Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Ewing

• Decision Date: 27 June 1913
• Docket Number: 18
• Citation: 88 A. 775,241 Pa. 581
• Parties: Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Appellant, v. Ewing
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

88 A. 775

241 Pa. 581

Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Appellant, v. Ewing

No. 18

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 27, 1913

Argued May 5, 1913

Appeal, No. 18, May T., 1912, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Dauphin Co., Equity Docket, No. 474; Commonwealth Docket 1911, No. 140; dismissing bill for injunction in case of Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Nathaniel Ewing, Charles N Mann and Milton J. Brecht, constituting the Pennsylvania State Railroad Commission. Affirmed.

Bill in equity for an injunction to restrain the Pennsylvania State Railroad Commission from enforcing the Act of June 19, 1911 P.L. 1053, known as the "Full Crew Act." Before KUNKEL, P.J., and McCARRELL, J.

Prior to the effective date of the act, this bill in equity was filed in the court below. From the record it appeared that plaintiff complied with the provisions of the act subsequent to its effective date, and in so doing employed additional trainmen on certain of its freight and passenger trains engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, and thereby incurred increased expenditures, which aggregated during the period between June 19, 1911, (the effective date of the act) and October 1, 1911, $98,107.31. At this rate it appeared that plaintiff's additional expenses per annum in complying with the act would be $483,907.68.

The court on final hearing held the act constitutional and dismissed the bill. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned were various findings of fact and law, and the decree of the court.

Appeal dismissed at the costs of appellant.

John G. Johnson, with him George Stuart Patterson and Lyman D. Gilbert, for appellant. -- The exercise of the police power of the State must be reasonable; not only must the end sought to be attained be within the scope of the power, but the means used must bear some fair relation to that end: Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (18 S.Ct. Repr. 383); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (6 S.Ct. Repr. 1064); Lake Shore & M.S. Railway Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (19 S.Ct. Repr. 465); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (14 S.Ct. Repr. 499); Wisconsin, Etc., R.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287 (21 S.Ct. Repr. 115); Lake Shore & M.S. Railway Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (19 S.Ct. Repr. 565); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (25 S.Ct. Repr. 539); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 206 U.S. 1 (27 S.Ct. Repr. 585); Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37.

The employment of an additional brakeman on passenger trains as required by the act, bears no relation to the safety of passengers, employees, or the public.

Section 7 of the act is unconstitutional, because it deals with the subject matter which is not expressed in the title, and is contrary to the provisions of article III, section 3, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

The cases of Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (86 Arkansas, 412), 219 U.S. 453; and Pitts. C.C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Indiana, 172 Ind. 147, are not decisive of the question before this court.

The failure of the act to make any exception in the case of strikes or other unavoidable causes makes the statute a burden upon interstate commerce and therefore an unconstitutional regulation thereof in a matter of national concern: Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321 (26 S.Ct. Repr. 491).

The enormous penalties imposed by the act for the purpose of preventing a resort to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, make the act unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law, and denies the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States: ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (28 S.Ct. Repr. 441); Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Company, 212 U.S. 19 (29 S.Ct. Repr. 192).

A court of equity is not prevented from acting in a case where it would otherwise grant relief, merely because the relief prayed for involves the enjoining of the enforcement of the penalties prescribed by a statute for its violation, such violation being expressly declared a misdemeanor: Mahoning & Shenango Ry. & Light Co. v. New Castle, 233 Pa. 413; Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Philadelphia County, 220 Pa. 100; P. & R. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia County, 228 Pa. 505; Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (14 S.Ct. Repr. 1047); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (18 S.Ct. Repr. 418); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (22 S.Ct. Repr. 30); Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (23 S.Ct. Repr. 498; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (25 S.Ct. Repr. 18); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (28 S.Ct. Repr. 441); Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135; Port of Mobile v. L. & N.R.R. Co., 84 Ala. 115 (4 So. Repr. 106); Platte Canal & Milling Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo.App. 184 (29 Pac. Repr. 1036); Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444 (58 N.E. Repr. 1004); Manhattan Iron Works Co. v. French, 12 Abb. N.C. 446; Mayor, Etc., of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 218; Atlanta v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 71 Ga. 106; Austin v. Cemetery Association, 87 Texas 330 (28 S.W. Repr. 528); Rushville v. Rushville Nat. Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575 (28 N.E. Repr. 853); Wesley Church v. Moore, 10 Pa. 273; Kirkpatrick v. M'Donald, 11 Pa. 387; Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. 278; Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210; Gray v. Citizens' Gas Co., 206 Pa. 303; Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa. 572; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464.

John C. Bell, Attorney General, and James Scarlet, for appellees.

Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE BROWN:

The purpose of the bill filed in this case was to enjoin the appellees, constituting the Pennsylvania state railroad commission, from enforcing the provisions of the Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1053, commonly known as the "Full Crew Act," on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void. Its constitutionality is challenged for the following alleged reasons: (1) It is not a valid exercise of police power; (2) it violates the provisions in the State Constitution prohibiting the passage of any special law regulating labor; (3) its enforcement will result in no benefit to railroad companies, employees or passengers and, therefore, it violates both Federal and State Constitutions, which alike forbid the taking of property without due process of law; (4) it imposes a burden on interstate commerce; and (5), the penalties for its violation are so enormous and excessive as to intimidate the appellant and other railroad companies from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation. The second reason does not seem to be pressed.

The question of the equitable jurisdiction of the court below, if raised there, was not pressed, and it was not raised here when this appeal was first before us at the October Term, 1912. We, nevertheless, ordered a reargument of our own motion on the single question of equitable jurisdiction, because the injunction prayed for was apparently to enjoin criminal prosecutions for violations of the Act of 1911, the provisions of which the state railroad commission are expressly required to enforce.

While courts of equity deal only with civil and property rights and are without jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with the administration of criminal justice, this rule is without application in the present case. True, by Section 8, of the Act of 1911, it is declared that a violation of its provisions shall be a "misdemeanor," but that word is the veriest surplusage, as clearly appears from what immediately follows. A misdemeanor is punishable by indictment resulting from a criminal prosecution, but no such prosecution is contemplated by the Act of 1911. On the contrary, no criminal prosecution can be instituted for a violation of its provisions, for the express remedy for each violation is the imposition of a penalty of $100, "to be recovered with costs as debts are now by law recoverable, by a suit in the name of the Commonwealth, for the use of the county in which such violation takes place." The proceedings which the Act of 1911 authorizes to be instituted for violating it are in the civil courts alone, where the violators are to be made defendants in actions of assumpsit. No criminal prosecution can be instituted against them, even though, by a legislative lapsus linguae, each violation of the act is declared to be a misdemeanor, for no fine or imprisonment is contemplated by the act, but the mere payment of a certain sum, recoverable as debts are now by law recoverable. Instead of being a penal law, the eighth section of the Act of 1911 is but a remedial one: Taylor v. United States, 3 Howard 197. On the grounds of complaint, as set forth in the bill, the court below clearly had jurisdiction of it: Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Philadelphia County, 220 Pa. 100; Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company v. Philadelphia County, 228 Pa. 505. In each of these cases the bill was for an injunction to restrain the county of Philadelphia from collecting penalties for violations of the Act of April 5, 1907, P.L. 59, which provided that, for every violation of it, a railroad company should be subject to a penalty of $1,000, payable to the county where the illegal charge was made, and recoverable by said county as debts of like amount were by law recoverable. In the very late case of Herndon v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, 218 U.S. 135, the bill filed asked for an injunction against Herndon, prosecuting attorney of Clinton County, Missouri, to enjoin him from attempting to compel payment of the penalties prescribed by an act of the legislature of that state,...