People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith
| Decision Date | 27 November 1979 |
| Citation | 423 N.Y.S.2d 862,48 N.Y.2d 477,399 N.E.2d 894 |
| Parties | , 399 N.E.2d 894 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Edward DOWDY by Donald H. Zuckerman, Appellant, v. Harold J. SMITH, as Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
A prior acquittal based on the defense of entrapment in a criminal proceeding collaterally estops the Board of Parole from revoking parole on the basis of the transactions proved and admitted in the criminal action.
Relator, a multiple felony offender, was on parole under concurrent sentences for robbery in the first degree and felonious possession of a weapon. On May 5, 1977 he was arrested on two indictments charging him with first degree criminal sale of a controlled substance, first and third degree criminal possession of a controlled substance and first degree conspiracy. On the same day he was served with a parole violation notice based on the same offenses, alleging that, by both possessing and selling heroin, he had violated general parole rule 12 which, in March, 1975, when relator was released on parole, provided: "I will not use, possess, or purchase any illegal drugs or use or possess those that have been unlawfully obtained." (Formerly 7 NYCRR 1915.10, repeal filed Jan. 9, 1979.) After a jury trial in which relator interposed the affirmative defense of entrapment, he was acquitted on all counts. At the subsequent parole violation hearing relator, relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, contended that his acquittal in the criminal action constituted a complete defense to the charge of parole violation. The Parole Board rejected this contention and sustained both violations.
Relator then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Supreme Court granted the writ, upholding relator's defense under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Appellate Division 65 A.D.2d 285, 411 N.Y.S.2d 472 reversed, holding the doctrine inapplicable. We now reverse and reinstate the judgment of Supreme Court.
To consider the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case a review of the proceedings below is necessary to an understanding of the procedural posture in which the case reaches us. At the parole revocation hearing the defense of collateral estoppel was advanced before the start of the evidentiary phase of the hearing as a "jurisdictional" bar to revocation of parole. The respective contentions of the relator and the Parole Division were pressed with some vigor. The arguments proceeded on the implicit assumption that the acquittal in the criminal action had indeed been in consequence of a jury determination that relator had established the affirmative defense of entrapment. At no point did the Parole Division contend or the Parole Board suggest that the acquittal was ambiguous or might have been based on a failure of the People to meet their burden of proof rather than on the success of relator in proving his affirmative defense. 1 The Parole Board rejected the "jurisdictional" defense based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the following ruling: "the fact that there was a dismissal following a jury trial will not be treated as a bar to the statutory revocation proceedings in New York State because there is no legal precedent for such."
The board and counsel then proceeded to the evidentiary stage of the hearing. The Parole Division introduced the testimony of the undercover police officer and that of relator on the criminal trial. Counsel for relator stood on his "jurisdictional" position based on collateral estoppel and offered no evidence. As indicated, the board sustained the violations and stated: "No evidence was presented to support the defense of entrapment, and entrapment was therefore not considered." There is nothing to suggest that the decision of the Board of Parole did not proceed on the implicit assumption that the acquittal in the criminal action was based on the affirmative defense of entrapment; the board rather held that it would not recognize a defense based on such an acquittal in the absence of applicable precedent in New York State.
The handling of the case by Supreme Court on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus confirmed this analysis. That court, after reciting the facts of relator's indictment and the finding of not guilty on all counts, explicitly stated, "It is agreed that the acquittal was the result of the affirmative defense of entrapment", and concluded that such acquittal constituted a defense to parole revocation under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nowhere does the Attorney-General as counsel for respondents now disavow that agreement or press the contention in our court that the acquittal might reflect only a failure of the People to have met their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal trial.
Accordingly, for the purposes of the disposition of the present appeal we take it as established that the acquittal in the criminal action did indeed constitute a determination that relator had proved the affirmative defense of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence (Penal Law, § 25.00, subd. 2; § 40.05).
We turn then to a brief consideration of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. That the doctrine, an aspect of the broader doctrine of Res judicata, is applicable to criminal cases is not disputed (see Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65, 330 N.E.2d 35, 37; cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469). Both courts below agreed that, if the prerequisites to its invocation were met, the doctrine would be applicable to parole revocation proceedings. 2 Several questions with respect to these prerequisites must be resolved, however, before it may be concluded that the doctrine is applicable to this case.
As to the identity of parties we encounter no difficulty in concluding, as did Supreme Court and as was not questioned by the Appellate Division, that for present purposes the People as prosecutors in the criminal action stood in sufficient relationship with the Division of Parole in the parole proceeding to meet the requirements of the doctrine in this respect. (Cf. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-403, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263; Matter of Finn's Liq. Shop v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647, 662, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, 594, 249 N.E.2d 440, 447.)
With respect to identity of issues, as stated above the criminal acquittal in this case constituted a conclusive finding that relator's conduct was induced by entrapment. The fact that the objectives of the criminal prosecution and of the parole revocation hearing may be differentiated the one described as punitive and the other as remedial (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-784, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) is irrelevant for the purpose of application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case. Our resolution of this appeal is not predicated on an application of relator's constitutional protection against double jeopardy as to which a punitive nature of the second proceeding against him would be crucial (Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917); we are here applying the substantive rule of collateral estoppel which springs from Res judicata principles, by which a determination in a prior criminal prosecution of a question necessarily involved in a subsequent proceeding may be conclusive, even though the second proceeding seeks some objective which is other than punitive (One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United...
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