People ex rel. Gramlich v. City of Peoria

• Decision Date: 11 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25633.,25633.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. GRAMLICH et al. v. CITY OF PEORIA et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

374 Ill. 313

29 N.E.2d 539

PEOPLE ex rel. GRAMLICH et al.

v.CITY OF PEORIA et al.

No. 25633.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 11, 1940.

Action by the People, on the relation of Harry Gramlich, and others, for a writ of mandamus commanding the officers of the city of Peoria to appropriate for and pay wages due relators as city firemen. From part of an order of the circuit court, relators appeal, and from the remainder of the order, respondents cross-appeal.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Peoria County; John T. Culbertson, Jr., judge.

Londrigan & Londrigan and Giffin, Lindner, Newkirk & Jones, all of Springfield, for appellants.

William L. Eagleton and Michael A. Shore, both of Peoria, for appellees.

MURPHY, Justice.

Relators instituted a mandamus action in the circuit court of Peoria county to command the officers of the city to appropriate for and pay certain wages relators claimed to be due them as firemen of the city under the Firemens' Minimum Wage Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 24, par. 860c et seq.) Relators alleged the monthly wages which had been paid were less than the amount specified in the act as a minimum wage and this action was to compel payment of the difference between the amount paid and the minimum as provided by the act. The original act became effective July 13, 1937, and the amendatory act, which provides for an additional tax and the adoption of the act by a referendum, went into effect July 21, 1939. ( Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 24, par. 860e et seq.) Relators contended the amendatory act was unconstitutional and asked relief to include the unpaid wages which accrued between July 13, 1937, and January 1, 1940. Appellees moved to strike that part of relators' petition which attacked the validity of the amendatory act and answered the remainder, setting up facts which they claimed supported their theory of the invalidity of the original act; they also contended mandamus was not the proper remedy and that the action was barred by laches. The court held both the original and amendatory acts constitutional and awarded a writ to include wages accruing between July 13, 1937, and July 21, 1939.

Relators appealed from that part of the order which held the amendatory act constitutional and the validity of the amendatory act is the sole question presented on the direct appeal. Appellees filed a cross-appeal from the remainder of the order, thereby presenting questions as to the validity of the original act, the right of relators to relief by mandamus and whether the action was barred by laches.

Relators contend that section 4 of the amendatory act amended section 2 of the original act and, therefore, contravenes that part of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats., which provides: ‘No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act.’

The title of the Firemen's Minimum Wage Act is ‘An Act to provide for and fix the salaries of firemen in certain cities, villages and incorporated towns.’ It contains two sections, the first of which defines who are firemen and included in the provisions of the act. The second section provides the salary to be paid a fireman shall not be less then $150 per month in cities, villages and incorporated towns having a population of 10,000 or more, but less than 25,000; $175 per month in municipalities having a population of 25,000 or more, but less than 150,000, and that it shall not apply to special firemen temporarily employed. The title of the amendatory act is ‘An Act to add Sections 3 and 4 to ‘An Act to provide for and fix the salaries of firemen in certain cities, villages and incorporated towns.’' Laws 1939, p. 400. Section 1 provides that the added sections 3 and 4 shall ‘read as follows.’ The substance of section 3 is that any city, village or incorporated town which adopts the act may levy a tax to provide revenue for the purpose of paying the salary of firemen in such cities, villages and incorporated towns. The tax so authorized is to be in addition to all taxes previously authorized by law to be levied and collected in such municipalities. Section 4 provides: ‘This Act shall become inoperative upon the effective date of this amendatory Act and shall have no further effect in any city, village or incorporated town, unless adopted therein as hereinafter provided’ Then follows provision for the adoption of the act by a referendum.

Whether the amendatory act amends prior acts is to be determined not alone by the title, or whether the act purports to be an amendment of existing laws, buy by its effect upon prior laws and an examination and ocmparison of its provisions with the prior law left in force. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155;Badenoch v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N.E. 31;Michaels v. Hill, 328 Ill. 11, 159 N.E. 278. This same principle is applicable whether the amendatory act purports to be an independent act or to be an act to amend another act by the adding of a new section. Lyons v. Police Pension Board, 255 Ill. 139, 99 N.E. 337. If the amendatory act is complete in itself, constituting an entire act of legislation on the subject will which it purports to deal, it is to be deemed good and is not subject to the constitutional provision notwithstanding it may repeal by implication or modify the provisions of the prior law. If the amendatory act merely amends the old law by intermingling new and different provisions or by adding new provisions so as to create out of the old act and the new, when taken together, a complete act and leaves it in such condition that the old act must be read with the new to determine its provisions and meaning, then the act is amendatory of the old law, and the constitutional provision requires that the law so amended be inserted at length in the new act. Bishop v. Chicago Railways Co., 303 Ill. 273, 135 N.E. 439;Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939.

The subject matter of the original act was to provide a minimum wage to be paid firemen in cities coming within a specified class based upon population. It became effective upon its passage and approval. The effect of section 4 was to suspend section 2 until a condition imposed by section 4 should be complied with, namely, the adoption of the act by a referendum. Section 4 is meaningless unless reference is made to section 2 of the original act. Section 4 makes no provision for a minimum wage to be paid firemen and contains no classifications of cities to which the act is applicable. Standing alone, the amendatory act merely provides for a referendum and does not specify the subject matter to which it refers. It can only be traced through the sentences above referred to from section 4. The words ‘this act,’ as used therein, obviously refer to both the original and amendatory acts. The purpose of the provision quoted from section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution was to avoid the necessity of having to make reference to a prior law to determine and give meaning to an amendatory act. $The method of amendment followed in this case is similar to the one considered in Lyons v. Police Pension Board, supra. In that case the amendment was made by the adding of a new section to the Police Pension Fund Act. It extended the benefits of the act to include police matrons in the police departments upon the terms specified in the additional section. Section 3 of the original act prescribed the rules of eligibility for benefits under the law. It was held the amendatory act fixing the qualifications of police matrons for the benefits was an amendment of section 3 of the original act and came within the prohibition of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution.

In Nelson v. Hoffman, 314 Ill. 616, 145 N.E. 688, the act under consideration purported to amend the Mortgage Act by adding a section. The prior law provided that a chattel mortgage acknowledged and recorded in accordance with the provisions of the act would, if bona fide,...