People v. Goodman

• Decision Date: 18 December 1986
• Parties: , 503 N.E.2d 996 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Morgan GOODMAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 565

511 N.Y.S.2d 565

69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Morgan GOODMAN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 18, 1986.

Arlene R. Popkin and Stephen J. Pittari, White Plains, for appellant.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty. (Melinda Tell Lazare and Anthony J. Servino, White Plains, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Defendant was originally charged with several crimes, including murder, robbery, grand larceny, burglary and criminal possession of a weapon, arising from the death of Elodie Henschel, age 83, and the theft of her two diamond rings. After trial the jury convicted him of the larceny and acquitted him of the remaining charges. On appeal we reversed, ordering suppression of defendant's statement to the police, and remanded the matter for a new trial on the larceny charge (People v. Goodman, 54 N.Y.2d 451, 446 N.Y.S.2d 202, 430 N.E.2d 1255). On retrial, defendant was again convicted. On this appeal he contends the judgment must be reversed because the People were permitted to present evidence to the second jury, over his objection that it violated principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, that (1) Ms. Henschel had been beaten to death, (2) defendant had said prior to her death that he intended to steal her rings and that he was willing to kill her to obtain them, and (3) defendant at a time relevant to the murder had blood on his clothes and hands. He concedes that the prior verdicts did not bar the second trial for grand larceny but contends that the People could not introduce this evidence after he had been acquitted of the murder, robbery and related counts in the first trial. For the reasons which follow there should be an affirmance.

The homicide was clearly established. Ms. Henschel's body was discovered in her apartment in New Rochelle January 24, 1978 by the assistant manager of the building. Investigation disclosed that she had been brutally killed hours earlier by blows to the head and that two diamond rings which she had been seen wearing the day before were gone. There were no signs of a forced entry into the apartment and apparently no other valuables or cash had been stolen.

Defendant knew Ms. Henschel and was generally familiar with the area because his girlfriend lived in the same building. In fact, he was visiting his girlfriend when the police arrived to investigate. While the police were securing the crime scene he volunteered to them that he had seen three suspicious males in the rear of the apartment building the day before.

Defendant's connection with the incident was established at the first trial by testimony that on January 20, 1978 defendant and a fellow student, Robert Shafran, had discussed the theft of Ms. Henschel's two diamond rings; that defendant told Shafran that he would kill her to get them if he had to; that on January 23, 1978 Shafran made arrangements with Robert Carpenter, another student who had access to his parents' automobile, to drive defendant and Shafran to the building in which Henschel lived; that when Carpenter drove them to the apartment they were also accompanied by Robert Benedict who had come along for the ride; that they parked the car about a block from the Henschel apartment and defendant left the others, saying that he would be back in about 20 minutes; that when defendant returned his manner was jittery, he seemed upset and looked pale and his three companions noticed a bloodlike substance on his hands and clothing; that Benedict noticed that defendant was carrying something that looked like "piping" beneath his coat; that he showed Shafran two diamond rings which appeared to have blood on them; that the four then drove to defendant's house where defendant and Shafran went in; that once in the house defendant told Shafran "I killed her", started to wash the blood from his hands and clothing as well as from the tire iron that he had had beneath his coat, and stated that he had injured his leg; that defendant later burned his clothes; that defendant and Shafran agreed on an identical alibi; that on the following day Carpenter, after first refusing, drove defendant and Shafran to the White Plains railroad station for a payment of $50; that during the trip Carpenter saw the rings; that defendant and Shafran caught a train to New York where they went to the jewelry district and sold the rings to a fence for $2,000 before returning to Westchester County.

Most of this evidence linking defendant to the crime came from Shafran, who had earlier pleaded guilty to manslaughter first degree, but Carpenter and Benedict, who had received immunity, each testified to what they did and saw during these events of January 23 and 24. The trial court charged that Shafran was an accomplice as a matter of law but instructed the jury that it must determine whether Carpenter and Benedict were accomplices. It also instructed the jury that the testimony of any accomplice had to be corroborated by independent evidence tending to connect defendant with the commission of the offenses charged. The People presented substantially the same evidence from these witnesses at the second trial and defendant assigns error as a result, claiming the People were estopped from introducing evidence relating to the charges of which he was acquitted.

Collateral estoppel originally developed in civil litigation, but it is now clear that the doctrine applies generally to criminal proceedings as well (see, People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 228, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701; People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64-65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518; People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 344, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783; Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35; United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161). It is not applied in quite the same way, however, because the preeminent concern in criminal cases is to reach a correct result whereas in civil litigation the focus is on the swift, impartial and peaceful resolution of disputes. The desire to avoid repetitious litigation must sometimes give way to concerns peculiar to criminal prosecutions (People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64-65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518, supra ). The term "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit" (Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469; Matter of McGrath v. Gold, supra, 36 N.Y.2d at p. 411, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35). As we noted in People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 380, 251 N.Y.S.2d 953, 200 N.E.2d 622, "[c]ollateral estoppel, as distinguished from the principle of double jeopardy, arises not so much from concern for the peace of mind of the defendant as from a long-recognized equitable reaction against allowing a party to relitigate issues which have already been decided against him."

The doctrine acquired constitutional dimension when the Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson (supra) that it is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and is applicable to the States (see, id., at p. 446, 90 S.Ct. at 1195; see also, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707). It differs from double jeopardy, however, because jeopardy may attach long before the jury has rendered a verdict, whereas collateral estoppel applies only when there has been a final judgment. Moreover, constitutional double jeopardy normally relates only to subsequent prosecutions involving the same offense (see, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306; i Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114; but see, CPL 40.10 et seq.), whereas the expansion of collateral estoppel principles to criminal cases was intended to overcome that narrow view of double jeopardy and prevent the harassment of defendants by serial prosecutions for multiple offenses arising from a single act or group of acts (see generally, Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 29 [1960]; Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 283-286 [1965] ).

Before collateral estoppel may be applied in a subsequent criminal case, there must be an identity of parties (People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 345, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783, supra; People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 277 N.E.2d 396; People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 380, 251 N.Y.S.2d 953, 200 N.E.2d 622, supra ) and issues (see, People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477, 482-483, 423 N.Y.S.2d 862, 399 N.E.2d 894; People v. Reisman, supra, 29 N.Y.2d at p. 285, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 277 N.E.2d 396) and a prior proceeding resulting in a final and valid judgment (see, People v. Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815, 498 N.Y.S.2d 335, 489 N.E.2d 222; Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 412, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35, supra ) in which the party opposing the estoppel had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate (see, People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 229, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701, supra; People v. Berkowitz, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at p. 347, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783; Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725).

Estoppel is asserted customarily in situations involving an acquittal followed by subsequent charges arising from the same incident. It may also apply, however, to a mixed verdict in a single prosecution which acquits defendant of some counts of a multiple count indictment and convicts him of others (see, e.g., United States v Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3rd Cir.); United States v. Venable, 585 F.2d 71 (3rd Cir.); see also, United States v. Medina, 709 F.2d 155 (2nd Cir.); United States v. Mespoulede,...