People ex rel. Booth v. Opel
| Decision Date | 07 April 1910 |
| Citation | 244 Ill. 317,91 N.E. 458 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. BOOTH v. OPEL. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; James A. Creighton, Judge.
Mandamus by the People, on relation of William Booth, against Charles E. Opel to compel defendant to extend taxes at a certain rate without reduction. From a judgment awarding the writ, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.Edmund Burke, State's Atty. (A. F. Bernard and T. J. Sullivan, of counsel), for appellant.
E. S. Smith, for appellee. W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and June C. Smith, for the People.
The Forty-Sixth Assembly passed an act which was approved by the Governor on June 14, 1909, and in force July 1, 1909, amending section 2 of the act concerning the levy and extension of taxes (Laws 1909, p. 323) and this suit was brought to question the validity of the act. It provides that the county clerk in each county of the state shall ascertain the rates per cent. required to be extended upon the assessed valuation of the taxable property in the respective towns, townships, districts, incorporated cities and villages in his county, as equalized by the State Board of Equalization for the current year, to produce the several amounts certified for extension by the taxing authorities in said county as the same shall have been reduced as therein provided, in all cases where the original amounts exceed the amounts authorized by law. There are two provisos to the act, the first of which does not restrain or limit the generality of the act in any manner. It provides that if the aggregate of all the taxes, exclusive of those enumerated therein not subject to reduction, certified to the county clerk shall exceed 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property upon which the taxes are to be extended, he shall reduce the rate per cent. of the tax levy of the taxing district in the same proportion in which it would be necessary to reduce the highest aggregate per cent. of all the tax levies, exclusive of the taxes before mentioned not subject to reduction, to bring the same down to 3 per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property upon which said taxes are required by law to be extended. The second proviso creates somewhat different limitations as to different taxing districts based on population. It provides that in reducing taxes the rate levied for county purposes in counties having a population of over 300,000 shall not be reduced below 40 cents on each $100 assessed valuation and in other counties shall not be reduced below 45 cents on each $100 assessed valuation; that in cities and villages having a population of over 150,000 the rate for city or village purposes, exclusive of library, school, and park purposes, shall not be reduced below $1.10 on each $100 assessed valuation nor the rate for school taxes for educational purposes below $1.05 on each $100 assessed valuation; that in cities and villages having a population of less than 150,000 the rate for city and village taxes, exclusive of taxes levied to pay bonded indebtedness, shall not be reduced below $1.20 on each $100 assessed valuation, and the rate of school taxes for educational purposes shall not be reduced below $1.50 on each $100 assessed valuation. The appellee, William Booth, filed his petition, in the name of the people, in the circuit court of Sangamon county, alleging that he was a citizen, legal voter and taxpayer in the city of Springfield, in said county, and was the owner of anticipation warrants issued by the city of Springfield and county of Sangamon, payable out of the taxes for the year 1909 when collected; that the various taxing authorities in said city had certified to the appellant, Charles E. Opel, as county clerk, taxes, exclusive of those not subject to reduction, amounting in the aggregate to $3.96 on each $100 assessed valuation of the taxable property in the city as equalized for the year 1909; that the appellant refused to extend the taxes at the rate specified by the authorities, but threatened to reduce the same to 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation, and that he claimed as his authortry for such reduction the aforesaid act. The petition prayed for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the appellant to extend such rates as would produce the aggregate of the amount of $3.96 on each $100 assessed valuation. The defendant entered his appearance, waived service of process and filed a general demurrer. The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant having elected to stand by it, a peremptory writ was ordered as prayed for in the petition, and the defendant appealed to this court.
Counsel for the relator filed in this court a brief and argument insisting that the act is unconstitutional on various grounds therein specified, and cited numerous authorities which he contended sustained his position. The state's attorney and counsel for the county clerk did not comply with the rules of the court requiring a brief and argument, but contented themselves with a statement of the case, to which was appended the following: ‘It is respectfully urged that the court below erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the petition for the writ of mandamus, and a reversal of the judgment is respectfully asked.’ Upon examination of the case it was found that the validity of an act which concerns the people of the state was involved and that the court was without the benefit of brief or argument in support of the act. An order was entered directing the Attorney General to enter his appearance in his official capacity, as representative of the public, and to file a brief in the case. Time was allowed to the Attorney General for that purpose, and having given due consideration to the questions raised, he filed such a brief as in his judgment would protect the interests of the public, and his brief and argument have proved of great assistance in determining the constitutionality of the statute.
The first objection made to the act is that it violates section 8 of article 9 of the Constitution by limiting the power of county boards to levy taxes for county purposes below 75 cents on each $100 assessed valuation. That section provides that county authorities shall never assess taxes, the aggregate of which shall exceed 75 cents per $100 valuation, except for the payment of indebtedness existing at the adoption of the Constitution unless authorized by a vote of the people of the county, and it confers no authority upon county boards to assess or levy any taxes. The authority to levy taxes is derived from other sections of the Constitution. Section 1 of the same article requires the General Assembly to provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax by valuation, the value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. Section 9 of the same article gives the General Assembly power to vest municipal corporations with authority to assess and collect taxes, and no county board could assess property or levy a tax merely by virtue of the Constitution. Section 8 is purely a limitation beyond which county authorities are not permitted to go, even under legislative authority. Neither counties nor other municipalities have any inherent power to levy taxes but the power is dependant upon legislation, and it may be destroyed or discontinued at the pleasure of the Legislature unless there is an interference with some existing obligation and a consequent violation of some other constitutional provison. The objection is unfounded.
The second objection is, that the act is a local and special law regulating county and township affairs, in violation of section 22 of article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits the passage of laws of that character. The body of the act and the first proviso extend, both in terms and in fact, to every county in the state, without distinction or discrimination, but the second proviso places limitations on the reductions to be made in certain taxes, based on population of different municipalities. The petition does not allege that the city of Springfield, the county of Sangamon, or any taxing district of either, is affected in any way by the classifications of the second proviso, which give to other counties and cities of greater population less privileges than are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Moshier v. City of Springfield
- Griffin v. Cook Cnty.
- Berman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago
- People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis