People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover

• Decision Date: 03 April 1913
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HATFIELD v. GROVER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

258 Ill. 124

101 N.E. 216

PEOPLE ex rel. HATFIELD

v.GROVER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1913.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1913.

Error to Circuit Court, McLean County; Colostin D. Myers, Judge.

Information by the People, on the relation of J. E. Hatfield, Assessor, against George W. Grover. A demurrer to a plea by defendant was overruled, and he brings error. Affirmed.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen. (Stone, Oglevee & Franklin, of Bloomington, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Barry & Morrissey, A. W. Peasley, and W. R. Bach, all of Bloomington, for defendant in error.

CARTER, J.

This is an information filed in the circuit court of McLean county, on motion of the Attorney General, against the defendant in error, George W. Grover, charging him with unlawful usurpation of the office of assessor of the alleged ‘town of the city of Bloomington.’ The defendant in error filed a plea, in which he set up that the city of Bloomington had a population of more than 15,000; that its territory was composed of parts of two townships; that its council, by resolution, requested the county board of said McLean county to organize the territory of said city of Bloomington into a separate township, by the name of ‘Town of the City of Bloomington’; that the county board granted said request; that said territory was duly organized as a new town under section 1 of an act which went into force July 1, 1877, as amended in 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 352 [Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 139, § 136]). Plaintiff in error filed a demurrer to this plea, which, after argument, was overruled. It elected to stand by the demurrer, and thereupon the court dismissed the petition. This writ of error was sued out from that judgment.

[1] The principal contention in this case is whether said section 1 of said act of 1877, as amended in 1903, is constitutional. Said section reads as follows: ‘That the county board, in any county under township organization, may provide that the territory embraced within any city in such county shall be organized as a town: Provided, such territory shall have a population of not less than 3,000: And provided, the city council in such city shall, by resolution, request such action by the county board: And provided further, that whenever the territory of any city of a population of not less than 15,000 shall be composed of portions of two or more townships, and shall by its council request, by resolution, the county board to organize it into a separate township, as aforesaid, and shall designate the name thereof, it shall be the duty of the county board to comply with such request and provide for such organization of said city into a new township under the name designated in such resolution of said city council.’ The last proviso was added by the amendment of 1903; the balance of the section reading the same as it did when originally passed in 1877. It is argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that the proviso is unconstitutional as special legislation; and, while insisting that it is not necessary for a decision of this case, they also claim that the entire section is unconstitutional for the same reason.

Concerning the limitations of the power of the Legislature to enact a township organization law, it has been held that the law must be general; that no two townships shall have the same name; that the system must be adopted by a majority of the legal voters of the county; that the holding of the annual twon meeting must be uniform throughout the state; that the fees of township officers must be fixed and regulated by general law; that aside from these limitations the Legislature is not restricted in regard to the terms and provisions of a township organization law. People v. Knopf, 171 Ill. 191, 49 N. E. 424.

[2][3][4] A town, under the township organization system, is a civil subdivision of a county. A county is an involuntary political or civil division of the state, created by statute to aid in the administration of government. People v. Martin, 178 Ill. 611, 53 N. E. 309. All municipal or public corporations are subject to legislative control, and may be divided, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, restrained, or abolished, as the exigencies of the public may demand. The only restriction on that power is that no local or special law shall be passed with reference to them. City of Chicago v. Town of Cicero, 210 Ill. 290, 71 N. E. 356, and cases cited; Chalstran v. Board of Education, 244 Ill. 470, 91 N. E. 712.

[5][6] A law is not local because it operates only in certain municipalities of the state, if, by its terms, it operates uniformly throughout the state under like circumstances and situation. L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, 72 N. E. 399,103 Am. St. Rep. 234. A classification of public corporations cannot be arbitrarily adopted. ‘There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and objects to be attained. There must be something, in the nature of things, which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes.’ People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155. If all laws were held unconstitutional because they did not embrace all persons, few would stand the test. A law is general, not because it embraces all of the governed, but that it may embrace all if they occupy the position of those who are embraced. Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am. Rep. 610. A law which classifies cities, towns, and villages on a basis of 5,000 to 10,000 population as to regulating the plumbing business and maintaining a board of examiners for plumbers and issuing certificates has been held constitutional. Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162. This court has repeatedly stated that additional powers may be required in cities for the performance of duties additionalto those required in less populous centers. People v. Knopf, supra; L'Hote v. Village of Milford, supra; Cummings v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 563, 33 N. E. 854;Northwestern University v. Village of Wilmette, 230 Ill. 80, 82 N. E. 615.

Section 1, before amended in 1903, has twice been held constitutional by this court as not contravening said provision against special legislation as to towns. People v. Brayton, 94 Ill. 341;People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319, 6 N. E. 480. That this section was a valid enactment has also been recognized in Tissier v. Rhein, 130 Ill. 110, 22 N. E. 848;People v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 172 Ill. 71, 49 N. E. 982;City of East St. Louis v. Rhein, 139 Ill. 116, 28 N. E. 1089, and Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N. E. 549.

Counsel for plaintiff in error concede that this court has held the original section constitutional, but insist that what is said on that subject was not necessary for the decision of either of said cases where that ruling was made. With this we cannot agree. Without discussing this point at length, the law was held constitutional in People v. Brayton, supra. In People v. Hazelwood, supra, the very question of special legislation was considered at length. On page 328 of 116 Ill., on page 485 of 6 N. E., of that decision, it was said: ‘Again, the objection is urged that the law is local or special, in that the townships affected by the act are essentially different from townships existing in territory unaffected by the act, and that it is for that reason unconstitutional. It will be observed that this difference is merely in the instrumentalities by and through which the general township system is enforced. The main object, evidently, is to reduce the number of officials required to carry on local government, and to that extent to reduce expenses. It is assumed, and rightly, as we think, that as regards the purposes of the organization of townships and the administration of township government there is such a difference in the conditions and relations of things within incorporated cities from those in the country as in material respects makes differences in the statutes applicable to the one and to the other indispensable. Thus, the construction and repairing of roads, bridges, etc., the regulation, restraint, or prohibition of domestic animals running at large, * * * can in the country be done only by the corporate authorities of the townships; but in the cities these things fall entirely within the powers of the municipal government. * * * So, also, there are other powers conferred upon towns by the Township Law which have relation only to the protection of the interests of agriculture in the country, the subject-matters whereof are, by the mere fact of the existence of a city, excluded from its limits. * * * Classification, therefore, in our opinion, is not only allowable, but to a large extent inevitable, between towns lying wholly in the country and those the entire territory of which is covered by an incorporated city; and we are, hence, unable to say that a law applicable, as is this, to all townships the territory of which does not extend beyond the limits of the territory of an incorporated city is unconstitutional, because local or special.’ This decision on this question has never been overruled or questioned by this court since that time.

From what was said in People v. Brayton, supra, and later in People v....