People ex rel. Orcutt v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver
| Decision Date | 21 October 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 23448,23448 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado ex rel. John P. ORCUTT, Commissioner of Agriculture for the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, The Honorable Edward J. Keating, District Judge, Shoenberg Farms, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Rocky Mountain Dairy Products, Inc., a Colorado corporation, and Edward P. Tepper,Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Russell P. Kramer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Creamer & Creamer, George Creamer, Ronald Zall, Denver, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding. The question to be determined is: Whether the district court had jurisdiction under R.C.P.Colo. 106 to prohibit the Commissioner of Agriculture from conducting an administrative hearing authorized by pertinent statutes commonly referred to as the Agricultural Marketing Act. We answer the question in the negative.
Shoenberg Farms, Inc., Rocky Mountain Dairy Products, Inc. and Edward P. Tepper, President and principal officer of the two corporations, to whom we will refer as the respondents, obtained a writ of prohibition from the Denver district court to stop a scheduled hearing involving respondents' refusal to comply with certain milk marketing orders issued by the Commissioner. The district court's Ex parte order commanded the Commissioner to show cause why the proceedings pending before him should not be dismissed and why he should not be prohibited from further proceedings. The Commissioner was also ordered to certify the record before him to the district court.
Alleging that the district court is without jurisdiction to interfere with the Commissioner in the exercise of his statutory duties in conducting hearings on complaints filed before him, the Commissioner sought a writ of prohibition out of this court commanding the district court and the respondents to show cause why the district court should not be prohibited from staying the scheduled proceedings before the Commissioner. The writ was issued, to which the district court and the respondents have replied, and the matter is now at issue.
C.R.S.1963, 7--3--16, and C.R.S.1963, 7--3--19, confer upon the Commissioner the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the Agricultural Marketing Act and marketing orders issued thereunder, and authorize the Commissioner to hold hearings and seek judicial enforcement of his orders. The Commissioner issued and made effective October 3, 1963 a milk marketing order bearing Docket No. A 20, which was amended and reissued on August 18, 1965. This marketing order provided in part that the cost of administration and operation of the order would be financed by assessments to handlers of milk and milk products on a pro rata basis predicated upon the quantity of milk or milk products utilized by each of such handlers.
The corporate respondents refused to pay any assessments and failed to furnish required information so that the specific amounts of the assessment owed by them could be determined. The Milk Administrative Committee, created by the marketing order, filed a verified complaint with the Commissioner to such effect. The Commissioner, upon receipt of the complaint, scheduled a hearing for January 26, 1968, to consider the matters set forth in the complaint. The corporate respondents appeared and filed a 'Special Appearance and objection to Jurisdiction' and a 'Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum.' The Commissioner found the objections to be without merit and denied them. The district court action challenged here then followed.
The complete answer to the question in this proceeding is to be found in Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502. That case involved an original proceeding in the nature of prohibition to restrain the trial court from interfering with the State Board of Medical Examiners in the exercise of its statutory functions in examining certain complaints made against a doctor.
In that case we held that the interference by the district court constituted 'direct and unjustified judicial interference with a function properly delegated to the Executive...
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