People ex rel. M.R.M.
| Decision Date | 25 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 17CA0255 |
| Citation | 484 P.3d 807 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Appellee, IN the INTEREST OF M.R.M., M.M.M., and M.A.M., Children, and Concerning M.M.A., Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Tari L. Williams, County Attorney, Heather K. Beattie, Assistant County Attorney, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Cassie L. Coleman, Luisa Berne, Guardians Ad Litem
Debra W. Dodd, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Berthoud, Colorado, for Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
¶ 1 M.M.A. (mother) appeals from the order dismissing the dependency and neglect proceeding concerning M.R.M., M.M.M., and M.A.M. (the children). In our original opinion on this case, we concluded that the order from which mother seeks to appeal wasn't a final and appealable order and that, because her notice of appeal wasn't filed within twenty-one days after the entry of the order that was final and appealable, her appeal was untimely. See People in Interest of M.R.M. , 2018 COA 10, 484 P.3d 711 ( M.R.M. I ). We dismissed mother's appeal. Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. The parties submitted supplemental briefs concerning R.S. and its effect on the issue at hand.
¶ 3 After reconsideration of mother's appeal in light of People in Interest of R.S. , we conclude that the allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) order was the final, appealable order in mother's proceeding — not the order terminating the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Because mother's notice of appeal was filed more than twenty-one days after the entry of the APR order, her appeal was untimely and, accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 4 In March 2016, the Garfield County Department of Human Services (the Department) sought and received temporary custody of eleven-year-old M.R.M., six-year-old M.M.M., and three-year-old M.A.M. based on concerns that the children had been exposed to drugs, violence in the home, and an injurious environment.
¶ 5 Shortly after the children were removed from mother's home, the Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect, naming mother and M.M., who is the father of M.R.M. and M.M.M., and stepfather to M.A.M. (hereinafter father M.M.), as respondents. The Department acknowledged that father M.M. wasn't M.A.M.’s biological father and that J.H., a resident of Florida, was suspected to be her father. A caseworker contacted J.H. in Florida and learned he had mental health issues. The caseworker then discussed the situation with J.H.’s mother, who was his primary caretaker.
¶ 6 Although the court entered an order requiring genetic testing of J.H., and the Department said that it was "in the process of conducting a genetic test to determine paternity," no genetic test results appear in the record, and J.H. was never determined to be M.A.M.’s father or named as a party to the case.
¶ 7 The court initially placed the children with their maternal grandmother. However, father M.M. moved from Florida to Colorado and sought custody of all three children soon after the case began. He said that he shared custody of the two older children with mother under a domestic relations order, and he asserted that he should have custody of M.A.M. because he was her psychological parent. The court placed the children with him, under the protective supervision of the Department, at the end of March.
¶ 8 In May, father M.M. entered into a stipulated agreement for continued adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2020, and the court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected with respect to mother after a trial. A division of this court affirmed the adjudication with respect to mother in People in Interest of M.R.M. , (Colo. App. No. 16CA1845, 2017 WL 5502209, Nov. 16, 2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e) ).
¶ 9 The court adopted treatment plans for both mother and father M.M. But a few weeks after the court approved mother's plan, father M.M. moved to modify the existing order under which he shared custody of the children with mother and to dismiss the dependency and neglect case. In support of his request for custody of M.A.M., as well as the older two children, he submitted a letter asserting that he was M.A.M.’s father because he was the only father she had ever known and that he was willing to take full responsibility for her.
¶ 10 In November, the juvenile court entered an order allocating parental responsibilities for all three children between father M.M. and mother (the APR order). The court made no findings as to whether J.H. or father M.M. was M.A.M.’s legal father. Instead, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to allocate parental responsibilities regarding M.A.M. to father M.M. under section 14-10-123(1)(d), C.R.S. 2020, which provides that a proceeding concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities may be commenced by a person other than a parent who has been allocated parental responsibilities through a juvenile court order.
¶ 11 Approximately two weeks after the court entered the APR order, the court entered an order terminating its jurisdiction and closing the case. Mother appealed from that order and the history of that appeal is discussed supra . Applying R.S. to mother's appeal, we reaffirm our prior holding that the APR order is the final, appealable order from which an appellant has twenty-one days to file a notice of appeal for the request to be timely.
¶ 12 Mother argues the APR order wasn't final and appealable for five reasons. First, she contends that the APR order can't be deemed a final, appealable order because the juvenile court didn't have jurisdiction under section 19-1-104(6), C.R.S. 2020. Second, she argues that the juvenile court didn't have jurisdiction to enter the APR order under section 19-4-130(1), C.R.S. 2020. Third, she argues that the APR order wasn't final or appealable because it didn't fully resolve M.A.M.’s paternity. Fourth, she argues that the APR order wasn't final because it was subject to revision. Fifth, she contends that the APR order wasn't final because when it was entered there were still other unresolved issues in the dependency and neglect proceeding.
¶ 13 Ordinarily, a final order or judgment, for purposes of appeal, is one that ends the action, leaving nothing further to be done to determine the parties’ rights. People in Interest of O.C. , 2012 COA 161, ¶ 8, 312 P.3d 226, aff'd , 2013 CO 56, 308 P.3d 1218.
¶ 14 Under section 19-1-109(1), C.R.S. 2020, of the Children's Code, "an appeal as provided in the introductory portion to section 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. [2020], may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment." Section 13-4-102(1) provides that the court of appeals may review the "final judgments" of district courts, including juvenile courts. In R.S. , the supreme court confirmed that "section 19-1-109(1) of the Colorado Children's Code authorizes appeals in dependency or neglect proceedings from ‘any order’ that qualifies as a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of section 13-4-102(1)." R.S. , ¶ 3.
¶ 15 Subsections 19-1-109(2)(b) and (2)(c) further authorize appeals of "order[s] terminating or refusing to terminate the legal relationship between a parent or parents and one or more of the children of such parent or parents on a petition, or between a child and one or both parents of the child," and "order[s] decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent ... after the entry of the disposition pursuant to section 19-3-508."
¶ 16 To determine "whether an order is final for purposes of appeal, we generally ask ‘whether the action of the court constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties in the action.’ " R.S. , ¶ 37 (quoting Cyr v. Dist. Ct. , 685 P.2d 769, 770 (Colo. 1984) ).
¶ 17 In R.S. , the supreme court construed subsections 19-1-109(2)(b) and (2)(c) in conjunction with subsection 19-1-109(1) as "authoriz[ing] appeals from certain additional orders beyond those authorized by subsection (1)." Id. at ¶ 19. That is, "subsection (1) codifies a general rule of finality, and subsection[s] (2)(b) and (2)(c) provide certain exceptions to that general rule by authorizing the appeal of certain orders from dependency or neglect proceedings that would not otherwise be considered final." Id. at ¶ 20.
¶ 18 Subsection 19-1-104(6) authorizes a juvenile court to enter an APR order for a child who is the subject of a dependency and neglect proceeding if requested to do so by a party to the case and if no child custody action concerning the same child is pending in a district court. Section 19-1-104(6) further provides that, following the entry of such an order, the court shall file a certified copy of the order in the county where the child permanently resides, and, thereafter, such order "shall be treated in the district court as any other decree issued in a proceeding concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities."
¶ 19 Thus, by entering an APR order as authorized by section 19-1-104(6) and ordering that a copy of the order be filed in the district court of the county where the child is to reside, the juvenile court ends the dependency and neglect...
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