Pensacola Christian Coll. v. Bruhn
Decision Date | 30 December 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 1D11–1376.,1D11–1376. |
Citation | 80 So.3d 1046,277 Ed. Law Rep. 568 |
Parties | PENSACOLA CHRISTIAN COLLEGE and Robert Maddox, Appellants, v. Joyanne BRUHN, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Peter S. Roumbos and Joseph A. Kopacz of Young, Bill, Roumbos & Boles, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellants.
James M. Burns, Pensacola, for Appellee.
The appellants, Pensacola Christian College (PCC) and Robert Maddox, appeal a non-final order in favor of the appellee, Joyanne Bruhn, upon a finding that PCC and Maddox were not entitled to worker's compensation immunity as a matter of law. Because the trial court erred in determining that PCC was not Bruhn's employer and that her injury was not sustained in the course and scope of employment, we reverse.
In the fall of 2004, Joyanne Bruhn was a full-time student at PCC, living on campus. On December 16, 2004, Bruhn entered into a Special Hourly Work Contract with PCC. One of the contract terms was that the “[s]tudent agrees to work where needed, and understands that this contract may be assigned to an affiliate of PCC, if needed.” Under the terms of the contract, Bruhn was assigned to work at A Beka Books, Inc. (“A Beka Books”), an affiliate of PCC located on the PCC campus.
On the day of the accident, Bruhn had taken a lunch break and was returning to work at A Beka Books when the bicycle she was riding collided with a PCC van driven by Maddox, a student-employee of PCC. The accident occurred at an intersection on the PCC campus in front of the PCC Administration Building. Following the accident, Tim Tate, a risk manager for PCC, submitted a workers' compensation claim on behalf of Bruhn. In his deposition, Tate stated that Bruhn was covered by PCC's workers' compensation policy because “[s]he was an employee who sustained an injury during a reportable period[,]” explaining that “[s]he was off the clock but she was on the company premises returning to work.” Tate also explained that PCC purchased one corporate policy of workers' compensation insurance for all its subsidiaries and affiliates, including A Beka Books, Inc. and A Beka Services, Ltd.
On November 17, 2009, Bruhn filed suit against PCC and Maddox seeking damages for injuries she sustained in the 2006 accident, alleging that Maddox was negligent and PCC was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. On November 10, 2010, PCC and Maddox filed a motion for summary judgment asserting workers' compensation immunity because PCC was Bruhn's employer at the time of the injury and Bruhn was injured on PCC's premises. After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for summary judgment, concluding that Bruhn was not an employee of PCC, but was instead an employee of A Beka Books:
The Court finds that although the Special hourly Work Contract was executed by Plaintiff and Pensacola Christian College, Plaintiff's employer was A Beka Services, Ltd. and Plaintiff worked at the Distribution Center of A Beka, Inc. These are separate legal entities and the Court finds that Pensacola Christian College was not Defendant's employer.
The trial court also ruled that even if PCC were Bruhn's employer, the injury did not occur in the course of her employment because the injury did not occur on the premises of A Beka Books:
Even if Pensacola Christian College is to be considered Plaintiff's employer, the question arises as to whether the entire college campus which contains multiple free standing buildings and parking lots for those buildings constitutes “on the employer's premises” for the purpose of determining that the workers' compensation immunity applies to Pensacola Christian College.... The premises of A Beka Books, Inc. Distribution Center do not encompass the entire campus of Pensacola Christian College.
In this appeal of the trial court's non-final order, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment based on its conclusion that PCC and Maddox are not entitled to worker's compensation immunity. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v); Ramos v. Univision Holdings, Inc., 655 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995).
The Florida workers' compensation system provides the exclusive remedy for an employee injured in the course and scope of employment. See § 440.11, Fla. Stat. (2006); Jones v. Martin Elecs., Inc., 932 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Fla.2006). Accordingly, employers are generally immune from liability in negligence actions brought by employees for injuries occurring in the course and scope of employment. Id. Two exceptions to workers' compensation immunity exist: (1) when the employer fails to secure workers' compensation coverage; or (2) when the employer commits an intentional tort. See Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. v. Phiel, 681 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Here, it is undisputed that PCC secured worker's compensation coverage both for itself and its affiliate A Beka Books, and Bruhn does not allege an intentional tort in her complaint against PCC and Maddox. Because neither exception applies in this case, Bruhn's sole remedy for an injury occurring in the course and scope of her employment is provided by the Florida workers' compensation law. See, e.g., Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So.2d 84, 90–91 (Fla.2005). Therefore, whether PCC and Maddox are entitled to workers' compensation immunity turns on (1) whether Bruhn was an employee of PCC; and (2) whether her injury occurred within the course and scope of employment.
The trial court erred in determining that PCC was not Bruhn's employer, simply because she worked (on campus) at A Beka Books. An employee may work for more than one employer, even while doing a single job.
“Long before the enactment of the statutory special employment provision for employees of help supply services companies, the common law recognized the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine.” [ St. Lucie Falls Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Morelli, 956 So.2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ]. Under this common law doctrine, one employer can “lend” its employee to another “special employer.”
Fossett v. Se. Toyota Distribs., LLC., 60 So.3d 1155, 1157–58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) .
“ ‘When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in relation to both employers, both employers will ... have the benefit of the exclusivity defense for tort claims.’ ” Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So.2d 599, 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation Law § 67.01 (2006)). See Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718, 721 (Fla.1963) (); Crawford v. Fla. Steel Corp., 478 So.2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ( ). See also Beaver v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 454 F.2d 284, 285 (8th Cir.1972) () .
Here, the record demonstrates that Bruhn entered into an express, written student-employment contract with PCC. There is no indication whatsoever in the record...
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