People ex rel. Rice v. Wilson Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23359.,23359.
• Citation: 4 N.E.2d 847,364 Ill. 406
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. RICE, Director of Flnance, v. WILSON OIL CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

364 Ill. 406

4 N.E.2d 847

PEOPLE ex rel. RICE, Director of Flnance,

v.WILSON OIL CO. et al.

No. 23359.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 14, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1936.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Joseph Burke, Judge.

Suit by the People, on the relation of Joseph J. Rice, Director of Finance, against the Wilson Oil Company and the Alliance Casualty Company. The suit was dismissed as to first named defendant and a judgment was entered against last named defendant, and the last named defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Wendell H. Shanner, of Chicago (Charles Laughlin, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen. (Earl B. Dickerson, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

STONE, Justice.

Appellant seeks to reverse a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county against it for $2,000, the penalty on a bond executed by it as surety for the Wilson Oil Company, a corporation, executed under the provisions of section 3 of the Motor Fuel Tax Law of 1929, as amended (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 120, § 419). The appeal is direct, as a constitutional question is raised.

The Wilson Oil Company, a corporation of Illinois, on or about August 10, 1931, made an application to the Department of Finance of the State of Illinois is accordance with the provisions of the Motor Fuel Tax Law of 1929, as amended in 1931 (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 120, § 419, Cahill's Stat. 1933, c. 95a, par. 81) for a license as a distributor of motor fuel, and, complying with section 3 of said law and the ruling of the department, delivered a surety bond executed by appellant in the sum of $2,000, which, among other things, provided that, if the Wilson Oil Company, principal, as licensee, engaged in the business as a distributor of motor fuel, should pay the State of Illinois all moneys becoming due the State under the provisions of the Motor Fuel Tax Law by reason of the sale or use of motor fuel by said principal, together with all penalties and interest accruing thereon, then the obligation of the bond shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. A license was duly issued to the Wilson Oil Company, and, while the bond was in full force, it became indebted to the State of Illinois for motor fuel taxes collected under said act in the sum of $17,969.15, and upon its failure to pay said indebtedness appellee brought suit against the Wilson Oil Company and appellant to recover the $2,000 penalty on said bond. Appellant defended on the ground that section 3 of said act as amended in 1931 is unconstitutional, and therefore action on the bond cannot be maintained. The trial court dismissed the suit as to the oil company and entered judgment against appellant in the sum of $2,000.

On this review two principal questions are presented: First, the validity of section 3 of the Motor Fuel Tax Law of 1929 as amended in 1931, and, second, assuming the act to be invalid, is appellant estopped from setting up the invalidity of the bond?

The grounds of the claimed invalidity of section 3 of the Motor Fuel Tax Law as amended in 1931 are that it does not provide sufficient standards to guide the Department of Finance in fixing the penalty of the bond required of a distributor of motor fuel; that the phrase ‘amount of business reasonably expected’ is not a sufficiently definite standard to guide the Department of Finance in fixing the penalty on the bond, but requires the Department of Finance to guess, conjecture, and speculate concerning future events; and that the Department of Finance need only ‘take into consideration,’ but is not compelled to act upon, its or another's expectation of the amount of business reasonably expected in fixing the amount of the bond, and so the act was incomplete when it left the Legislature, resulting in a delegation of legislative power to an administrative department or officer.

Section 3, after providing for the application for and issuance of a license to act as a distributor of motor fuels, also requires that ‘the applicant shall also file with the department a bond in an amount not to exceed $5,000 on a form to be approved by and with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the department conditioned upon said applicant paying to the State of Illinois all moneys becoming due by reason of the sale or use of motor fuel by the applicant, together with all penalties and interest thereon. The department shall fix the penalty of such bond in each case taking into consideration the amount of business reasonably expected to be handled by him [the applicant], and the penalty fixed by the department shall be such, as in its opinion, will protect the State of Illinois against failure to pay the amount hereinafter provided on motor fuel sold and used.’

In determining the constitutionality of section 3 complained of, it is necessary to consider the entire act to arrive at the legislative intent. All its sections are to be construed together in the light of the general purpose and plan as therein expressed. Burns v. Industrial Comm., 356 Ill. 602, 191 N.E. 225. The evil to be remedied and the object to be attained must also be considered. Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill. 515, 198 N.E. 341, 102 A.L.R. 561. It is a familiar rule that all doubt and uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the section should be resolved in favor of its validity, and, if two constructions of the act are equally available, one of which renders it void and the other valid, the latter construction will be adopted. Great United Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Palmer, 358 Ill. 276, 193 N.E. 146;People v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 289, 189 N.E. 338;People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N.E. 784;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865,123 Am.St.Rep. 822,14 Ann.Cas. 994.

In considering whether section 3 was complete when it left the Legislature or incomplete, resulting in the delegation of legislative power, the test is whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one reading it to know his rights and obligations. Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485, 99 A.L.R. 607. If section 3 delegates to the Department of Finance power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, it violates article 3 of the Constitution. If, on the other hand, it but confers authority or discretion on that department, to be exercised under the limits of the act, as to its execution, it is valid. Sutherland on Stat.Const. § 68; Klafter v. Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193,46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann.Cas.1914B, 1221;People v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co., 232 Ill. 292, 83 N.E. 839;Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N.E. 718.

The General Assembly cannot deal with the details of each particular case that may arise in the administration of an act, but must necessarily leave such to the reasonable discretion of administrative officers, and the exercise of such discretion does not constitute the exercise of legislative power. Italia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N.E. 198;Board of Education v. Board of Education, 314 Ill....