Kloss v. Suburban Cook Cnty. Tuberculosis Sanitarium Dist.

• Decision Date: 22 September 1949
• Docket Number: No. 31093.,31093.
• Citation: 404 Ill. 87,88 N.E.2d 89
• Parties: KLOSS et al. v. SUBURBAN COOK COUNTY TUBERCULOSIS SANITARIUM DIST. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

404 Ill. 87

88 N.E.2d 89

KLOSS et al.

v.SUBURBAN COOK COUNTY TUBERCULOSIS SANITARIUM DIST. et al.

No. 31093.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 22, 1949.

George Kloss and others sued the Suburban Cook County Tuberculosis Sanitarium District and others to enjoin the extension and collection of the tax levied by the District for its fiscal year commencing July 1, 1948.

The Circuit Court, Cook County, John Prystalski, J., denied a temporary injunction and sustained the district's motion to dismiss the complaint for legal insufficiency and the plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court, Daily, J., held that the act under which the defendant district was created and the tax levied was constitutional, and that the levy was made within the time prescribed by statute, and affirmed the judgment.Scott, MacLeish & Falk, Chicago (Robert S. Cushman and John J. O'Brien, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Edwin B. Berndtson and Blueford, Krinsley, Schultz & Voorheis, Chicago (Victor Hedberg and Robert B. Moore, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

Appellants, suing in behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers similarly situated, filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County against The Suburban Cook County Tuberculosis Sanitarium District (hereinafter called the district) and the county clerk and county treasurer of Cook County, to enjoin the extension and collection of the entire tax levied by the district for its fiscal year commencing July 1, 1948. The trial court denied a temporary injunction and sustained the district's motion to dismiss the complaint for legal insufficiency. Appellants elected to stand by their pleading, and, the revenue being involved, come to this court seeking a review of the trial court's action.

The Suburban Cook County Tuberculosis Sanitarium District is composed of all the territory of Cook County which lies outside the corporate limits of the city of Chicago. It was formed and organized after a favorable referendum in November, 1947, pursuant to and under ‘An Act to provide for the creation and management of tuberculosis sanitarium districts' (Ill. Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 23, pars. 177(a) to 177(n) inclusive), which act was approved May 21, 1937. (Laws of 1937, p. 470.) This act shall hereinafter be referred to as the ‘1937 sanitarium act.’ The first section of the act provides as follows: ‘Any area of contiguous territory lying wholly within one county but entirely outside the corporate limits of any city or village which has adopted ‘An Act to enable cities and villages to establish and maintain public tuberculosis sanitariums,’ approved March 7, 1908, as amended, may be incorporated as a tuberculosis sanitarium district in the following manner,' etc. It is apparent from the pleadings that the city of Chicago maintained a tuberculosis sanitarium organized under the act of 1908 referred to, and thus was not included in the district here. Appellants contend, (1) that the statute under which the district here was formed and levies its taxes, is based on an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, and (2) that since the city of Chicago is excluded from the district by virtue of having adopted the 1908 act, a special privilege and immunity is granted to its citizens in that they will be subject to only one tax for sanitarium purposes, where as other cities and villages in the county will be subject to two taxes for sanitarium purposes, if and when such cities or villages in the district should decide to organize a sanitarium under the 1908 act. On these two grounds they urge that the 1937 sanitarium act violates section 22 of article IV of our State constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats.

As to the first ground, appellants admit the general rule to be that a classification will suffice as a basis of legislation when it is based on a difference in situation found to exist in persons or objects upon which the classification rests. Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851, 163 A.L.R. 1425;Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435. They contend that the statute here does not meet this test and is wholly arbitrary and void. In support of this contention appellants rely on Grennan v. Sheldon, 401 Ill. 351, 82 N.E.2d 162;People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155;People ex rel. Kane v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, 114 N.E. 331, and People ex rel. Board of Education v. Read, 344 Ill. 397, 176 N.E. 284. A careful examination of those cases indicates that in each of them the statutes under consideration were held to be based on an unreasonable classification, for the reason that the inhabitants of the political subdivisions there involved were given special privileges which were denied to inhabitants, or part of the inhabitants, of other political subdivisions of like population or area and similarly situated. A law is not class legislation merely because it affects one class only, if it affects all members of the same class alike. Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N.E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780;People v. Sisk, 297 Ill. 314, 130 N.E. 696. A law is not local because it operates only in certain subdivisions of the State if by its terms it operates uniformly throughout the State under like circumstances and situations. L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, 72 N.E. 399,103 Am.St.Rep. 234; People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover, 258 Ill. 124, 101 N.E. 216, Ann.Cas.1914B, 212. A law is general, not because it embraces all of the governed, but because it may, from its terms, when many are embraced in its provisions, embrace all others when they occupy the position of those who are embraced. Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am.Rep. 610;City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 101 N.E. 192;People v. Vickroy, 266 Ill. 384, 107 N.E. 638. In People ex rel. Meyer v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319, 6 N.E. 480, it was held that a classification of townships between those lying wholly in the country and those the entire territory of which was covered by an incorporated city was not unconstitutional and therefore void as being a local and special law. It was said in that opinion that laws are general and uniform, and hence not obnoxious to the objection that they are local or special, when they are general and uniform in their operation upon all in a like situation. There is nothing in the statute before us which gives the inhabitants of one sanitarium district under the act any privileges which do not extend to other districts similarly organized and situated. The only distinction which might occur in districts to be organized comes from the proviso which states that the district shall not include cities which have previously adopted the city tuberculosis sanitarium act. We are of the opinion that such a classification is reasonable and bears a proper relation to the purpose to be attained by the statute. Little discussion is needed to point out that tuberculosis is a menace to all the citizens of our State. The legislature recognized this when it enacted the 1908 law allowing the creation of city sanitariums. That such city sanitariums were not geographically located or economically situated to care for all victims of the disease, must have been apparent to the legislature when the 1937 statute here under consideration was passed. As we see it, the classification created is between cities which had existing facilities and taxing power to operate them, and the remainder of the county outside of such cities, which had neither facilities nor taxing power to wage the necessary fight against the disease. It was reasonable and proper to exclude from the act cities which already possessed sanitarium facilities, and we do not find such classification to be arbitrary or capricious. It is based on an actual difference of situation which exists in the persons and political subdivisions so classified. Classification cannot be disturbed by courts unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require its extension with equal force to others whom it leaves untouched. Bowers v. Glos, 346 Ill. 623, 179 N.E. 80. It is obvious that a fair reason exists here.

Also under this point, appellants argue that the 1937 sanitarium act creates a special privilege and immunity for citizens of the city of Chicago, as distinguished from other residents of Cook County, in that they will be exposed to only one tax for sanitariums, whereas citizens of other municipalities in the district here might be exposed to double taxation in the event the voters of any of said municipalities also adopt the city act of 1908. This objection cannot reflect upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the classification made by the county act. The result proposed by counsel would not render the act unconstitutional, but could be grounds for the court to grant relief in the future, if any or all of such municipalities should levy for the same purpose within the same territory, and at the same time. People ex rel. Ammann v. Wabash Railroad Co., 391 Ill. 200, 62 N.E.2d 819. The 1937 sanitarium act is not subject to the constitutional objections raised.

Appellants next attack the tax levy of the district, which is its first since organization, on the ground that it was not adopted within the time provided in the 1937 sanitarium act, and is therefore null and void. The levy, purporting to be for the district's fiscal year commencing July 1, 1948, was made August 24, 1948, and a certified copy thereafter filed in the office of the county clerk. The portion of the 1937 act under which the district made its levy, is as follows: ‘All general taxes levied by the board of directors of any tuberculosis sanitarium district shall be levied at the same time and in the same manner as taxes are levied for city and village purposes; * * *.’ (Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 23, par. 177(n).) When this section was passed in 1937 the Cities and Villages Act provided that...