People ex rel. C.C-S.
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA0913 |
| Citation | 503 P.3d 152,2021 COA 127 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, IN the INTEREST OF C.C-S., Juvenile-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Matthew A. Hardy, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
¶ 1 Defendant C.C-S., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's judgment adjudicating him delinquent based on findings that he possessed marijuana illegally as an underage person, see § 18-13-122(3)(b), C.R.S. 2020, and illegally possessed marijuana with intent to distribute, see § 18-18-406(2)(b), C.R.S. 2020. C.C-S. contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the marijuana and paraphernalia, the only evidence supporting the court's adjudication, because they were discovered in the course of an unreasonable search and seizure of his backpack at school, conducted after an initial, illegal seizure of his person.
¶ 2 This case requires us to address for the first time the standard to be applied when school officials conduct a seizure or detention of a student. We are confronted with whether, under the reasonableness standard adopted by our supreme court in People in Interest of P.E.A. , 754 P.2d 382, 387 (Colo. 1988), the Fourth Amendment is satisfied in the context of this case where a search of a student by school officials was based on anonymous information received through Colorado's Safe2Tell hotline. Finally, we must address for the first time whether the exclusionary rule applies to searches of students by a school official. Because we conclude that the trial court erred by relying on a tip received through the state's Safe2Tell program, we agree with C.C-S. that his search and detention were illegal. We also conclude that the exclusionary rule applies in the context of school searches, and therefore, because the evidence of the search should have been suppressed, we reverse the adjudication.
¶ 3 A school security officer employed by Denver Public Schools (DPS) received a report that C.C-S., a student at a DPS high school, had been seen in a Snapchat video shooting a firearm out of a car window.
¶ 4 The tip was reported through the statewide Safe2Tell program, see §§ 24-31-601 to - 611, C.R.S. 2020, which allows students, parents, and staff members within a school district to submit anonymous tips about potential school safety concerns. Tips are then emailed to the DPS security team.
¶ 5 By the time the Snapchat video showing C.C-S. was reported to Safe2Tell on February 25, 2018, it was about one month old. At that point, no one was able to review the footage because videos posted on Snapchat automatically disappear from the platform after twenty-four hours, unless they are saved.1 Although unable to review the Snapchat video, the dean of C.C-S.’s school told the school security officer that C.C-S. had a history of "bringing things to school that he shouldn't, such as drugs and things like that."
¶ 6 At that point, the school security officer decided to search C.C-S., based on the Safe2Tell firearm tip, the dean's comment, and the security officer's policy of searching every student and their backpack when he received a Safe2Tell report that the student had either drugs or weapons. Once C.C-S. arrived at school, he was taken to an office for questioning by the school security officer, as well as a campus security officer, who was also employed by DPS but was stationed at C.C-S.’s school. With the door closed, the DPS officers told C.C-S. about the information they had received from the Safe2Tell tip and told him they were going to search his backpack.
¶ 7 C.C-S. refused to consent to a search and, after further discussion, attempted to leave the office. The DPS officers would not allow him to leave, instead reiterating that they were going to search his backpack. After the campus security officer asked C.C-S. whether he was refusing to allow the search because he had drugs in his backpack, C.C-S. confessed that he had drugs in his backpack and handed it over to the officers to be searched.
¶ 8 Although no weapons were found in C.C-S.’s backpack, the DPS officers found a plastic bag of marijuana, as well as marijuana paraphernalia: a scale, more plastic bags, and cigar wraps. Based on this evidence, the People charged C.C-S. in a delinquency petition with underage possession of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
¶ 9 C.C-S. moved to suppress the marijuana and the paraphernalia found in his backpack on grounds that they were discovered during an unconstitutional detention of his person and search and seizure of his backpack. The juvenile court denied the motion, ruling that the Safe2Tell firearm tip, plus the dean's comment about C.C-S.’s history of bringing drugs to school, were sufficient justification for the search of his backpack.
¶ 10 Following a bench trial, C.C-S. was found guilty of both marijuana charges and was adjudicated delinquent.
¶ 11 In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the court's findings of fact but evaluate its conclusions of law de novo. See People v. Hammas , 141 P.3d 966, 969 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 12 C.C-S. contends that the information contained in the anonymous Safe2Tell tip was stale and that the dean's comment about C.C-S.’s history of bringing drugs to school did not furnish sufficient grounds to search his backpack. C.C-S. acknowledges that he admitted to having drugs in his backpack while in the closed-door office and that he handed it to the officers to be searched. He asserts, though, that his admission does not justify the otherwise illegal search because, when it was made, C.C-S. was unreasonably detained. We agree with both contentions.
¶ 13 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Bailey , 2018 CO 84, ¶ 18, 427 P.3d 821, 826. This prohibition safeguards individuals’ privacy and security against arbitrary intrusion by government officials, People v. Coke , 2020 CO 28, ¶ 33, 461 P.3d 508, 515-16, and it extends to searches of students by public school officials, New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325, 333, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). Ordinarily, a warrantless search "must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has occurred." Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733 (citations omitted). However, this standard is relaxed in the school setting to accommodate "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools." Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733 ; P.E.A. , 754 P.2d at 387. We therefore evaluate the legality of school searches according to the less stringent reasonableness standard set forth by the Supreme Court in T.L.O.
¶ 14 When assessing the reasonableness of a school search or seizure, we look to traditional Fourth Amendment principles to evaluate, "on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
Doe v. Heck , 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) ). And the reasonableness of a search or seizure will depend on the context in which the search or seizure takes place. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. at 337, 105 S.Ct. 733.
¶ 15 Under T.L.O. , determining the reasonableness of a school search involves a twofold inquiry. A school search is reasonable if it is (1) justified at its inception and (2) conducted in a manner "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733 (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Our supreme court in P.E.A. adopted T.L.O. ’s reasonableness standard and test in the context of school searches. P.E.A. , 754 P.2d at 386.
¶ 16 The T.L.O. Court, however, left open the question of how or whether the reasonableness standard should also apply to seizures or detentions of students by school officials. Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist. , 422 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2005). In P.E.A. , while addressing and adopting the T.L.O. standard for searches, the supreme court did not need to confront the standard for seizures and detention of students by school officials.
¶ 17 In the context of school seizures, some state courts have applied a more lenient standard, sanctioning detentions of students as long as the detentions were not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment. See, e.g. , In re K.J. , 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 385 (2018). The consensus among federal circuit courts, though, is that the T.L.O. reasonableness standard should also apply to school seizures. Shuman , 422 F.3d at 148 (collecting cases).
¶ 18 We recognize that students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), and the "nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school," Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 656, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). Accordingly, we join the federal courts in adopting the T.L.O. reasonableness standard to evaluate whether a student was detained in violation of the student's Fourth Amendment rights. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Haw. Dep't of Educ. , 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) ; Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist. , 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees , 883 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1989).
¶ 19 The...
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