People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Shasta Pipe & Supply Co.

• Decision Date: 30 July 1968
• Citation: 264 Cal.App.2d 520,70 Cal.Rptr. 618
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHASTA PIPE AND SUPPLY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FEATHER RIVER INVESTMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 11467.

Page 618

70 Cal.Rptr. 618

264 Cal.App.2d 520

The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHASTA PIPE AND SUPPLY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FEATHER RIVER INVESTMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 11467.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

July 30, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1968.

Hearing Denied Sept. 25, 1968.

Edward J. Connor, Jr., Dept. of Public Works, and Paul M. Joseph, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Corkin & Corkin, Oroville, and David Livingston and David P. Kassoy, by David Livingston, San Francisco, for defendants-appellants.

RECKERS, Justice pro tem.

Two consolidated cases are here on appeal by the defendants from final judgments of the Superior Court of Butte County. The judgments awarded compensation for property taken in eminent domain proceedings and decreed further that defendants were not the owners of additional property claimed by defendants and which also was devoted to public use by the plaintiff State of California. The defendants have also appealed from orders denying their respective motions for new trial but said orders are not appealable.

In 1961 the Department of Public Works commenced a proceeding to acquire various parcels of property in Butte County, including parcels in the estate of Nellie Ford, but which were conveyed to defendant Shasta Pipe and Supply Company before trial. Another complaint was filed by the Department of Water Resources in 1962 to acquire various parcels, including property of defendant Feather River Investment Company, but which had also been a part of the Ford estate. The Department of Public Works complaint was based upon a resolution stating that the property in question was being acquired for 'freeway purposes.' The Department of Water Resources complaint was based upon a resolution to acquire the property as part of the 'Feather River Project.'

The above cases were consolidated for trial. Preliminary issues relating to the area and extent of the land ownership of defendants and appellants were tried by the court prior to the issue of valuation which was tried before a jury.

The issues as between plaintiff state and each of the defendants as to the boundary portions of the case were identical before the trial court and are identical before this court so it is unnecessary to consider the claims and contentions of the defendants separately.

In order to understand the precise issues that were before the trial court during the boundary phase of the case, certain geographical data must be considered as it was developed in the evidence presented. The issues, as formulated for trial, will also be explained.

The Feather River flows in a general southerly direction from its source in the mountains above Oroville to its confluence with the Sacramento River between Marysville and Sacramento. However, as it passes the city of Oroville, the river in its downstream course swings in a westerly direction for some distance and then turns south once more. During the early 1860's the channel of the river opposite Oroville moved a considerable distance south of its natural location due to hydraulic mining operations in the immediate area and upstream. In the early 1940's the channel was straightened and moved still farther south of its original location as a result of further mining and dredging operations.

The real dispute in this case relates to ownership of the land between the north line of the original river channel and the center line of the river in its present location.

The defendants' title to land north of the north bank of the river in its original location was derived from a Mexican land grant known as the Fernandez Rancho. A confirmation patent of the Mexican grant was issued by the United States government in 1857 and referred to the description and 'Plat of the Fernandez Rancho' as surveyed by one A. P. Green.

In the first of the two condemnation proceedings filed, the Department of Public Works in its complaint set forth a metes and bounds description of the property owned by the estate of Nellie Ford, the predecessor of defendant Shasta Pipe and Supply Company. It described the southerly boundary of the property as meandering up the center of the Feather River.

Subsequently, this complaint was amended so as to contain a different description which incorporated a meander line of the north bank of the Feather River as fixed by the Green survey of the original confirmation patent. Thus, the new description did not contain the part which carried to the center of the river in its present location or as referred to as the meander line of the center of the river in the original complaint. When the complaint of the Department of Water Resources against Feather River Investment Company was filed, the plaintiff was careful to describe the property as owned by the defendants only on the north side of the Green meander line as in the amended complaint in the Department of Public Works action. In both actions a further allegation was made to the effect that if defendants established ownership of property south of the Green meander line and north of the river in its present location, it was to be condemned likewise. In both actions orders of possession were obtained at the outset, and the state actually took possession of all lands to the north bank of the river in its present location.

The answers of the respective defendants set forth their claims of ownership as to all land lying north of the thread of the Feather River in its present location.

In due course the consolidated actions were pretried. In its pretrial statement the plaintiff states, among other things, contended that the Feather River was a navigable stream at the time California was admitted to the Union. It also contended that since the river was navigable the state acquired title to the bed of the stream at the time of admission. In their pretrial statements the defendants contested the title of the state as to any property lying south of the rancho boundary and north of the center of the river in its present location. The pretrial order of the court, however, was silent as to whether the state had any obligation to establish title to any property south of the rancho boundary and north of the river in its present location but did set forth as an issue the question of whether defendants had acquired title to any property south of the original rancho boundary by adverse possession. The pretrial order also provided for the trial of the boundary questions by the court without a jury in advance of the valuation issues to be tried by the jury. The pretrial order was later amended to provide that if severance damages were being claimed in one of the actions, the amount was to be set forth by way of amendment to the answer prior to the commencement of trial on the boundary issues.

After several days of trial on the boundary issue, the matter was submitted to the court. The court wrote a comprehensive opinion indicating that the meander line of the north bank of the Feather River, as shown by the Green survey of 1857, was the south boundary of any lands owned by defendants; that the river was navigable when California was admitted to the Union and that as a result of its navigability title to the bed of the stream vested in the state and any deeds of conveyance which called to the center of the river would convey to the bank only. The court also indicated in its written opinion that the defendants had no interest whatever in any land or property lying to the south of the Green meander line as established from the 1857 patent confirmation survey and held that the movement of the channel was caused by artificial rather than natural means so defendants and their predecessors had not acquired any title to lands south of the Green meander line by accretion. The court also concluded that defendants and their predecessors had not established any title to any lands south of the Green meander line because the state was the owner of the property and adverse possession could not be established by defendants for that reason, and also for the reason that defendants had not shown an actual use for five continuous years. There was evidence that defendants and their predecessors had color of title for about sixty years; that they had paid whatever taxes were levied or assessed against the property by the County of Butte; and that they had been in possession, if anyone had been in possession, for the whole period and had exercised various acts of dominion and ownership during the period.

At the time the trial court rendered its decisions, the defendants moved for written findings and also requested that the court find that the plaintiff state had not established its title to any property in the area of dispute to the south of the Green meander line. Defendants also requested the court to find that defendants had title based on color of title and possession which they claimed was a good title and one that required purchase in condemnation in the absence of a showing of better title.

The court correctly refused to make findings in advance of the valuation portion of the trial, but when they were made at the time of and preceding the final judgments the contention of defendants that their title was sufficient in the absence of a better title was again presented by way of objections to the state's proposed findings and proposed findings were submitted by defendants.

It should be noted that defendants did not make formal objection to the pretrial statement as signed by the trial court, but they did submit their own proposed statement. They also objected to the state's failure to prove its own title and requested findings with respect to the state's title at the end of the boundary phase of the case and again before entry of final...