People ex rel. Mulford v. Turner

• Decision Date: 01 June 1850
• Citation: 1 Cal. 143
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, EX REL. MULFORD ET AL. v. TURNER, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District.
• Court: California Supreme Court

1 Cal. 143

THE PEOPLE, EX REL. MULFORD ET AL. v. TURNER, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District.

Supreme Court of the State of California

June Term, 1850

June 1, 1850

THIS was an application for a writ of mandamus to the District Judge of the Eighth Judicial District, to command him to vacate an order striking the names of the relators from the roll of the Court as attorneys. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Stephen J. Field, on the part of the Relators.

By the Court, BENNETT, J. Application for a writ of mandamus. At a term of the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, held in and for the County of Yuba, on the tenth day of June last, the following order was made: "Whereas, Messrs. Field, Goodwin and Mulford, having set at defiance the authority of this Court, and having vilified the Court, and denounced its proceedings, the said Field, Goodwin and Mulford are hereby, by order of the Court, expelled from the bar of the same."

An application is now made for a writ of mandamus to require the Court to vacate the above order, and reinstate the applicants. Copies of the papers upon which the motion is founded, together with notice of the motion, have been duly served upon the Judge of the Eighth Judicial District.

Two questions are presented by this application: First, Has this Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus to the District Court? and, secondly, Whether, conceding the existence of the power, the case presented is a proper one for its exercise?

First, as to the power. The seventh section of the Act organizing this Court, declares that "the Court, and each of the Justices thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, of mandamus, of injunction, certiorari, supersedeas, and such other writs and process known to the law, as may be necessary in the exercise of their jurisdiction." This section containing an express delegation of power to issue the writ of mandamus, there can be no question that, so far as statutory authority is concerned, the power resides in the Court, to issue such writs in all cases in which they may appear to form the appropriate remedy. The only doubt which can be entertained upon the subject, arises under the Constitution which creates the Court, and from which all its powers must be derived.

The first section of article six of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the State in the Supreme Court, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Justices of the Peace, and in such municipal and other inferior Courts as the Legislature may deem necessary. Section four of the same article is in the following words: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars, when the legality of any tax, toll, or impost, or municipal fine is in question, and in all criminal case amounting to felony or questions of law alone. And the said Court, and each of the Justices thereof, as well as all District and County Judges, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus at the instance of any person held in actual custody. They shall also have power to issue all other writs and process necessary to the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, and shall be conservators of the peace throughout the State." The subsequent sections of the same article confer upon the District Courts and the County Courts "original jurisdiction" in law and equity, in all civil cases, and in all criminal cases not otherwise provided for. From the section of the Constitution above quoted, in connection with the context, it appears entirely clear, that with the single exception of proceedings upon writs of habeas corpus, this Court has no original jurisdiction, and that the Legislature can confer upon it none. It is strictly a revisory tribunal: its jurisdiction is, with the exception above mentioned, exclusively appellate; and in the exercise of that appellate jurisdiction, and of that alone, can it issue such writs and process as may be necessary to render such jurisdiction effectual.

What, then, is the extent of that appellate jurisdiction? In the determination of this question we are fortunate in being furnished with a sure guide by the decisions of the highest tribunal of our country in their interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. The judicial power of the United States is vested, by the Constitution, in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish; and it extends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, Treaties, and Laws of the United States, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to a variety of other cases particularly enumerated. It is then declared, by the second section of the third article of the Constitution of the United States, that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall make." It is thus perceived that, by the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court is vested, in some cases, with original, in others, with appellate jurisdiction; as, by the Constitution of California, this Court has, in one class of cases, original, and in other cases, appellate jurisdiction. The distinction between these different species of jurisdiction, taken in the one instrument, is substantially the same as the like distinction made by the other; the language used to express this distinction is strongly analogous in both; and, thus, the judicial interpretation of this portion of the Constitution of the United States may be safely relied upon in giving construction to the Constitution of our own State.

The leading case in which the section above referred to, of the Constitution of the United States, came up before the Supreme Court, is that of Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137). It was there declared to be an essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises proceedings already instituted, and does not institute them; and that to enable the Court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or be necessary to enable the Court to exercise such jurisdiction; and it was held, in pursuance of these principles, that though the Court might, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, issue a mandamus to other Courts, yet to issue such writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, such as a commission, would be, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore belonged not to appellate, but to original jurisdiction; and that, consequently, the authority given by the 13th section of the Judiciary Act...