character are to be construed liberally, and that ambiguous provisions, or those capable of two constructions, should be construed favorably to the insured and most strongly against the insurer, plain, explicit language cannot be disregarded, nor an interpretation given the policy at variance with the clearly disclosed intent of the parties. Taking the policy in the case at bar by its four corners, it will admit of but one construction. White v. S. L. & Accident Insurance Co., 95 Minn. 77 [103 N. W. 735, 884, 5 Ann. Cas. 83]. in Carr v. P. M. Life Insurance Co., 100 Mo. App. 602 , the court said that the question of proximate and immediate cause is not raised under the conditions of a policy which in terms excludes disease or bodily infirmity, and which could have no more force than the general provision, 'independent of all other causes.' See, also, C. T. Mut. Association v. Fulton, 79 Fed. 423 . If the jury had found that the injury was caused by the sum of two causes— that is, that the accident and the pre-existing cataract and diseased condition of the eye were together responsible for the subsequent blindness—the plaintiff could not have recovered, as the injury must have resulted from the accident, 'independent of all other causes.'" We did not before fail to consider in its full scope the language of the learned Judge in charging the Jury, and, after a more careful examination of his in structions, we do not think that in word or phrase he so narrowed the terms of the insurance contract as to prejudice the plaintiff's rights, but that he correctly stated the law which is applicable to the case.

There was a disputed question of fact presented by the testimony, whether the plaintiff was suffering from a cataract on his eye at the time of the alleged fall, or whether the fall produced a cataract. in addition to the testimony recited in the brief for the petitioner, testimony by Dr. McGee was given as follows: "He complained of pain in his left eye and in the lower third thigh, right side. On examination of his eye, I found that he had an old cataract, and so told him. He had particles of dust around his eye. I put a little antiseptic solution on that. I found no evidence of traumatism or blow on the head, nor any inflammation. I found an old cataract, and told him it was from an old injury, that it was produced by some injury in the past. It is possible to have a blow on the eye or on the head that will cause a rupture of the lens, and cataract follows. I found no sign of an injury resulting from a fall from the train. It takes a cataract some time to form and develop from...