Michaels v. Hill

• Decision Date: 21 December 1927
• Docket Number: No. 18512.,18512.
• Citation: 328 Ill. 11,159 N.E. 278
• Parties: MICHAELS v. HILL et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

328 Ill. 11

159 N.E. 278

MICHAELS

v.HILL et al.

No. 18512.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1927.

Petition for writ of mandamus by S. Hunter Michaels against Gilford H. Hill and others. The petition was dismissed, and petitioner appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Du Page County; William J. fulton, judge.

Locke & Baker, of Glen Ellyn, and Rankin & Lustfield, of Chicago (Richard F. Locke, of Glen Ellyn, of counsel), for appellant.

H. S. Pettis, of Wheaton, for appellees.

STONE, J.

The appellant filed a petition in the circuit court of Du Page county for a writ of mandamus to compel the appellees, members of the board of education of school district No. 44 in that county, and others, to issue certain school bonds theretofore authorized by vote of the district. The defendants to the petition filed a general demurrer thereto, which was sustained, and, the appellant having stood by his petition, it was dismissed. He brings the cause here for review.

The petition, after averring the existence of the school district and facts concerning its organization, alleges that, pursuant to a petition of more than 300 voters of the district, the board of education called a special election to vote on the propositions of selecting and purchasing a new schoolhouse site, the building of a new schoolhouse and the issuance of $45,000 in bonds of the district. This election was held on May 14, 1927, and a majority of the voters voted in the affirmative on all the propositions, thus authorizing the board of education to issue bonds of the district in the sum of $45,000, dated June 1, 1927. The petition avers that the board thereafter adopted a resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds, prescribing their form, directing that the same be executed and delivered, and directing the levy of a tax sufficient to pay the principal of said bonds and interest thereon, of which action a record was made according to law; that $17,000 of the bonds have been executed, issued, and delivered to the purchaser thereof and paid for by him and $28,000 of the bonds have not been delivered or executed; that, although demand has been made on the defendants to execute and deliver the bonds in compliance with said proceedings, they and all of them refuse so to do. The petition avers that the full value of the taxable property in the school district is $2,360,820 and the assessed value thereof as last extended previous to the election authorizing the bonds is $1,180,410; that the aggregate indebtedness of the district is a bond issue of $12,000, exclusive of the $45,000 authorized at the election by the voters of the district; that taxes have been levied, collectible in the year 1928, for educational and building purposes sufficient to pay the ordinary operating expenses of the district.

At the 1927 session of the Legislature an act was passed amending an act concerning the levy and extension of taxes and adding thereto a new section designated as section 3. Laws of 1927, pp. 723-727. This new section is as follows:

‘No county having a population of less than 500,000 and no city, township, school district or other municipal corporation having a population of less than 300,000, shall become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding two and one-half (2 1/2) per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.’

The act was approved and became effective on July 7, 1927. Counsel for appellant say that the effect of this act, so far as this bond issue is concerned, is to reduce the bonding capacity of the school district from $59,020.50 to $29,510.25, and that it is for this reason that the appellees have refused to issue the remainder of the bonds.

The only question raised here is as to the constitutionality of the act of 1927. The grounds upon which appellant contends it is unconstitutional and void are, first, that it contravenes section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides in part:

‘No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed; and no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act.’

The second ground upon which the invalidity of the act is urged is, that it contravenessection 22 of article 4 of the Constitution, in that it provides for a classification of counties, cities, townships, school districts, and other municipalities which unreasonably discriminates against the smaller counties and municipalities.

[1][2][3][4] Does this act violate section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution of this state? This question is to be approached with a recognition of the well-established rule that acts of the Legislature are presumed to be valid. All doubts or uncertainty arising from the language of the Constitution or of the act must be resolved in favor of the validity of the act, and the court will assume to declare it void only in case of a clear conflict with the Constitution. It is the duty of the court to so construe acts of the Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality, if such can reasonably be done. If their construction is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the law. People v. Newcom, 318 Ill. 188, 149 N. E. 269;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994;Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851,58 L. R. A. 277, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357. To render an act or a portion thereof void as not embraced in the title it must be seen that it is incongruous with or has no proper connection with or relation to the title. If by any fair construction the provisions of such act have a necessary or proper connection with or relation to the title, it is not open to this objection. People v. McBride, supra; Hudnall v. Ham, 172 Ill. 76, 49 N. E. 985. The word ‘subject,’ as used in the Constitution, signifies ‘the matter or thing forming the groundwork.’ It may contain many parts which grow out of it and are germane to it, and which, if traced back, will lead the mind to it as the generic head. People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 106 N. E. 458;People v. Sargent, 254 Ill. 514, 98 N. E. 959;O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. 534. It is not required that the title of an act be so worded as to form an index to all the provisions contained therein, and mere mentioning in the title of related particulars is not a stating of a plurality of subjects. People v. Sargent, supra; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454,29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315.

[5][6] The title of the act in question is as follows:

‘An act to amend the title and section 2 of an act entitled, ‘An act concerning the levy and extension of taxes,’ approved May 9, 1901, in force July 1, 1901, as amended, and to add a new section thereto to be known as section 3.'

Section 1 of the act provides:

‘That section 2 of an act entitled ‘An act concerning the levy and extension of taxes,’ approved May 9, 1901, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows.'

Section 2 of the Act of 1901, as amended, is thereupon set out in full. Section 2 provides:

‘That said act be and the same is hereby further amended by adding thereto a new section to be known as section 3, to read as follows.’

Thereupon follows the new section hereinbefore quoted. The last section provides that the title of the act be amended to read as follows:

‘An act concerning the levy and extension of taxes, and also providing for a limitation of indebtedness in counties having a population of less than 500,000 and in cities, townships, school districts and other municipal corporations having a population of less than 300,000.’

Counsel for appellant urge that both the title and the body of the act contain two unrelated subjects, and that the act therefore violates the provision of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, that ‘no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,’ and is therefore void in toto.

The rule consistently adhered to is that all matters are properly included in an act which are germane to the title, and those matters may be included in the title which relate to the same general subject. While it cannot be doubted that the provisions of section 3 are within the title of the act as that title is amended, the question arises whether the title contains more than one subject. The subject of an act may be expressed in the title by the use of a brief general form, as in case of the Criminal Code, which is entitled, ‘An act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence.’ Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 38. Necessarily there are many things included in an act which are not expressed in the general title except as they are related to or have some more or less direct connection with the general subject legislated upon. The prohibition of section 13 of article 4 is against the use of two subjects in the title or in the act. It is not required that the subject of the bill passed by the Legislature be specifically and exactly expressed in the title or that the title shall be an index to the details of the act. Ritchie v. People, supra; Sutherland on Stat. Const. §§ 82, 85, 86, 88, 92-96; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431.

In Sutter v. People's Gas Light Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N. E. 562, the title of the act as passed by the Legislature embraced the power of the city of Chicago to sell surplus electricity and also to fix rates and charges for the supply of gas and electricity furnished by any individual or corporation. This court held that...