People ex rel. Barrett v. Thillens

• Decision Date: 20 May 1948
• Docket Number: No. 30258.,30258.
• Citation: 79 N.E.2d 609,400 Ill. 224
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BARRETT, Atty. Gen., v. THILLENS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

400 Ill. 224

79 N.E.2d 609

PEOPLE ex rel. BARRETT, Atty. Gen.,

v.THILLENS.

No. 30258.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prystalski, judge.

Action by the People, on the relation of George F. Barrett, Attorney General, against Melvin Thillens, doing business as North Town's Check Cashing Service, to enjoin the defendant from operating armored trucks for delivery of money for payroll checks contrary to the Community Currency Exchange Act. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint for want of equity.

Orr, Lewis & Orr and Joseph L. Kadison, all of Chicago (Warren H. Orr, Wallace W. Orr and Haskell F. Lamm, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a final decree in equity of the circuit court of Cook County, which enjoined appellant, Melvin Thillens, from operating a fleet of armored trucks engaged in delivering money for payroll checks, on the ground that appellant violated the provisions of the Community Currency Exchange Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 16 1/2, pars. 31-56. It is claimed that the decree deprived the appellant or property without due process of law, and also, that if the Community Currency Exchange Act is construed to cover the business in which appellant is engaged it is unconstitutional.

The complaint in this case was filed by the People upon the relation of the Attorney General, and alleged that appellant was operating a community currency exchange at No. 2351 West Devon Avenue, in Chicago, and that the mode whereby the defendant operated such exchange was by armored automobile trucks, stopping them around large industrial plants and cashing payroll checks; and further that the bazards of operating such trucks constituted a public nuisance, and prayed for an injunction.

The answer of the appellant admits he does operate a community currency exchange, and has for several years past; denies he operates such exchange by operating trucks, or that by such trucks he renders the service of the community currency exchange; admits he owns and operates armored vehicles which he operates as his own private business for the sole purpose of cashing payroll checks of employees of industrial companies, pursuant to a contract with such industrial companies; denies that said trucks issue money orders, or that they provide any of the services defined by the Community Currency Exchange Act as the operations of a currency exchange; states that this service is not open to the public but is furnished in pursuance of private contracts with various industries, and that the only checks cashed are the payroll checks of the company employing appellant, and that nobody else can cash a check at said trucks. The answer avers appellant has contracts with over four hundred industries, and that the maximum charge per check is ten cents; that appellant's business does not constitute a nuisance but, on the contrary, is of great value to people generally, and that the operation of the trucks has been construed by the Auditor of Public Accounts as not being within the purview of the said Community Currency Exchange Act; and, further, that if such Currency Exchange Act is deemed to prohibit appellant's truck operations, the act is unconstitutional and void, in that the law prohibits the doing of a harmless and useful business and deprives appellant of his liberty and property without due process of law.

After the evidence was heard by the chancellor a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the appellant from cashing checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other commercial instruments for fee or service charge, either from a motor truck or otherwise,at any place or upon any premises with respect to which he does not have a license under the Community Currency Exchange Act, and for which premises he does not have a lease, as provided by that act. The appeal to this court followed.

It will be observed that the effect of this decree is to prohibit the appellant from delivering any money in his trucks to any premises aside from the premises licensed as a community currency exchange upon which he has a lease.

The facts in the case are substantially without dispute. Appellant owns a license for a Community Currency Exchange at No. 2351 Devon Avenue in Chicago. At that place of business he does all of the different types of business authorized by the Community Currency Exchange Act. He has operated this place for many years. In 1934 the appellant commenced an armored truck payroll cash service. He was directed by the State Auditor to segregate his armored truck operations from that of his community currency exchange operations, and complied with such direction. The armored truck system is operated by the appellant distinct and separate from the exchange. It is not available for, and does not serve, the general public of the local community neighborhood where the exchange is located. The service is rendered solely to business establishments, wherever located in the entire Chicago area, and only by prior private contractual arrangement between the appellant and such firms under contract. The defendant is obliged to transport currency to the contracting firm for the purpose of cashing payroll checks of the company at the time their pay is due. The currency is carried in armored trucks, which are owned and operated by the appellant. The fund so transported is the property of appellant. The payroll checks of the employees of the contracting concerns are cashed by the appellant upon the premises of the company serviced; at times the payroll checks are cashed in some central point upon the premises, and in other cases they are cashed at the individual work bench or station of the employee, the currency so used being transported in small cars protected by armed guards. The only service rendered by appellant's armored trucks is the cashing of payroll checks, and only those of the employer contracting for the service. The truck service does not cash any other orders or evidences of money, and does not cash all checks, but payroll checks only of the serviced employer. No money orders are issued or sold by the mobile service at any time, under any circumstances; neither does the mobile service accept any money for the payment of local utility bills, nor accept any checks for collection. The payroll checks are purchased outright by appellant. Any loss which occurs in connection with the transaction is borne by appellant, and no loss can accrue to anybody else. The charge made is five cents for each check cashed under $10, and ten cents for all payroll checks cashed over $10; no more. Some employers pay the charges of appellant for cashing the payroll checks of the employees, and in such case no charge is made to the employees by appellant.

For the past few years appellant has been servicing four hundred industrial concerns in the Chicago area, and cashing payroll checks in a face amount of over $10,000,000 per month, and renders this service to approximately 75,000 employees of the said concerns. The injunction issued will destroy this business unless four hundred licenses are obtained by appellant to deliver money to each employer's place of business, under the decree of the circuit court. At the present license rate this would cost appellant over $20,000 per year, and this requirement, it is claimed, amounts to a confiscation and destruction of the business of the appellant without due process of law.

The principal questions urged on review are: (1) whether the business of appellant as conducted comes within the operation of the Community Currency Exchange Act; (2) if within the technical wording of the act, whether it was so intended by the legislature; (3) whether the business of appellant, as operated, can be made subject to licensing or regulation. The reply of appellee to these points is that the case cannot be distinguished from McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 58 N.E.2d 899, 156 A.L.R. 1059, in which the constitutionality of the Community Currency Exchange Act was sustained, and hence that the injunction was authorized.

As applied to appellant the statute defines a Community Currency Exchange as ‘any person * * * engaged in the business or service of, and providing facilities for, cashing checks, * * *.’ (Sec. 1.) The statute also requires that an application shall be made in writing, containing, among other things, the name and business address of the applicant (sec. 4); a bond for the benefit of any creditor of such community currency exchange (sec. 5); that the exchange shall not be carried on in any premises where the chief source of revenue is derived from the sale of alcoholic liquor (sec. 8); that only one place of business can be maintained under one license but that more than one license may be issued to the same license (sec. 13); and that applicant shall have a permanent address evidenced by a lease of at least six months' duration as his place of business (sec. 18). There are other provisions which indicate that the business of conducting a currency exchange shall be at a business location in the community. While not so stated in the statute, the apppellee claims the business must be wholly performed on the premises.

The business of appellant is not conducted at any particular address, nor is there any need of a lease on any premises. It is a mobile operation, and the checks are cashed on the premises of the employer issuing the checks. By its various provisions the act contemplates that the place licensed have a permanent office in the location, which it must control for a period of at least six months. There is no language in the act which applies to an armored mobile truck, except the words ‘cashing checks.’ These words might...