People Ex Rel. Anita Alvarez v. Skryd

• Decision Date: 03 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 110498.,110498.
• Citation: 241 Ill.2d 34,348 Ill.Dec. 384,944 N.E.2d 337
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Anita ALVAREZ, Petitioner,v.David SKRYD, Respondent.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

241 Ill.2d 34

944 N.E.2d 337

348 Ill.Dec. 384

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Anita ALVAREZ, Petitioner,

v.David SKRYD, Respondent.

No. 110498.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 3, 2011.

Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for petitioner.Marc D. Wolfe and Jacqueline M. Aldrich, of Wolfe & Stec., Ltd., of Woodridge, for respondent Efrain Loza.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[241 Ill.2d 36 , 348 Ill.Dec. 386] Petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney of Cook County, seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition against respondent, the Honorable David Skryd, judge of the circuit court of Cook County. See Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(a). Respondent granted the motion of defendant, Efrain Loza, to withdraw defendant's approximately 12–year–old guilty plea and vacate his misdemeanor conviction. The State requests an order compelling respondent to rescind his order and dismiss defendant's motion for lack of jurisdiction. We award the State a writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

At the outset we make two observations. First, in an original action to review a judicial act, the judge is only a nominal party in the proceeding. Counsel for the prevailing party below may file papers for that party, but shall not file any paper in the name of the judge. Ill. S.Ct. R. 381(c) (eff. Dec.29, 2009). Second, our recitation of the undisputed facts is taken from limited sources for a limited purpose. In an original mandamus proceeding: “Only issues of law will be considered. The proposed complaint shall be sworn to and shall contain or have attached to it the lower court records or other pertinent material that will fully present the issues of law.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 381(a) (eff. Dec.29,

[348 Ill.Dec. 387 , 944 N.E.2d 340]

2009). Here, the parties have attached to their pleadings only those portions of the record in support of their respective legal arguments.

On May 21, 1998, defendant entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of misdemeanor possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 1998)) in exchange for two days in the Cook County jail, time considered served. The circuit court held a hearing on defendant's guilty plea (see Ill. S.Ct. R. 402 (eff. July 1, 1997)), which is memorialized, in full, as follows:

“CLERK: Efrain Loza.

[Defense Counsel]: * * * We would accept the State's offer time considered served and tender a jury waiver.

COURT: Is that what you are agreeing to, two days House of Corrections, time considered served?

Defendant: Yes.

COURT: You are giving up right to a jury, right to insist the State prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Are you aware you are giving up those rights?

Defendant: Yes.

COURT: Still pleading guilty?

Defendant: Yes.

COURT: That is the order.”

These were the court's only admonishments to defendant.

On April 7, 2010, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Defendant alleged that at the time of his conviction, he was a Mexican citizen, but a lawful permanent resident in the United States. However, as a result of defendant's conviction, his “petition for citizenship is being denied and he is subject to removal.” Defendant contended that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because at the hearing on the plea the circuit court failed to admonish him of his appeal rights as required by Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (Ill.S.Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Aug.1, 1992)). ¹ At a hearing on the motion to withdraw, the State argued that the motion, filed nearly 12 years after the guilty plea, should be dismissed as untimely. Without explanation, respondent granted defendant's motion.

The State filed a motion to reconsider, in which it contended that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over defendant's motion to withdraw because it was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the guilty plea, as required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (Ill.S.Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992)). At the close of a hearing, again without explanation, respondent denied the State's motion to reconsider.

The State filed a motion with this court for leave to file a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition against respondent. Ill. S.Ct. R. 381(a) (eff. Dec.29, 2009). We allowed the State's motion for leave to file the complaint.

II. ANALYSIS

Before this court, the State contends that respondent lacked jurisdiction over defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction because defendant filed his motion beyond 30 days—indeed, nearly 12 years—after his guilty plea. Defendant counters that respondent was not divested of jurisdiction because defendant was not admonished regarding his appeal rights.

[944 N.E.2d 341 , 348 Ill.Dec. 388]

[2] Article VI, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution confers upon this court discretionary original jurisdiction to hear mandamus cases. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(a). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion is involved. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill.2d 185, 192–93, 330 Ill.Dec. 761, 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009). The issue presented in this case is not whether respondent's order was discretionary or ministerial, but whether respondent lacked the power to enter the order. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an order entered by a court that erroneously assumed jurisdiction which the court did not possess ( People ex rel. Bradley v. McAuliffe, 24 Ill.2d 75, 78, 179 N.E.2d 616 (1962) (collecting cases)) or to expunge a void order entered by a tribunal without jurisdiction ( Daley v. Laurie, 106 Ill.2d 33, 40, 86 Ill.Dec. 918, 476 N.E.2d 419 (1985); People ex rel. Carey v. White, 65 Ill.2d 193, 197, 2 Ill.Dec. 345, 357 N.E.2d 512 (1976); People ex rel. Courtney v. Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198, 201–02, 192 N.E. 908 (1934)).² A writ of mandamus will be awarded only if the petitioner establishes a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public official to act, and clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ. Although mandamus generally provides affirmative rather than prohibitory relief, the writ can be used to compel the undoing of an act. Konetski, 233 Ill.2d at 193, 330 Ill.Dec. 761, 909 N.E.2d 783 (collecting cases).

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides in pertinent part: “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which the sentence is imposed, files in the trial court * * *, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Aug.1, 1992). This court has repeatedly observed that our rules are not mere suggestions. Rather, they have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written. People v. Houston, 226 Ill.2d 135, 152, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23 (2007); People v. Campbell, 224 Ill.2d 80, 87, 308 Ill.Dec. 730, 862 N.E.2d 933 (2006).

The purpose of Rule 604(d)

“is to ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be given the opportunity to hear the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom. Rule 604(d) provides for fact finding to take place at a time when witnesses are still available and memories are fresh. [Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty plea.” People v. Wilk, 124 Ill.2d 93, 104, 124 Ill.Dec. 398, 529 N.E.2d 218 (1988).

The rule was designed to eliminate needless trips to the appellate court and to give the circuit court an opportunity to consider the alleged errors and to make a record for the appellate court to consider on review in cases where a defendant's claim is disallowed. Id. at 106, 124 Ill.Dec. 398, 529 N.E.2d 218. Accordingly: “Rule

[348 Ill.Dec. 389 , 944 N.E.2d 342]

604(d) establishes a condition precedent for an appeal from a defendant's plea of guilty.” Id. at 105, 124 Ill.Dec. 398, 529 N.E.2d 218. As a general rule, the failure to file a timely Rule 604(d) motion precludes the appellate court from considering the appeal on the merits. Where a defendant has failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill.2d 291, 301, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174 (2003) (collecting cases).

In addressing appeals from judgments entered upon guilty pleas, Rule 604(d) has ramifications not only for the appellate court, but for circuit courts as well. Article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution confers upon circuit courts jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9. “As applied in the context of criminal proceedings, the term ‘subject matter’ jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine a given case.” People v. Davis, 156 Ill.2d 149, 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993). However, once cases are heard and determined, “[t]he jurisdiction of trial courts to reconsider and modify their judgments is not indefinite.” Flowers, 208 Ill.2d at 303, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174. Generally, a circuit court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment. Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill.2d 232, 238, 162 Ill.Dec. 10, 579 N.E.2d 824 (1991); People v. Heil, 71 Ill.2d 458, 461, 17 Ill.Dec. 673, 376 N.E.2d 1002 (1978); see Holwell v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 334 Ill.App.3d 917, 922, 268 Ill.Dec. 821, 779 N.E.2d 435 (2002); Weilmuenster v. H.H. Hall Construction Co., 72 Ill.App.3d 101, 105, 28 Ill.Dec. 412, 390 N.E.2d 579 (1979). In Flowers, this court stated...