People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz

• Decision Date: 11 May 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27200.,27200.
• Citation: 386 Ill. 360,54 N.E.2d 441
• Parties: PEOPLE et rel. BAKER et al. v. STRAUTZ, Chief of Police.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

386 Ill. 360

54 N.E.2d 441

PEOPLE et rel. BAKER et al.

v.STRAUTZ, Chief of Police.

No. 27200.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 21, 1944.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1944.

Original petition by the People, on the relation of Melba R. Baker and another, for a writ of habeas corpus against Sam Strautz, Chief of Police.

Petition for discharge denied and petitioners remanded to dustody.MacDonald, Meyer & Meyer, of East St. Louis, for petitioners.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.

FULTON, Justice.

This cause arises upon the original petition of Melba R. Baker and Marlin Ronen for a writ of habeas corpus.

On March 8, 1943, the petitioners were arrested in East St. Louis, Illinois, and placed in the city jail. The next morning complaints were filed before a justice of the peace charging that each ‘wilfully and unlawfully solicited to prostitution’ and ‘wilfully and unlawfully was a lewd and lascivious person in speech and character.’ On the same day an order was entered by the justice of the peace that it appearing that each of the petitioners may be suffering from a communicable venereal disease, they are hereby held for the clinic. No bond was fixed by the justice of the peace.

Each of the petitioners refused to be examined by doctors or a clinic of any kind on the ground that it was an invasion of their rights and contrary to the constitutions and statutes of the United States and State of Illinois. On this same day each of the petitioners filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the city court of East St. Louis and upon hearing were remanded to the custody of the chief of police, the court holding the offense was not bailable. The next day petitioners filed their petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of St. Clair county, and on March 12 an order was entered in the circuit court denying the petition and remanding petitioners to the chief of police of East St. Louis until petitioners submitted to an examination, and further providing that if they submitted to examination by the East St. Louis Health Clinic and such clinic reports that they are not afflicted with any communicable venereal disease, that bail for the petitioners would be fixed by the court.

On March 14, an original petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court, which petition was allowed, and a return made thereon and bail fixed by this court at $1000 each, which the petitioners have given, and they were thereby released from custody.

It appears that petitioners were ordered held for the clinic under the provisions of section 4 of an act entitled, ‘An Act to enable counties or cities to segregate and treat persons suffering from certain communicable diseases,’ approved June 28, 1919, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 23, par. 392, which section provides as follows: ‘When it appears to any judge or justice of the peace from the evidence or otherwise that any person coming before him on any criminal charge may be suffering from any communicable venereal disease, it shall be the duty of such judge or justice of the peace to refer such person to the director of such hospital, sanitarium or clinic, or to such other officer as shall be selected or appointed, for the purpose of examining the accused person, and if such person be found to be suffering from any communicable venereal disease, he or she may by order of the court be sent for treatment to a hospital, sanitarium or clinic if any be available and if necessary to be segregated for such term as the court may impose at such hospital, sanitarium or clinic.’

The petitioners, for the purpose of this case, agree that the arrests, complaints and warrants were legal and proper.

Petitioners contend that:

1. Section 4 of the act above quoted is unconstitutional and void in depriving the petitioners of their liberty without due process of law under section 1 of amendment XIV of the constitution of the United States and section 2 of article II of the constitution of the State of Illinois, Smith-Hurd Stats.; that section 4 contains subjects not expressed in the title of the act; that the section violates section 7 of article II of the constitution of the State of Illinois in denying bail to the petitioners when they are not charged with a capital offense; that it violates section 9 of article II of theIllinois State constitution in that it denies the petitioners the right to be heard in answer to the criminal charges and defend in person and to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and denies them the right to a speedy and public trial.

2. If section 4 is valid, then the order of the justice of the peace is void for the same reasons set forth as stated in 1 above.

3. The petitioners have been and are being illegally held in custody in violation of the fifth, sixth and seventh amendments of the United States constitution and article II of the constitution of the State of Illinois.

The petitioners in their statement, brief and argument have failed to argue their case, except to state that the said statute is unconstitutional, having left the argument up to the respondent and having confined their arguments to a reply to the brief of the respondents.

The questions involved in this litigation are of supreme importance not only to the individuals involved, but to the citizens of the State of Illinois and to the State itself. Measures to prevent the spread of dangerous communicable diseases and to provide for the isolation, segregation and treatment of those diseased are as old as history itself.

The power to detain a person who is suspected of having a contagious disease rests in the police power of the State. When a State employs its police power to safeguard the public health it may act in a summary manner even though the result is to deprive a citizen of his liberty. Such powers were recognized and approved in People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, at page 427, 134 N.E. 815, 817, 22 A.L.R., 835, where we held: ‘Among all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws none is more important than the preservation of public health. The duty to preserve the public health finds ample support in the police power, which is inherent in the state, and which the state cannot surrender. Every state has acknowledged power to pass and enforce quarantine, health, and inspection laws to prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence, and unwholesome food, and such laws must be submitted to by individuals for the good of the public. The constitutional guaranties that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, were not intended to limit the subjects upon which the police power of a state may lawfully be asserted in this any more than in any other connection. 12 R.C.L. 1271; Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 57 N.E. 798,50 L.R.A. 762, 78 Am.St.Rep. 229;State v. Robb, 100 Me. [180], 189, 60 A. 874,4 Ann.Cas. 275;Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 1188; Ayres v. State, 178 Ind. 453, 99 N.E. 730,...