State ex rel. State Lands Com'n v. Su
| Decision Date | 20 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. C009815,C009815 |
| Citation | 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 761,21 Cal.App.4th 38 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 21 Cal.App.4th 38, 26 Cal.App.4th 1390, 31 Cal.App.4th 1582, 36 Cal.App.4th 114 21 Cal.App.4th 38, 26 Cal.App.4th 1390, 31 Cal.App.4th 1582, 36 Cal.App.4th 114 STATE of California ex rel. STATE LANDS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT, Sacramento County, Respondent, Richard K. LOVELACE, et al., Real Parties In Interest. |
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Richard M. Frank, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jan Stevens, Kenneth R. Williams, and Michael L. Crow, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Washburn, Briscoe & McCarthy, Edgar B. Washburn, Sean E. McCarthy and Lyn Jacobs, San Francisco, for real parties in interest, Richard K. Lovelace, et al., and as amicus curiae, on behalf of real parties in interest California Land Title Association.
Although this case involves just a twelve-acre parcel of land along the Sacramento River, it implicates issues of statewide importance. The subject is the accretion process and alluvial deposits, and the basic issue is who owns alluvial deposits that attach to a riparian or a littoral tract when the process of accretion that deposited them was influenced by the works of people who were strangers to the tract. 1 Does the state or does the owner of the tract own these deposits? For reasons that we will explain, we side with the owner of the tract.
Resolution of this dispute turns on an interpretation of Civil Code section 1014 (hereafter, section 1014), which provides: "Where, from natural causes, land forms by imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by accumulation of material [accretion] or by the recession of the stream [reliction], such land belongs to the owner of the bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank." (Italics added.)
In resolving this dispute, we attempt to clarify what have become muddied legal waters in California regarding the meaning of the phrase "from natural causes" in section 1014. As we shall explain, this issue implicates another one: the issue of artificial accretion on California tidelands. Since section 1014 and the tideland issue deal with the process of accretion, perhaps they can be forgiven for creating muddied waters. But the fact is that the overwhelming number of jurisdictions in this country have developed simple, fair and workable principles in this area. (See Annot., Accretion Caused by Artificial Condition (1974) 63 A.L.R.3d 249, 252-257, 295, (hereafter, 63 A.L.R.3d).) These principles recognize the pervasive influence of human beings on the modern landscape and hold that alluvial deposits attaching to a riparian or a littoral tract belong to the tract's owner even though the process of accretion was influenced by the works of people who were strangers to the tract. (63 A.L.R.3d at pp. 252-256, 295.) To interpret section 1014 based on California's seemingly unique and factually inapposite decisions in Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co. (1866) 31 Cal. 118 (Dana ) and the artificial accretion cases that rely upon Dana holds the promise of only more unfairness and confusion, as exemplified by the issues and arguments comprising the present proceeding. (See 63 A.L.R.3d at pp. 256-257, 295-296.)
Our theme regarding section 1014 is that the term "natural causes," if construed on the basis of Dana and the artificial accretion cases that rely upon Dana, threatens to assume a prominence in California jurisprudence unwarranted by the ancient property and common law principles that served as the foundation for section 1014. Unless properly harnessed, this prominence will likely spawn unfair claims to land premised on an impractical view of section 1014. As we shall explain, neither Dana nor the artificial accretion cases that have followed Dana-- Forgeus v. Santa Cruz Co. (1914) 24 Cal.App. 193, 140 P. 1092; City of Los Angeles v. Anderson (1929) 206 Cal. 662, 275 P. 789; City of Newport Beach v. Fager (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 23, 102 P.2d 438; Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 772, 147 P.2d 964; L.A. Athletic Club v. City of Santa Monica (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 795, 147 P.2d 976; People v. Hecker (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 823, 4 Cal.Rptr. 334; South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 628, 41 Cal.Rptr. 277 ()--are appropriate bases on which to interpret section 1014. Dana was not an accretion case involving a riparian or upland owner. A practical and fair interpretation of section 1014 Our theme regarding artificial accretion on California tidelands employs much of the same analysis. All of the significant artificial-accretion tideland cases in California are founded on Dana (and are cited immediately above) with the exception of Patton v. City of Los Angeles (1915) 169 Cal. 521, 147 P. 141. As noted, viewing Dana as an accretion case is suspect. So too is Patton's analysis, which adopts an unrealistic view of tidelands as static entities regarding the principle of tideland inalienability. (See Cal.Const., art. 10, § 3; formerly art. 15, § 3.)
requires a return to the principles of accretion and alluvion law upon which section 1014 was [31 Cal.App.4th 1587] [21 Cal.App.4th 119] founded, principles that have gained an almost universal acceptance through ancient and modern times. Based on these principles and practical considerations, we conclude that the phrase "from natural causes" in section 1014 refers to the action of the water in the accretion and reliction processes.
As we shall explain, a fair, workable and legally-supportable rule of accretion, for both section 1014 and the tideland context, is that of a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of material that results from the action of the water, even if artificially-influenced.
In this action and cross-action to quiet title and for declaratory relief, plaintiffs allege they own the twelve-acre parcel, which is situated along the Sacramento River at the west end of Seamas Avenue in Sacramento at a point commonly known as Chicory Bend. Plaintiffs claim they received title by deeds from their predecessor in interest. The state claims title under the following theory: in 1850, the area at Chicory Bend was under water and constituted riverbed which came under state ownership when California achieved statehood; thereafter, due to accretion at Chicory Bend, the river shifted westward; the alluvion at Chicory Bend was caused by "artificial accretive influences," i.e., debris (washed into the river) from hydraulic mining activities in the American River and Feather River watersheds beginning in the 1870's, levees constructed at or near Chicory Bend in the 1890's, wing dams erected in the river channel at or near Chicory Bend in the early 1900's, and dredging of the river channel in the vicinity of Chicory Bend; alluvion deposited on the bank of the Sacramento River at Chicory Bend due to artificial accretion belongs to the state rather than the riparian owner.
Claiming that artificial accretion is limited to that which is caused by placement of a structure or other artificial obstruction in the water which alters the water flow and results in the gradual accumulation of sediment, plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication that "any gradual accumulations of land along the Sacramento River at Chicory Bend consisting, in part, of sediments washed into upstream tributaries in the Feather River and American River watersheds by hydraulic mining, and not caused by any artificial structures or activities at Chicory Bend, are natural accretions that belong to the riparian landowner."
Plaintiffs' statement of undisputed material facts alleged:
The state disputed these facts only to the extent they "understate[ ] the effect of hydraulic mining debris on the Sacramento River." The state asserted: "The hydraulic mining occurred over a 32-year period between 1852 and 1884.... It had the effect of quintupling for about 100 years the average annual amounts of sediment that would have passed from the Sacramento Basin into In support of their request for summary adjudication, plaintiffs cited section 1014, which provides that alluvion belongs to the riparian landowner where, from natural causes, land forms by imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river either by accumulation of material or by the recession of the river. Plaintiffs acknowledged that cases have held that alluvion belongs to the state rather than the riparian owner where it is caused artificially by the construction of piers or other structures which impede the water's natural flow and cause sediment to collect proximate to the obstruction. (Citing City of Los Angeles v. Anderson, supra, 206 Cal. 662, 275 P. 789; Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 772, 789, 147 P.2d 964.) However, plaintiffs sought to distinguish these cases by arguing that alluvion which was not caused by any structure or other artificial obstruction placed in the water at or near Chicory Bend is not the product of artificial accretion "but occurred naturally, as a result of the River's natural process of...
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State ex rel. State Lands Com'n v. Sacramento County Superior Court (Lovelace)
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