People ex rel. Murray v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 08 April 1921
• Docket Number: No. 13754.,13754.
• Citation: 130 N.E. 366,297 Ill. 199
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MURRAY, County Collector, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

297 Ill. 199

130 N.E. 366

PEOPLE ex rel. MURRAY, County Collector,

v.CITY OF ST. LOUIS.

No. 13754.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 15, 1921.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1921.

Application by the People, on the relation of M. P. Murray, County Collector, for a judgment of sale for taxes, opposed by the City of St. Louis. From judgment for relator the objector appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from St. Clair County Court; Joseph B. Messick, Judge.

Charles H. Daues, of St. Louis, Mo., and Kramer, Kramer & Campbell, of East St. Louis, for appellant.

Hubert E. Schaumleffel, State's Atty., of Belleville (H. L. Browning and A. B. Davis, both of East St. Louis, of counsel) for appellee.

CARTER, J.

The material facts in this case are substantially the same as those in People v. City of St. Louis, 291 Ill. 600, 126 N. E. 529, and have to do here, as there, with the application of the county collector of St. Clair county, Ill., in the name of the people of the state, for a judgment of sale for taxes levied by the authorities of that county against the portion of the Municipal Free Bridge of the city of St. Louis situated in St. Clair county. The facts as to the location of this bridge and the levying of the taxes on the portion of such bridge are set out at length in the former opinion, and need not be restated in detail here. The only difference in the two cases is that this concerns the taxes levied for 1919, while that had reference to the taxes for 1918.

Other questions are raised here than were raised in the former case. The one to be met at the threshold is the objection here raised that the county court improperly denied appellant's petition for a removal of this cause to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Illinois, alleging diverse citizenship of the parties to the proceeding. Appellee's demurrer to this petition was sustained. Appellant contends here, as it did in its petition for removal, that the controversy is between citizens of different states with a sufficient jurisdictional amount involved, and that therefore it should have been removed, on the application of appellant, to the federal District Court. U. S. Comp. Stat. chap. 3, § 1010. Undoubtedly, under this section of the statute conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, the party desiring removal is entitled to it on a proper showing, in order to prevent unseemly conflict between the courts. If there appeared to be any question as to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, in our judgment it would be the proper and better practice for the state courts to withhold the exercise of jurisdiction untilthe question had been passed upon by the federal courts. The conflict of jurisdiction in such cases should be avoided, if possible. In such questions there should not be a divided jurisdiction. ‘It must rest with one court alone, and that, in our opinion, is more properly the circuit court.’ Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Co. v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513, 7 Sup. Ct. 1262, 30 L. Ed. 1159. Under this statute, however, in a matter of this kind, in a controversy between a state and a citizen of another state, the federal court does not acquire jurisdiction to compel removal from the state court to the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship, for, as that statute has been construed by the highest courts of the country, a state is not a citizen. Title Guaranty Co. v. Allen, 240 U. S. 136, 36 Sup. Ct. 345, 60 L. Ed. 566;Postal Telegraph Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482, and cases cited: Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 251 Fed. 279, 163 C. C. A. 435. In discussing a similar question as to the jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court when a state was a party to the litigation, it was said in VirginiaCoupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, on page 296, 5 Sup. Ct. 903, on page 917 (29 L. Ed. 185):

‘A case which belongs to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, on account of the interest that a state has in the controversy, must be a case in which a state is either nominally or substantially the party. It is not sufficient that a state may be consequentially affected.’

Counsel for appellant argue that the state of Illinois is not really a party in this proceeding; that the real party is the county treasurer of St. Clair county. Section 191 of the Illinois Revenue Law (Hurd's Stat. 1919, p. 2501) provides that a judgment obtained in such a proceeding as this shall be entered against the land of the owner in favor of the people of the state of Illinois; and section 203 of the same act, as to forfeiture for the nonpayment of taxes, provides that such forfeiture shall be to the state of Illinois. Under these statutes, as under the reasoning of the court in City of Nashville v. Weiser, 54 Ill. 245, and Madison County v. Smith, 95 Ill. 328, the conclusion seems necessarilyto follow that the state of Illinois is both the nominal and the real and substantial party to this proceeding.

In Postal Telegraph Co. v. Alabama, supra, a suit was brought in Alabama to recover taxes and penalties imposed by its own revenue laws, and it was held that the jurisdiction over the case belonged to its own tribunals, except so far as Congress, in order to secure the supremacy of the national Constitution and laws, has provided for a removal into the courts of the United States. As already stated, the cause under this statute was held not removable to the United States court. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, supra, concerned a suit for certain taxes imposed under the laws of Nebraska, and it was...