People ex rel. Edwards v.  Bellevue

• Decision Date: 17 April 1923
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. EDWARDS v. SUPERINTENDENT OF BELLEVUE AND ALLIED HOSPITALS OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

235 N.Y. 398

139 N.E. 553

PEOPLE ex rel. EDWARDS

v.SUPERINTENDENT OF BELLEVUE AND ALLIED HOSPITALS OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 17, 1923.

Habeas corpus by the People, on the relations of John T. Edwards, against the Superintendent of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals of the City of New York and others. The writ was sustained by the Appellate Division (203 App. Div. 598,196 N. Y. Supp. 678), relator discharged, and defendants appeal by permission.

Reversed, application denied, and relator remanded.

Hogan, Crane, and Andrews, JJ., dissenting.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Ceorge P. Nicholson, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (W. Cleveland Runyon, John F. O'Brien, and George H. Cowie, all of New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

Mirabeau L. Towns, Abraham Simonoff, and James H. Farrell, all of New York City, for respondent.

CARDOZO, J.

On January 9, 1922, there was lodged with one of the magistrates of the city of New York an affidavit, which, after describing the relator's conduct, expressed the belief that he was insane, and prayed his commitment to the custody of the board of trustees of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals for examination as to his sanity. Upon this information a warrant was issued, and two days thereafter the relator was arraigned in the Magistrate's Court for the Third District before the magistrate then presiding. An adjournment was ordered to January 13, the relator being paroled in the custody of his counsel and thereafter there were successive adjournments, all by consent, till March 23, when, again by consent, a trial was directed before another magistrate, sitting in the same court. This magistrate heard testimony both in support of the information and against it. More than 10 months after arraignment, on November 18, 1922, the case was finally submitted. In the meantime, 31 adjournments had been ordered, the relator on every occasion consenting thereto. On November 18, 1922, the magistrate signed a warrant of commitment, reciting that the relator was apparently insane, and directing that he be committed to the care and custody of the trustees of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals at Bellevue Hospital in the city of New York until the question of his sanity could be determined in accordance with law, the detention not to exceed 10 days. Before the 10 days had expired, the relator, while still under examination at the hospital, sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was made returnable at the Appellate Division. That court held the commitment void for two reasons. One was that the Insanity Law did not contemplate a trial by the magistrate, or even an adjournment, but summary action at the time of the arraignment. Another was that jurisdiction was confined to the magistrate then presiding. The writ was accordingly sustained, and the relator discharged.

[1] Upon this writ of habeas corpus, the inquiry is confined to the single point of jurisdiction. People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364. The question is not whether the action of the magistrate is improvident or erroneous. The question is whether it is void. The Insanity Law provides (section 87; Consol. Laws, c. 27) that ‘whenever in the city of New York an information is laid before a magistrate that a person is apparently insane,’ a warrant of arrest shall issue. The proceeding is not one for the punishment of crime. The state intervenes in the capacity of parens patriae for the welfare of its wards. People ex rel. Riesner v. New York Nursery & Child's Hospital, 230 N. Y. 119, 122, 129 N. E. 341. ‘If upon arraignment it appears to the magistrate presiding that the person so arraigned before him is apparently insane,’ it shall be the duty of the magistrate ‘to commit such apparently insane person to the care and custody of the board of trustees of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals at Bellevue Hospital, and therein keep in a safe and comfortable place’ until the question of his sanity be determined as prescribed by law.

We cannot yield assent to a ruling that jurisdiction is lost if the commitment is not ordered at once upon arraignment. Injustice may be done either to the complainant or to the prisoner, if the magistrate be without power to inquire and deliberate. A lunatic whose vagaries of conduct have been manifest without the courthouse may give no hint of lunacy when arraigned within its walls. In such circumstances, the sworn information may not satisfy the conscience of the magistrate. Inquiry of the complainant or of others may be necessary to inform him whether the charge has been laid in sincerity or in malice. To this end, the power to adjourn is a necessary incident to the power to determine. ‘Upon arraignment’ means ‘after’ or ‘following’ arraignment, and is not confined to action on the impressions of the moment.

We have no doubt that it is the duty of the magistrate to conduct the proceeding in a summary manner, and to reach his decision with all reasonable dispatch. He is not to determine whether the prisoner is insane. The very purpose of the commitment is to supply an opportunity for the determination of that question upon fuller observation. He is to determine merely whether the evidences of insanity are such as to show the need of examination by those best qualified to examine. A magistrate, mindful of his duty and of the purpose of the statute, will not enter upon a protracted trial, when the proceeding, brought to a conclusion, will at best culminate in a form of relief that is provisional and tentative. He will find a very practical objection to...