People ex rel. Ammann v. Wabash R. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 September 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 28718.,28718. |
| Citation | 391 Ill. 200,62 N.E.2d 819 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. AMMANN, County Collector, v. WABASH R. CO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Macon County Court; Martin E. Morthland, Judge.
Proceeding by the People, on the relation of A. C. Ammann, County Collector against the Wabash Railroad Company. From an order and judgment overruling objections to certain taxes levied against its property for 1943, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
LeForgee & Samuels, of Decatur (Carleton S. Hadley and L. H. Strasser, both of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel) for appellant.
Ivan J. Hutchens, State's Atty., and Joseph L. Rosenberg, both of Decatur (Ralph J. Monroe, Byron M. Merris, and Robert N. Patterson, all of Decatur, of counsel), for appellee.
Appellant, Wabash Railroad Company, a corporation, appeals from an order and judgment of the county court of Macon county overruling objections it filed to certain taxes levied against its property in that county for the year 1943. The taxes involved are taxes extended for: (1) Decatur Park District for airport expense; (2) city of Decatur for public library tax; (3) part of the road and bridge tax of the township of Decatur to the extent of $55,000.
The Decatur Park District was organized under the provisions of the act of June 24, 1895, entitled ‘An Act to provide for the organization of park districts and the transfer of submerged lands to those bordering on navigable bodies of water.’ Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, chap. 105, par. 256 et seq. The act in general provides for the establishment of an organized park district through a petition, referendum, election and authority given by a majority of the legal voters in the territory seeking the formation of a park district. It further provides that when properly organized such district shall constitute a body corporate and exercise the powers given under the act. The management of the park district is lodged in a board of commissioners duly elected and qualified under the terms of the act, and section 11 of the act (par. 266) sets forth their powers as the corporate authorities of such district. Under section 14 (par. 269) the park district is given broad and complete powers in establishing and constructing all manner of park and recreational facilities and equipment. It is also given power in section 15 (par. 270) to acquire lands and properties by condemnation or otherwise, for the purposes needed for the appropriate park development, and also to acquire lands by condemnation or otherwise for an armory.
In 1929 the legislature adopted an act entitled ‘An Act authorizing park districts to acquire, establish, construct, maintain, and operate airdromes, airports and landing fields for aircraft, and authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain and permitting the levy of a tax therefor.’ Laws of 1929, p. 557. The title of said act, herein referred to as the Park Airport Act, was amended in 1943 and section 3 was added by which the tax voted could be anticipatedby the issuance of bonds and for the purpose of acquiring land and building an airport. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, chap. 105, pars. 327b, 327c, and 327c 1/2.
Section 1 of the aforesaid Park Airport Act is as follows:
Section 2 of said act is as follows: ‘Upon a petition signed by not less than two (2) per cent of the legal voters of any such park district or upon the order of the board of commissioners of any such park district, the question of the levy of an additional annual tax to provide revenue for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, maintaining and operating airdromes, airports and landing fields for aircraft shall be submitted to the legal voters of such park district at the regular biennial election in such district or at a special election called for that purpose.’ (Then follows the provisions for the election and directions to the county clerk to extend said tax in addition to maximum taxes permitted or authorized to be levied for park purposes.)
It was pursuant to this act that an election was had in the Decatur Park District and the tax levied, to which appellant's objections were filed.
It was stipulated that the boundaries of the Decatur Park District are the same as and are co-extensive with Decatur township; that said park district is located entirely within Macon county, and that the city of Decatur is located entirely within said park district, and that the city of Decatur covers approximately one third of the park district and one third of Decatur township.
The proof showed that the park district had leased in July, 1943, one airport field of 120 acres and had bought another field of 700 acres, which was authorized by ordinance of the park district adopted on January 13, 1944, and that an airport was being constructed on said 700-acre tract, and that both of these airports were located in Macon county, Illinois, but were outside the park district. The proof further showed that the lease to the 120-acre airport field was cancelled on September 14, 1944, by contract, which was after the end of the fiscal year for which the levy was made on July 15, 1943. The evidence showed that in that tax levy there were various itemized expenditures aggregating $38,000 levied ‘For Airport Expense.’ The evidence further disclosed that the item, ‘To Cost and Expense of Purchase of Land for Airport, $23,000.00,’ was for the airport of approximately 700 acres located northeast of the city of Decatur, while the remaining ten items aggregating $15,000 were for the 120-acre airport on leased ground located northwest of the city of Decatur.
It was further stipulated that the objector had duly filed its objections to the application of the county collector for judgment.
There was no evidence offered or any stipulation made that either the county of Macon or the city of Decatur were operating airports or levying any tax for the same, and counsel for appellant do not make any contention that said county of Macon or city of Decatur were actually operating airports of levying any tax for the same.
Appellant contends that sections 1 and 2 of the Park Airport Act, under which the levy in question was made, are unconstitutional and that the levy is for a noncorporate purpose; that said act is vague, indefinite and uncertain; that under said act and the other airport legislation hereinafter referred to, which gave to the county and the city of Decatur power to acquire land for airports and operate airports, two or more distinct municipal corporations could exercise the same powers in the same territory at the same time; that said act violates the constitution in that it provides that the airport may be located without and beyond the boundaries of the park district; that the power granted to the park district by said sections 1 and 2 was withdrawn by later acts of the legislature granting the same power to other municipal corporations hereinafter referred to, and that said sections were repealed by implication by the passage of said later acts, and finally that the levy for the park district for two airports (being the leased airport and the one under construction) violates the said act and is void.
The first point covered by appellant's brief and argument is based upon the assumption that park districts organized under the act of 1895 (chap. 105, par. 256) known as the Submerged Land Act, ‘for the establishment, construction and maintenance of public parks and boulevards,’ are forever afterwards limited in their charter powers, and that the legislature is without authority, either by direct amendment or by general enactment applicable to all park districts, to confer additional charter powers upon such corporations. No constitutional limitation of this kind or character is cited or referred to. We known of no such limitation and have found none. The repeated pronouncements of this court are quite to the contrary.
In the recent case of People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf, 388 Ill. 445, 58 N.E.2d 172, which involved the validity of the act entitled ‘An Act in relation to municipal airport authorities,’ approved May 21, 1943, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, chap. 15 1/2, par. 49 et seq., this court at page 462 of 388 Ill., at page 179 of 58 N.E.2d, said:
It was held in the Bartholf case that a public airport authority is created for a public and not a private purpose. The question regarding the authority or power vested in corporate authorities of municipalities to assess and collect taxes was fully and completely considered in the Bartholf case, and the court's decision of it is here adhered to.
The question before us is whether the act in question, which gives to park districts power to acquire land for airport purposes and to operate an...
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