PEOPLE BY VACCO v. Mid Hudson Medical Group, PC, 94 Civ. 4688 (HB).

• Decision Date: 06 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94 Civ. 4688 (HB).,94 Civ. 4688 (HB).
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, by Dennis C. VACCO, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. The MID HUDSON MEDICAL GROUP, P.C. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

877 F. Supp. 143

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, by Dennis C. VACCO, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. The MID HUDSON MEDICAL GROUP, P.C. Defendant.

No. 94 Civ. 4688 (HB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 6, 1995.

Dennis C. Vacco, Atty. Gen., of the State of N.Y., New York City, Michael A. Schwartz, Angie I. Martell, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel for plaintiff.

Anderson, Banks, Curran & Donohue, Mount Kisco, NY, Maurice F. Curran, of counsel, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

BAER, District Judge:

G. Oliver Koppell, the Attorney General of the State of New York in 1994, brought this action on behalf of the People under (1) Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"); (3) Sections 63(12) and 296 of the New York Executive Law; and, (4) Section 40-c of the New York Civil Rights Law to redress defendant's alleged "practice of unlawful, discriminatory conduct against people with hearing impairments in the provision of medical services" by refusing to provide sign language interpreters at medical examinations. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Pl.Mem.") at 2. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendant from such unlawful discrimination, and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages, statutory penalties and attorney's fees. Id. at 6.

Defendant, the Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C. ("Mid Hudson"), moves to dismiss the federal claims in the complaint and the supplemental complaint for (1) lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), alleging that the People of the State of New York are not a "person aggrieved" under the ADA and Section 504 and thus lack standing; and (2) failure to set forth the requisite jurisdictional facts under the ADA or Section 504, Fed. R.Civ.P. 8. Mid Hudson has also moves for dismissal of the New York claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction in case I dismiss the federal claims. For the reasons stated below, I deny Mid Hudson's motion to dismiss in all respects.

Separately, Mid Hudson moves to compel production of certain documents which plaintiff claims are protected by the attorney work product doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, I deny Mid Hudson's motion to compel.

I. Factual Background

Mid Hudson operates a large medical practice at four facilities in New York's Westchester, Putnam and Dutchess counties. Mid Hudson's 19 physicians and staff of 90 treat approximately 50,000 patients a year. Currently, Mid Hudson has seven to ten hearing impaired patients. Plaintiff contends that, in violation of federal and state statutes, defendant refuses to provide interpretive services for these patients. As a result, these patients must resort to notewriting and lip-reading to communicate with their doctors. Plaintiff bases its allegations on the experience of James Boardman, a hearing and vision impaired patient at Mid Hudson. In May 1994, Mr. Boardman asked Mid Hudson to provide an interpreter for his scheduled physical examination. Mid Hudson denied his request. Mr. Boardman later hired his own interpreter and submitted the bill for his services to Mid Hudson for reimbursement. Defendant refused to pay the bill.

At about the same time, the New York State Attorney General's Office conducted an investigation of Mid Hudson. Two investigators called without disclosing that they were in the employ of the plaintiff and asked Mid Hudson to provide interpreters for medical appointments of hearing impaired relatives. Both requests, made a few weeks apart, were denied.

In August 1994, Mr. Boardman renewed his request for interpretive services, this time for an appointment scheduled for his daughter. Mr. Boardman's daughter is not hearing impaired but relies on her father's guidance during doctors visits. Defendant again refused the request. As before, Mr. Boardman appeared with an interpreter he had hired. In a later emergency visit for his daughter, Mid Hudson similarly failed to provide interpretive services.

Plaintiff claims that defendant discriminates against people with hearing disabilities in violation of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by "rigidly adhering to a policy rejecting the provision of sign language interpreters for patients with hearing impairments." Pl.Mem. at 6. Defendant contends that plaintiff is not a "person aggrieved" under the federal statutes and thus lacks standing to sue. Additionally, defendant argues that it is not a program receiving federal funding for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. The Standard for Rule 12(b) Motions

When considering the sufficiency of a complaint under a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992).

The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.

Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 1686. Dismissal is warranted only if, under any set of facts that the plaintiff can prove consistent with the allegations, it is clear that no relief can be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Frasier v. General Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1007 (2d Cir.1991).

B. The State's Standing to Sue in Parens Patriae

The ancient common-law prerogative to sue in parens patriae

is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person, or in the legislature, and is a most beneficent function ... often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57, 10 S.Ct. 792, 808, 34 L.Ed. 478 (1890). Parens patriae means literally "parent of the country." Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Defendant claims that the failure of the ADA and Section 504 to specifically provide for enforcement by state attorneys general precludes suits by them. Plaintiff responds that it has standing under the parens patriae doctrine to seek redress for injury to its citizens.

We have found no case holding that a state has parens patriae standing to sue under the ADA or under Section 504 and, not surprisingly, we have found no authority that provides such standing to a state attorney general. However, states have frequently been allowed to sue in parens patriae to other enforce federal statutes that, like the ADA and Section 504, do not specifically provide standing for state attorneys general. In the leading case, the Supreme Court recognized that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had standing to sue in parens patriae under the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of its citizens employed as migrant farm workers in Virginia apple orchards. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). See also New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.1982) (New York had standing to sue in parens patriae for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 on behalf of the mentally disabled), modified on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.1983) (en banc); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.1981) (State had parens patriae standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of victims of police misconduct), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121, 102 S.Ct. 3509, 73 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1982); New York v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. 92 Civ. 4884, 1993 WL 405433 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993) (New York "has parens patriae standing to redress conspiratorial civil rights violations directed against its citizens" by seeking an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibiting anti-choice extremists from accosting then Governor Clinton with the remains of a human fetus during the 1992 Democratic National Convention); New York v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. Civ-92-147A (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1992) (New York has parens patriae standing to secure women's constitutional right to abortion); Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS v. Village of Waterford, 799 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (New York had standing to sue in parens patriae for persons with AIDS under the Fair Housing Act). In each of these cases the statute the attorneys general sued under did not specifically give them standing.

In Snapp, the Supreme Court held that the case law established three requirements for parens patriae standing: (a) the state "must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party"; (b) the state "must express a quasi-sovereign interest"; and (c) the State must have "alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population." Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 3269. I will address these factors in turn.

1. Is New York State more than a nominal party?

Defendant contends that Mr. Boardman is the real party in interest and that the State is a nominal party. I find no support for that position. The complaints seek relief for all hearing impaired New Yorkers, far beyond the needs of Mr. Boardman. The Attorney General brought this suit "to safeguard the health and welfare of the State's residents" and "to prevent discrimination in places of public accommodation...." Compl...