People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett
| Decision Date | 17 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 44761,44761 |
| Citation | 50 Ill.2d 242,278 N.E.2d 84 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE ex rel. Lawrence E. KLINGER, Petitioner, v. Michael J. HOWLETT, Auditor of Public Accounts, Respondent. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Don H. Reuben, Lawrence Gunnels, James C. Munson, and Hartigan & Hartigan, Chicago (David M. Hartigan, Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.
William J. Harte, and Kevin M. Forde, Chicago, for respondent.
On October 29, 1971, this court granted leave to file an original petition for Mandamus to compel the respondent Auditor of Public Accounts to process vouchers and issue warrants in connection with Senate Bills 1195, 1196, and 1197, passed by both houses in the 77th General Assembly. These bills are also identified as 'Public Acts 77--1656, 77--1657 and 77--1658.' They relate to financial assistance for nonpublic school education. The respondent answered, denying the constitutionality of the bills, an expedited briefing schedule was fixed, and oral argument was heard on December 13, 1971.
The briefs of the parties have discussed the validity of the bills under the first amendment to the constitution of the United States and under article I, section 3, and article X, section 3 of the 1970 constitution of Illinois, S.H.A. Issues were also discussed as to the proper interpretation of authority given to the Governor, under section 9(e) of article IV of the constitution of 1970, to return a bill passed by the General Assembly with his 'specific recommendations for change.' A question was also raised as to whether the bills complied with the command of article IV, section 8(d) of the constitution of 1970, that 'Appropriation bills shall be limited to the subject of appropriations.' Since the case was submitted, the parties have complied with the court's request that they submit supplemental memoranda on the question of whether or not the three bills are presently in effect.
The three bills were passed by the Senate on June 2, 1971, and by the House on June 22, 1971. By messages dated September 10, 1971, the Governor, stating that he was acting pursuant to the authority vested in him under article IV, section 9(e) of the constitution of 1970, returned each bill with the recommendation that the title of each bill be amended and that everything in each bill after the enacting clause be stricken and entirely new textual material be substituted therefor. On October 14, 1971, a motion to accept the Governor's recommendations was adopted by the Senate and a similar motion was adopted by the House of Representatives on October 28, 1971. On that date the Governor certified that the acceptance of the General Assembly conformed to his specific recommendations for change.
Section 10 of article IV of the constitution of 1970 provides:
When the General Assembly acted upon the changes recommended by the Governor, the following provision concerning the 'effective date of laws' was in effect:
H.B. 3029: Public Act 77--147.
These are the constitutional and legislative provisions that were in effect on October 28, 1971, when the Governor certified that the action of the General Assembly with respect to the three bills now before us conformed to his specific recommendations. None of the three bills contained a provision specifically providing an effective date. Under these provisions the bills cannot become effective before July 1, 1972. These are also the constitutional and legislative provisions that were in effect when another bill, House Bill 3032, also identified as 'Public Act 77--1691,' was certified by the Governor on November 17, 1971. That bill is relied upon to establish for the three bills now before us an effective date earlier than July 1, 1972.
House Bill 3032 (P.A. 77--1691), as printed in Illinois Legislative Service 1971 Laws, p. 2974, provides:
'Two or more Acts which relate to same subject matter and which are enacted by the same General Assembly shall be construed together in such manner as to give full effect to each Act except in case of an irreconcilable conflict. In case of an irreconcilable conflict the Act last acted upon by the General Assembly is controlling to the extent of such conflict. The Act last acted upon is determined by reference to the final legislative action taken by either house of the General Assembly, whether such final action is passage on third reading in the second house, concurring in or receding from an amendment, adoption of a conference committee report, acceptance of the Governor's specific recommendations for change, or passage over the Governor's voto. However, for the purpose of determining the effective date of laws under Section 10 of Article IV of the Constitution of (1970) and 'An Act in relation to the effective date of laws', approved July 2, 1971, a bill is 'passed' at the time of its final legislative action before presentation to the Governor as provided in paragraph (a) of Section 9 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1970.
'An irreconcilable conflict between 2 or more Acts which amend the same section of an Act exists only if the amendatory Acts make inconsistent changes in the section as it theretofore existed.
'The rules of construction provided for in this section are applicable to Acts enacted by the same General Assembly throughout the 2 year period of its existence.
(The portion of the specific change recommended by the Governor that is significant for present purposes is italicized.)
House Bill 3032 could not have become effective before November 17, 1971, the date upon which the Governor certified that it was passed in accordance with his recommended changes. Therefore, it cannot be applicable to the three bills involved in this case as it became effective after October 28, 1971, when those bills became law, and it contains no suggestion that it was intended to have a retroactive effect. As the provisions of House Bill 3032 are not applicable to this case, we do not now consider problems which might arise from the fact that the changes proposed by the Governor were not accepted in the same form by the two houses of the General Assembly. Cf. H.J. Oct. 20, 1971, p. 18--S.J. Nov. 2, 1971, p. 18.
In Board of Education v. Morgan (1925), 316 Ill. 143, 147 N.E. 34, this court held that a bill passed by the General Assembly on June 19, 1923, and approved by the Governor on July 2, 1923, became effective upon its approval, and rejected the contention that it did not become effective until July 1, 1924. The court there quoted the following definitions of the word 'passage':
'Webster's New International Dictionary, in defining passage, says: 'Of a measure or law, ordinarily passage refers to the final affirmative action by which the assembly enacts the law, but it has been also sometimes used to designate the time of taking effect of the act, (52 Ill.App. 514, 518; 45 Neb. 724;) or the final act necessary to make it a valid law, as the signing or approval by the Governor or other executive.--82 Mass. (16 Gray) 144; 50 Tenn. 442.' The Standard Dictionary, in defining passage, says: '8. The course of a legislative measure through the various stages of debate and action or through a single stage; especially its enactment by the final vote, or the signing or approval by the supreme authority, as the President, King or Governor of a State." (316 Ill. 143, at 147, 147 N.E. 34, at 36.)
The court there was concerned only with the normal procedure whereby the legislature initially passes a bill and sends it to the Governor for his approval; no...
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