Ex parte Dubois

• Decision Date: 07 July 1954
• Parties: Ex parte DUBOIS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 920

120 N.E.2d 920

331 Mass. 575

Ex parte DUBOIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued May 5, 1954.

Decided July 7, 1954.

James S. Seligman, Fall River, Benjamin A. Friedman, Taunton, with him, for petitioner.

Maurice M. Lyons, Dist. Atty., New Bedford, for respondent.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the superintendent of the State farm at Bridgewater by a person who has been committed for observation to the defective delinquent department of that institution under St.1953, c. 645. That statute provides, so far as is here material, that where it has been judicially determined that a commitment to a defective delinquent department has been 'procedurally improper' the person held under such commitment shall be newly committed for stated periods of observation. If found not to be mentally defective he shall be returned to the court for further order consistent with the previous determination. If found to be mentally defective notice shall be given him, and if he is under the age of seventeen, notice shall also be given to his parents or nearest relative that a hearing is to be held for his commitment to a defective delinquent department. 'If, after a hearing and examination of the person's record, character and personality, the court finds that such person has shown himself to be dangerous or shows a tendency toward becoming such, that such tendency is or may become a menace to the public and that such person is not a proper subject for the school for the feeble-minded or commitment as an insane person, the court shall make a report of the finding to the effect that the person is a defective delinquent and may commit him to a department for defective delinquents * * * as provided in * * * section one hundred and thirteen [of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123], and all of the applicable provisions of said section relating to the procedure governing the commitment of defective delinquents shall apply. If a person so requests, an issue or issues shall be framed and submitted to a jury.'

It appeared at a hearing of the petition by a judge of the Superior Court that the petitioner was committed as a defective delinquent in 1949 after pleading guilty to a charge of burglary; that his commitment was later determined to have been 'procedurally improper'; and that he was 'newly committed' for observation under St.1953, c. 645. The petitioner requested the following rulings: '1. Chapter 645 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts of 1953 is unconstitutional because it furnishes an undefined, vague and uncertain standard over what constitutes a 'mentally defective' contrary to the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. 2. Chapter 645 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts of 1953 is unconstitutional because it furnishes an undefined standard over the terms 'shown himself to be dangerous or shows a tendency to become such, that such tendency is or may become a menace to the public' contrary to the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. 3. Chapter 645 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts of 1953 is unconstitutional because delinquency implies an offense or crime and the confinement as provided thereby of a person not convicted or even arraigned or arrested for a crime is contrary to the due process clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and to art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. 4. Chapter 645 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts of 1953 is unconstitutional because it is so indefinite, vague and uncertain as not to enable petitioner to know what constitutes a 'mental defective' and what constitutes one as 'dangerous' or having a 'tendency to become such, that such tendency is or may become a menace to the public' and therefore amounts to a delegation by the Legislature of legislative powers to courts and juries to determine the meaning of said provisions contrary to art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.'

The judge did not pass upon these requests but in the following terms reported to this court the questions of law thereby raised: 'If the statute is constitutional as drawn, and the definition 'mental defective' means merely someone below general normal intelligence, I find that the petitioner is mentally defective, and if mere potentiality for criminality is sufficient to classify the petitioner as dangerous or likely to become such, or a menace, I find that the past history, mentality, the associations and environment of the petitioner, are such that he might engage in some criminal activity. I have remanded the petitioner to the custody of the department of defective delinquents. Being of the opinion that the questions involved ought to be determined by the full court before any further proceedings, I report the case for that purpose, having stayed all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.'

The enactment of St.1953, c. 645, followed decisions of this court in Petition of O'Leary, 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769, and Ex parte Tardiff, 328 Mass. 265, 103 N.E.2d 265, wherein it was determined that the commitments of the respective petitioners to a defective delinquent department under the provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 113, were illegal because of failure of the committing tribunal to conform to important procedural requirements of that section. Since these decisions were reported many other commitments have been invalidated by the courts for similar reasons. The present act was passed as an emergency measure for the purpose as stated in its preamble 'to provide for the immediate observation, examination and recommitment of certain persons who may be mentally defective and a menace to the public.' Its obvious intent is to prevent the immediate discharge of such persons from custody and supervision because of technical fault in their commitment as defective delinquents until from further observation it can be determined that they are not mentally defective and potentially dangerous.

In no sense is it a criminal or penal statute. It does not purport to define a crime and it imposes no penalty. Commitment under its provisions is not in the nature of punishment. People ex rel. Edwards v. Superintendent of Bellevue & Allied Hospitals of City of New York, 235 N.Y. 398, 401, 139 N.E. 553; County of Black Hawk v. Springer, 58 Iowa 417, 418, 10 N.W. 791. See Sylvester v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 244, 247, 148 N.E. 449. The general power of the Legislature, in its capacity as parens patriae, to make suitable provision for incompetent persons who are...