People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau

Decision Date25 January 1966
Docket NumberNo. 39398,39398
Citation34 Ill.2d 84,213 N.E.2d 507
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. Marilyn DRURY, Appellant, v. CATHOLIC HOME BUREAU, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Francis J. Mahon, Chicago, for appellant.

Isham, Lincoln & Beale, Chicago (Robert E. Cronin and Peter A. Tomei, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

Marilyn Drury instituted this habeas corpus action in the Cook County circuit court against the Catholic Home Bureau, a corporate child placement agency licensed by the State of Illinois and operating under the auspices of the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago. Petitioner's objective was to regain custody of her infant son previously surrendered by her to the agency for adoptive placement. Petitioner's appeal comes directly here (Const. of Illinois, art. VI, sec. 5, S.H.A.) from a final judgment finding the surrender to have been voluntarily made and from an order denying a petition to vacate this judgment in order that newly discovered evidence might be considered.

The principal argument is that the trial court's finding as to the absence of duress is against the menifest weight of the evidence, and that petitioner was incapable of forming any considered judgment as to whether she should surrender her child to an adoption agency. Resolution of the questions requires a review of the evidence.

Petitioner was shown to be a 28-year-old unmarried graduate of the University of chicago. She had done post-graduate study at Roosevelt University and taught in the Chicago Public schools. A prior pregnancy in 1962 had been terminated by abortion. Her father died when she was 20, leaving a still intact estate approximating a half-million dollars. Her mother remarried. Petitioner is the only living child, an older brother having been killed when she was 14.

In the fall of 1963 petitioner was examined by Dr. Abraham Jackman who filed a certificate stating she was mentally ill, and her mother filed a petition for her commitment. She was, by an October 16th order of the county court of Cook County, committed a mentally ill to the Department of Mental Health and admitted to the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute in Chicago, the diagnosis of the court-appointed commission then being 'schizophrenic reaction, manifested by hostile and belligerent behavior-delusional paranoid, no insight.' Peior to this commitment she had been privately hospitalized for treatment of her mental difficulties, but the record does not disclose the dates nor extent of such hospitalization. The characteristics of her mental condition were shown to involve wide swings between elation and depression, interfering with her thought processes and functioning, coupled with suspiciousness of other people.

Apparently, interns and staff members from other hospitals were assigned to the Institute as part of their training. Dr. F. T. Reid, Jr., a psychiatrist, was director of the representatives of Michael Reese Hospital at the Institute. Miss Drury was under the immediate care of Dr. Harvey Freed, a resident in psychiatry at Michael Reese Hospital, who spent six months at the Institute. Marcellina Reich, a psychiatric social worker, was also assigned to her case. Petitioner's suspicions that she was pregnant were confirmed shortly after her admission. At the time of her commitment she had been dating Eugene Brill, to whom she was apparently engaged, but she was uncertain as to whether he had fathered the child with which she was pregnant.

During November the Institute staff, Drs. Freed and Reid and Miss Reich discussed petitioner's case and determined it would be best for her adoption, and in December Drs. Freed and Reid and Miss Reich discussed this plan with petitioner's mother and step-father, the Haleys, who agreed. Petitioner was then told of the plan, became angry and refused to consent. Thereafter the Haleys went to Florida, remaining there until April. Later in December the hospital staff decided Miss Drury should make her own decision about the child's future, and that Dr. Freed would discuss this with her.

Petitioner was permitted to date Brill during December, and did so once or twice a week, many of these dates occurring outside the hospital. His testimony indicates that, for some unexplained reason, he told her about March 1, 1964, that he would be willing to adopt the child if they married, but only if it were first placed for adoption and then taken back six or eight months later. She told him that plan was not workable. After talking to Dr. Freed and Miss Reich, he told petitioner he thought it best to place the child for adoption. Petitioner discussed her problems with Dr. Freed twice each week, and in March Miss Reich and petitioner discussed contacting several child-placement agencies regarding assistance with petitioner's problems. Petitioner wrote to one agency herself. Several agencies refused to co-operate because of the mother's hospitalization, but an appointment was made by Miss Reich at petitioner's request with respondent agency, and petitioner, on April 3, was taken at her own request by an agency caseworker to stay with a private family in Lake Zurich, having received conditional discharge from the hospital as improved. At this time petitioner told her mother she was probably going to place the baby for adoption.

Several weeks later petitioner left this home. Her mother and step-father refused to permit her to stay at their home, and she moved to the Sherman Hotel in Chicago. On May 8 petitioner entered St. Vincent's Infant and Maternity Hospital in Chicago and stayed there until just before the birth of her child when she was taken to St. Joseph's Hospital. Throughout this entire period it is established that petitioner conferred regularly with Dr. Freed and discussed the problems related to the future plans for the baby. She also discussed these problems with her social worker, the agency worker, her mother, stepfather, and fiance. She was uncertain as to what she should do, wanting to keep the child but simultaneously realizing that she was not living in a social vacuum, that many people objected to her doing so, and that perhaps it would be best to surrender the youngster for adoption. She talked with Miss Josephine Murphy of the Catholic Home Bureau, was advised as to the several types of child care, including the foster care and adoptive placement plans, looked at the forms relating to adoptive consent, was told such consent was irrevocable and that she would forever relinquish her parental rights and could not thereafter change her mind if she signed a consent to adoption. Miss Drury was also shown the section of the statute relating to irrevocability of adoptive consents and read it. She repeatedly stated it looked as though she would be relinquishing the child for adoption since the attitudes of her mother, step-father and fiance had not changed.

On June 7 Marilyn saw Dr. Freed as an out-patient and requested an absolute discharge which was refused. The baby was born June 17, and on June 22 an absolute discharge was issued by the Institute superintendent indicating petitioner was 'without psychosis'. After leaving St. Joseph Hospital, Miss Drury went to her mother's home. Upon receiving the notice of absolute discharge the circuit court of Cook County on June 24 entered its order restoring petitioner's civil rights. She then contacted Miss Murphy, the Catholic Home Bureau caseworker with whom she had previously conferred, an appointment was made to sign the consent to adoption, and on June 30 the consent was signed by petitioner. At that time the legal effect of her action was again explained to her, and she testified she knew the nature of the documents she signed and that they were the same as the one she had asked to see in an earlier interview. She also signed on June 30 a statement reciting she had read and understood section 11 of the Adoption Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 4, par. 9.1-11,) relating to irrevocability of consents, and that no fraud or duress was used by the Catholic Home Bureau or its agents in accepting her consent to adoption.

During the ensuing summer petitioner worked briefly at Stouffer's and for a longer period at Marshall Field and Co. At the time of the hearing in the habeas corpus action she was a cashier in the Palmer House Pub.

Subsequent to consenting to the adoptive placement petitioner inquired of the caseworker regarding the adoptive family and as to whether the baby had been placed. She was told he had not but that a family had been selected which had already adopted two girls and now wanted a boy. The baby was placed in an adoptive home in August. In September petitioner told the agency she wanted to meet the adoptive parents and was told this was contrary to agency policy. She did not then ask to have the child returned. During September petitioner and the Haleys again saw Dr. Jackman, acting superintendent of Ridgeway Hospital, who was the physician originally certifying to her mental illness in 1963. The doctor talked to them at some length and determined that petitioner's condition was not appreciably different from when he originally saw her and that, in his opinion, she had not been mentally competent when she signed the consent to adoption nor at any time after 1963. In October a lawyer representing her called the agency, repeating the request; the agency policy was explained, and he stated he would advise petitioner to do nothing further. He did not ask for the baby's return. Mrs. Haley, petitioner's mother, testified that her daughter was so 'downcast' that Mrs. Haley changed her mind and told her she would help her try to recover the child and would help her raise it. In november petitioner, who was then living at the McCormick Y.W.C.A., her mother and her counsel sought return of the baby from the Catholic Home Bureau. In December this action was instituted.

The evidence at the hearing was...

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    ...561 (1998); In re Phyllis P., 182 Ill.2d 400, 401, 231 Ill.Dec. 78, 695 N.E.2d 851, 852 (1998); People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 Ill.2d 84, 95, 213 N.E.2d 507, 512 (1966); In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill.App.3d 476, 481, 254 Ill.Dec. 12, 746 N.E.2d 769, 774 (2001). This principle......
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