People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette

• Decision Date: 24 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33439,33439
• Citation: 5 Ill.2d 303,125 N.E.2d 473
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Richard T. CARTER, State's Attorney, Appellant, v. Elmer TOUCHETTE, County Clerk, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 473

125 N.E.2d 473

5 Ill.2d 303

The PEOPLE ex rel. Richard T. CARTER, State's Attorney, Appellant, v. Elmer TOUCHETTE, County Clerk, Appellee.

No. 33439.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1955.

Richard T. Carter, State's Atty., and Kevin Kane, Belleville (Kenneth J. Juen, Belleville, of counsel), for appellant.

John R. Sprague, Belleville, for appellee.

DAILY, Justice.

In December, 1953, the board of supervisors of St. Clair County appropriated for and levied a tax for county corporate purposes in the amount of $648,283.50. To produce such an amount, the county clerk would have been required to extend the tax at a rate of .10 cents on each $100 valuation, a rate well within the .125 cents limit set in section 25.05 of the Counties Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 34, § 25.05.) The clerk, however, on approximately June 1, 1954, extended the tax at a rate of .0840 cents on the $100, which, in the absence of authorization for a higher rate by the legal voters of the county, was the maximum rate authorized by section 162a of the Revenue Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 120, § 643a.) Such a rate produced an amount some $141,000 less than had been appropriated and levied by the board. On July 13, 1954, a petition was filed in the circuit court in the name of the People on the relation of the State's attorney for St. Clair County, praying for a writ of mandamus directing the clerk to extend the tax at the rate of .10 cents. As a basis for such relief the petition alleged that the provisions of section 162a became ineffective on December 31, 1952, and that a later enacted provision extending the effective date to December 31, 1953, is unconstitutional. In denying the petition, the trial court held that the later enacted statute was the one to be obeyed but made no ruling on its alleged unconstitutionality. The petitioner, hereafter referred to as appellant, prosecutes this appeal, and since the revenue is involved we have jurisdiction.

Appellee has raised a question of the sufficiency of appellant's brief and we think justifiably so, for it neither specifies the errors relied upon for reversal nor sets forth in verbatim any portion of the statute claimed to be invalid. The brief does not fully comply with the requirements of Rule 39 of this court. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 110, par. 259.39.) We have held in the past, however, that the requirements of the rule are not jurisdictional but procedural and that an appeal will not be arbitrarily dismissed for noncompliance if a reading of the entire brief makes it possible for the court to determine the questions or issues sought to be raised. Swain v. Hoberg, 380 Ill. 442, 44 N.E.2d 38; Joyce v. Blankenship, 399 Ill. 136, 77 N.E.2d 325; Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411 Ill. 289, 103 N.E.2d 473. Though appellant's statement of the case and argument are not too clearly presented, we are inclined to hold that they sufficiently define the issues so as to bring the brief within the rule of the cited cases. Our action in refusing to dismiss the cause is not, however, to be construed as an effacement of the rule, and future litigants in this court are cautioned that continued or increasing disregard of its requirements can only lead to strict and arbitrary enforcement.

Appellant has failed to argue, and so has abandoned, the contention that section 162a of the Revenue Act was ineffective when the tax in question was levied. There remain, therefore, but two issues fairly arising from his brief, first, the constitutionality of section 162a as it was last enacted by the legislature (Laws of 1951, p. 1185), and, second, whether the county clerk...