People ex rel. McDonough v. Marshall Field & Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22144.,22144.
• Citation: 355 Ill. 633,189 N.E. 885
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. McDONOUGH, County Collector, v. MARSHALL FIELD & CO.

355 Ill. 633

189 N.E. 885

PEOPLE ex rel. McDONOUGH, County Collector,

v.MARSHALL FIELD & CO.

No. 22144.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 23, 1934.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 1934.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Joseph B. McDonough, County Collector, against Marshall Field & Co., which filed objections to judgment and order of sale of its property for taxes. Judgment for relator, and objector appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Cook County Court; Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge.

Wilson & McIlvaine, of Chicago (William B. Hale, Calvin F. Selfridge and Sidney K. Jackson, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell, Robert S. Cushman, Louis H. Geiman, and Jacob Shamberg, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

William H. Soxton, Corp. Counsel, and William L. Sullivan, both of Chicago, for City of Chicago, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

Marshall Field & Co., a corporation, filed objections in the county court of Cook county to judgment and order of sale of its property known as the Merchandise Mart for the taxes of 1930. The objections were overruled, and judgment was entered for the amount of the tax. The cause comes to this court by an appeal prosecuted by the objector, hereinafter referred to as appellant.

The real estate is situated in the city of Chicago on the north bank of the Chicago river. In March, 1929, appellant began the construction of a large building upon the premises for its wholesale business and for rental purposes. By April 1, 1930, the outer walls were completed, the roof was on, and the windows and sashes were installed. From photographs in evidence it has the outward appearance of a completed building. One tenant moved into the building in April. Appellant moved in on May 5, and twenty-two tenants paid rent for the month of May. The board of assessors assessed the premises as unimproved property. The full value was fixed at $2,306,319 and the assessed value at $853,339. No assessment was made on the building. The board of review made no change in the assessed value of the land, but added thereto the sum of $4,475,703 as the assessed value of the improvements, making the total assessment $5,329,042. The tax based upon this assessment was $305,572.29. Appellant paid $55,501.62 as the amount due under the valuation fixed by the board of assessors, and deposited the balance of the tax with the county treasurer. Judgment was entered for $321,117.76 for delinquent tax, penalties, interest, and costs.

The proceedings before the board of review to increase the assessment were initiated by a complaint filed July 30, 1931, signed ‘City of Chicago, Wm. H. Sexton, corporation counsel; Wm. L. Sullivan, assistant corporation counsel.’ It alleged that ‘improvements on this property were erroneously omitted from assessment by board of assessors. Building was under roof and substantially completed April 1, 1930.’ It further stated that the full, fair cash market value of the building on such date was $21,993,629. That amount had been actually expended in the construction of the building.

One of appellant's objections to the tax is that the board of review was without jurisdiction to increase the assessment. The contentions presented are that the city of Chicago had no power, under the law, to make the complaint; and, further, that the corporation counsel and his assistant acted without authority from the city, even if it did have power to complain.

The general rule is that cities may exercise only such power as are expressly delegated or necessary incidents of such powers. It is insisted that this rule forecloses cities of any right to question assessments on private property because no such powers are given them by the statute. Section 35 of the Revenue Act of 1898 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 120, § 314) was in force at the date the complaint herein was filed, and the requisites of the complaint must be tested by the statutes then in force and not by those subsequently enacted. That section provides: ‘On complaint in writing that any property described in such complaint is incorrectly assessed, the board shall review the assessment, and correct the same, as shall appear to be just.’ Under a similar provision of the Revenue Act of 1872, the city of East St. Louis, through its mayor, filed a complaint with the board of review that the property of the St. Louis Bridge Company was assessed too low. The board increased the assessment, and the taxpayer filed objections thereto in the county court of St. Clair county, where the objection to the increase was overruled. Upon appeal to this court (St. Louis Bridge Co. v. People, 128 Ill. 422, 21 N. E. 428, 429), we said: ‘It is also urged that the complaint as to the lowness of the assessment must be made to the board by a tax-payer, and that the city of East St. Louis, acting through its mayor, was not a tax-payer. We think the complaint was properly made by the city, as the latter was interested in the amount of the tax to be raised. Section 86 says that the assessment may be reviewed upon the application of ‘any person who shall complain,’ etc. Such application is not confined to tax-payers, by the terms of the section.' In the case at bar the city of Chicago had an interest in the assessment upon appellant's property, and under the provisions of the statute of 1898 we hold the city had a right to file the complaint. What we said in People v. Nixon, 353 Ill. 556, 187 N. E. 650, about the necessity of the complaint being filed by a taxpayer is based upon statutory enactments since 1931.

The original objections filed July 20, 1932, did not question the power of the city to make the complaint or the authority of the corporation counsel to act in behalf of the city. After the hearing in the county court on the merits, and after the court had entered an order overruling the objections, appellant filed additional objections, by which for the first time it urged that the city and its corporation counsel were not authorized to file the complaint. The objection was dilatory in its nature, and should have been made at the first opportunity. Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265, 4 N. E. 783.

Appellant also contends that the assessment was illegal because the complaint did not state the fair cash market value of the real property, including the improvements; that there was no minute of the decision of the board of review, with reasons therefor, entered in any record of the proceedings; that no such notation was made on the complaint in the space provided for that purpose; that the assessor's card contains no definite...