People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Chevalier

• Decision Date: 16 June 1959
• Citation: 340 P.2d 598,52 Cal.2d 299
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Respondent, v. Stuart CHEVALIER et al., Defendants, Richard C. Goodspeed et al., Appellants. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. Richard C. GOODSPEED et al., Appellants. L. A. 25275.

Page 598

340 P.2d 598

52 Cal.2d 299

PEOPLE of the State of California ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Respondent, v. Stuart CHEVALIER et al., Defendants, Richard C. Goodspeed et al., Appellants.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. Richard C. GOODSPEED et al., Appellants.

L. A. 25275.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 16, 1959.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1959.

Richard C. Goodspeed, So. Pasadena, in pro. per., Paul R. Hutchinson and Vaughan, Brandlin & Baggot, Los Angeles, for appellants.

George C. Hadley, William H. Peterson, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., and Peyton H. Moore, Jr., Los Angeles, for respondents.

SPENCE, Justice.

Defendants Richard C. Goodspeed and William A. Hyland, as trustee, appeal from a judgment entered in two consolidated eminent domain actions, one brought by the state and the other by the city, to extinguish certain street access rights and to acquire an easement over said defendants' land for street purposes. The takings were incidental to the construction of a freeway. The jury found that the market value of the property taken was $7,500, and that severance damages were offset by special benefits to the portion of the land which was not taken. Defendants seek a reversal on the following grounds of alleged error: (1) the striking of portions of their answer, which purported to raise special defenses of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion; (2) the consolidation of the two proceedings for trial; (3) the refusal of certain instructions bearing on the measure of damages; (4) the submitting to the jury of an alleged improper form of verdict; and (5) the exclusion from evidence of a proposed plan for improving defendants' land.

The litigation involved property in a block in the city of Los Angeles, which block was bounded on the north by 98th Street, on the east by Broadway, on the south by Century Boulevard, and on the west by Olive Street. Defendants owned a strip on the southeast corner, with a frontage of 87 feet on Century Boulevard and 441.63 feet on Broadway. 99th Street formerly cut into the block, crossing Olive Street from the west, but did not continue through to Broadway. It ended at the westerly boundary of defendants' land.

A section of the new Harbor Freeway was built, running generally along Olive Street. It does not cross defendants' land but its construction resulted in the closing of the intersection of 99th Street and Olive. Access to the west along 99th Street was thereby denied to defendants and to the owners of property located in said block on 99th Street to the east of its former intersection of Olive Street.

To provide access for the landlocked parcels located on 99th Street east of its former intersection with Olive Street, the state sought to obtain an easement measuring 60 feet by 87 feet over defendants' land, for the purpose of extending 99th Street to Broadway. Defendants successfully interposed demurrers on the theory that the condemnation to provide for this extension was beyond the power of the state with respect to the freeway project. The state and the city then entered into an agreement whereby the city agreed to condemn the easement across defendants' land. The state therefore limited its action against defendants to condemning defendants' right of access over 99th Street to and across the former Olive Street; and the city then brought the action to condemn the easement over defendants' land to extend 99th Street to Broadway.

The two actions were thereafter consolidated for trial. At the outset of the trial plaintiffs moved to strike from the defendants' answers those portions which defendants characterize as establishing 'special defenses' of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion. With respect to the state's action, the allegations were that it was feasible to construct the freeway over 99th Street instead of closing off defendants' westerly access, and that in failing to so construct the freeway, the State Highway Commission acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion.

The allegations of fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion with respect to the city's action were more detailed. They attacked the city council's action in finding that condemning an easement across defendants' land was necessary and in the public interest. In substance, the allegations were that (1) the council abused its discretion in that (a) it failed to investigate properly the advisability of providing access to the landlocked parcels by constructing a north-south service road along the east side of the freeway, from 99th Street to 98th Street, across land available for the purpose; (b) the council's finding was 'pursuant to an agreement and conspiracy by and between said Council and the California State Highway Commission' merely to further the commission's desires rather than to further any of the city's own interests, since the state would otherwise have to construct the described service road; (c) the council refused to hear defendants' arguments that the described service road was more in the public interest; (2) the council acted in bad faith, fraudulently, arbitrarily, and negligently in that (a) it acted in concert with and under the domination, control, and influence of state agencies, without studying or investigating for itself the necessity or desirability of the described service road as an alternative; (b) rather than for a legitimate city interest, the condemnation was for the purpose of accomplishing for the state what the state was unable to do, and saving the state from having to build the described service road; (c) it refused to hear defendants' arguments that the public interest would be better served by the described service road.

After receiving in evidence the city ordinance and the commission's resolution containing the findings attacked in the answer, the court ordered the 'special defenses' stricken. The question is whether the stricken allegations presented a justiciable issue.

Because eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, constitutional provisions merely place limitations upon its exercise. County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 634, 63 P. 78, 621; County of Los Angeles v. Rindge Co., 53 Cal.App. 166, 174, 200 P. 27. The only limitations placed upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain by the California Constitution (art. I, § 14) and the United States Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) are that the taking be for a 'public use' and that 'just compensation' be paid for such taking. Each of these limitations creates a justiciable issue in eminent domain proceedings. But 'all other questions involved in the taking of private property are of a legislative nature.' University of Southern California v. Robbins, 1 Cal.App.2d 523, 525, 37 P.2d 163, 164. The taking of property for use as a public street or highway is clearly a taking for an established public use (Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 706, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L.Ed. 1186; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain (Third Ed.) § 7.512(2), p. 489), even though the street or highway will bear relatively little traffic. Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 255. There is no question, then, that the takings in the instant case are for a public use. Defendants did not allege fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemner does not actually intend to use the property as it resolved to use it. The stricken allegations in defendants' 'special defenses' sought judicial review of the findings that the respective takings were necessary and commensurate with the greatest public good and the least private injury. These legislative determinations are frequently termed the question of necessity.

The recitations in the city ordinance and highway commission's resolution of the 'public necessity' of the proposed improvements, that 'such property is necessary therefor,' and that the improvements were 'planned or located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good, and the least private injury,' are 'conclusive evidence' of those matters. Code Civ.Proc., § 1241, subd. 2; Sts. and Hy. Code, § 103. In upholding the constitutionality of this conclusive presumption, the United States Supreme Court said: 'That the necessity and expediency of taking property for public use is a legislative and not a judicial question is not open to discussion. * * * The question is purely political, does not require a hearing, and is not the subject of judicial inquiry.' Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, 262 U.S. 700, 709, 43 S.Ct. 689, 693, 67 L.Ed. 1186.

However, defendants maintain that there is an implied exception to the statutory conclusive presumption. They argue that the determination of necessity is justiciable when facts constituting fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion are affirmatively pleaded. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that implying such an exception would allow public improvements to be unduly impeded by frequent and prolonged litigation by persons whose only real contention is that someone else's property should be taken, rather than their own. Plaintiffs point out that property owners do have considerable protection in any case, since just compensation must always be paid, and since the conclusive presumption attaches only to those city ordinances that have been passed by a two-thirds vote. Code Civ.Proc., § 1241, subd. 2.

There is no doubt that the language used in several decisions seems to imply that the condemning body's findings of necessity are reviewable in condemnation actions when facts establishing fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion are affirmatively pleaded. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Lagiss, 160 Cal.App.2d 28, 32-33, 324 P.2d 926; Orange County Water Dist. v. Bennett, 156 Cal.App.2d 745, 750, 320 P.2d 536; Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Jan, 154 Cal.App.2d 389, 394, 316 P.2d 25; City of...